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Exploring the Formation of Digital Therapeutics 
Margaret Martin 
Abstract 
Purpose: This critical ethnographic study explores regulatory, social, and commercial spheres of 
behavioral health innovation in the United States through the lens of a burgeoning employment 
sector: digital therapeutics. By examining ways that digital therapeutics are being defined and 
operationalized in connection with shifting policies to evaluate digital health, this study draws on 
collected data to examine evolving conceptions of evidence, access, and public benefit 
happening in the name of health innovation.  
Background: Pursuant to the 2016 passage of the 21st Century Cures Act, The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration is actively revamping its evaluation frameworks for digital health products. 
Policies to appropriately regulate software as a medical device (SaMD) are in development to 
review whole company characteristics rather than individual product efficacy, address the 
iterative nature of software product development cycles, and empower commercial actors to 
provide their own effectiveness analytics for post-market assessment purposes.  
Methods: A qualitative approach was used drawing on multiple data sources for this project. 
These sources included: collected documents (n=25), in-depth individual interviews with 
stakeholders working on or with knowledge of digital therapeutic products across professional 
areas including engineering, clinical science, regulatory science, executive leadership, academia, 
and financial services (n=41), and ethnographic observations (n=75 hours) taking place at two 
digital therapeutic conferences, technology sector worksites, interview locations, and an FDA 
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workshop. Data were transcribed, thematically coded, and analyzed using a qualitative software 
program, Dedoose.  
Results: Digital therapeutics are being defined and operationalized in connection with the 
digitization of behavioral health. This shift entails a connected commercialization of behavioral 
science interventions. In an environment where standards to guide product development are 
unclear, regulatory expertise is heightened as an asset for which companies compete. The FDA’s 
evolving regulatory schema advantages commercial actors with more resources, which may 
impact the types of organizations from which innovative and FDA approved digital health 
products originate.  
Digital therapeutics advance conceptions of health that center the optimization of 
individual selfhood through processes that seek to “purify” interventions. These “purified” 
interventions, often digitized therapeutic encounters, eliminate interference and variation by 
human actors in the name of improving biomedical intervention standards. Commercial promises 
to increase digital access to care ignore varying ways that access is invoked through product 
creation, including the possibility that digital therapeutics may hinder in-person access to 
therapeutic relationships and contribute to stratifying occupational dynamics with implications 
for health equity. 
Conclusion: This study highlights ways that scientific evidence is being reshaped in the 
commercialization of behavioral health, in addition to the co-production of digitization and 
commercialization as stratifying processes. Findings shed light on the need to assess evidence 
production within emergent health technology production more closely. Ethical guidelines to 
define and center equity should be incorporated into digital health implementation strategies and 
are of considerable importance to the domains of regulatory and translational science. 
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Introduction 
 
In November 2017, the New York Times released a news article entitled “First Digital 
Pill Approved to Worries about Big Brother.” The piece garnered 152 comments and was widely 
circulated, pointing to ethical questions associated with MyCite, an ingestible sensor produced 
by a company called Proteus Digital Health, used to track medication compliance in people 
living with Schizophrenia and Bipolar I disorder (Belluck, 2017; Proteus Digital Health Website, 
2017). Recently approved for sale by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), it was 
deemed safe enough to market, but the jury was out as to whether it was effective. A few months 
later, in May 2018, another New York Times article featured a start-up company named Pear 
Therapeutics in a piece discussing ReSet™, the newly approved digital therapy used to treat 
opioid use addiction through cognitive behavioral programs delivered on your iPhone. The 
article prominently featured the company’s MD/venture capitalist founder, Corey Mann, and 
mentioned the $500 million fundraise, to date (Singer, 2018).  
Digital therapeutics, as they were called in the news, popped up in public news outlets in 
2017 as the next important wave of health technology innovations, leveraging artificial 
intelligence and occupying a middle ground between pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices. 
Ostensibly more rigorously validated than general digital health products, many of their makers 
were partnering with traditional pharmaceutical firms to develop novel addenda and substitutes 
for existing therapies. Their hype dovetailed with both a flurry of venture capital dollars into 
artificial intelligence for health care (a figure estimated at $4 billion during the 2019 year alone) 
as well as congressional approval for the 21st Century Cures Act, a public law designed to 
expedite availability of novel drugs and devices (Landi, 2019; H.R.34, 114th Cong., 2016.)  
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As President Barack Obama left office, both fiscal and regulatory incentives were set to 
create a new market for novel healthcare gadgets. Remarkable in light of the polarized political 
climate of the time, the 21st Century Cures Act was shepherded in with ubiquitous bi-partisan 
support on November 16, 2016 and included urgent language to allocate $6.2 Billion in funding 
to expedite “21st century cures” to patients (Lupkin, 2016; Mendoza, 2017).  
Following an influx of funding from public and private sources after passage of the 21st 
Century Cures Act, federal agencies like the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
which benefitted from the boost in dollars, still had to figure out how to actually allocate the 
funds. Tasked with the job of revitalizing their approach to evaluating digital health, FDA’s 
Center for Radiologic and Digital Health went to work crafting early risk-based guidance, hiring 
artificial intelligence experts, and seeking public input (Kesselheim and Hwang, 2016). Largely 
built with hardware devices in mind, neither their timelines for approving digital health products, 
nor their expertise in algorithmic evaluation was concurrent with 21st century software 
capabilities (Gottlieb, 2017). It was time for them to revamp their frameworks and the looming 
question was how to do this while assuring  the safety and efficacy of the products they were 
tasked with reviewing. 
Currently, FDA has no specific framework for evaluating digital therapeutics as 
differentiated from other types of digital health technologies, but policies to appropriately 
regulate the more general product area termed “software as a medical device (SaMD), are in 
development (FDA Precertification Pilot Program, 2017; Wechsler; 2017). FDA’s goals are to 
envision a regulatory pathway that lifts barriers to market for SaMD devices—serving as an 
incentive for technological innovation— while protecting the public from risks. The current 
method for categorizing low-risk SaMD leaves significant grey area among products, including 
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many classified as “digital therapeutics” which do not fit squarely within a specific risk category 
as determined by FDA. These loopholes leave considerable space for companies developing 
novel products to shape the regulatory environment overseeing them.  
This dissertation was foregrounded by almost two years of work within a startup 
company environment attempting to build a caregiver navigation app. The work experience was 
a dramatic shift for me personally; prior to joining this startup group, I had worked as a public 
health nurse solely in community settings. Acknowledging the frustration that often accompanies 
community-level work, I was motivated by the exuberance of this startup group to create a 
product that would make resources more accessible to patients. Its partnership with a notable 
healthcare institution seemed to elevate the group’s credibility in my mind, and to some degree, I 
drank the startup Kool-aid. I was eager to contribute to a rising tide of innovations aimed at 
improving health, and also deeply curious about the nature of work within “tech” environments.   
Our company was building an application to assist caregivers of people living with chronic 
disease and my mandate was both to work with patients through our application, as well as to set 
up pilot programs within health institutions to trial the product.  
What commenced in my job change was a dizzying 18 months working out of a venture 
capitalist’s garage in Palo Alto, where the boss of the show hosted midday poker tournaments 
from a glass room with floor-to-ceiling curtains in the middle of our office space. We were a 
congenial bunch of 12 that grew to 29, walking to lunch together most days, always finding time 
to ham it up over HipChat. In truth I was usually about 30 seconds behind the joke punchlines, if 
I caught them at all, and spent the first several days completely bewildered both by how to send a 
GIF as well as by the sheer magnitude of them coming across our group chat window. I was 
trying hard to get used to what it felt like to sit and stand in front of a computer screen all day 
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long matching the friendly, easygoing demeanor of my colleagues. And I was in the midst of 
packaging my clinical experience into a systematic approach for working with people, one that 
involved x and y axes, inputs and outputs. Our founder asked me to prioritize the development of 
our “caregiver journey,” to map on a timeline all the experiences someone would go through 
both in living with a chronic disease, as well as in caring for a person living with chronic disease. 
Once we had this information perfectly arranged, we would map service offerings onto these 
experiences, and define the things that our team of assistants would do to be helpful to customers 
of our service.  
With candor, I recall our user-experience expert emphasizing how crucial the 
development of these services were, joking that, “No one is going to pay us to call them and say, 
‘Hey, I’m thinking about you!’” While we all laughed in agreement, I was the only employee 
who had previously worked with patients and felt embarrassed by remembering the number of 
times I had done just that very thing as a nurse. In my experience working with families caring 
for someone nearing the end of life, the simple statement had seemed at times to be the only 
thing I could offer, in addition to being an honest thing to say. Nevertheless, I recognized that 
this environment was different from healthcare settings I had worked in previously, and that our 
service was something people would need to find valuable enough to pay for -- so I kept my past 
employment blunders to myself and deferred to our user-experience expert, whom I trusted knew 
way more about marketable services than I did.  
As time wore on, it became clear that our start-up group was missing some special, 
crucial ingredient. Despite our CEO’s myriad conference appearances and pitches, despite the 
notable venture capital firms who’d come to meet with us, no one was willing to commit capital. 
Investors were concerned about our services’ lack of “scalability,” which made good sense at the 
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time since at that point our services were largely oriented around filing insurance claims and 
following up on outstanding or equivocal medical bills – tasks so far from standardizable that 
even as we completed them, we couldn’t explain how we had done so. Our successes seemed 
like random strokes of luck – getting the right call center employee on the phone, catching the 
right claims representative after a good lunch. We didn’t have a specific enough focus, and the 
pilot projects we had sourced with academic medical centers were taking too long to get up and 
running. What’s more, the conversations between our clinical partners and the investment 
personnel always seemed to reveal something of an impasse, or at least the extent to which no 
one understood the other person’s language. Our investors, early ex-Facebook billionaires, had 
gamed our position in the Apple App Store, prompting a bounty of videogame-playing teenagers 
to download our application and send in gratuitous photos of their genitalia. All the while, the 
real number of meaningful users on our service were few.  
These predicaments were as anxiety-provoking for our founders as they were fascinating 
to me. I wasn’t sitting in the hotseat with our clinical partners or our investors, so in most ways I 
bore no real consequence for the potential outcomes of this trouble, and was rather enjoying the 
bird’s eye view inside the ring. After a year and a half of these shenanigans, I was presented with 
the opportunity to start a Ph.D. where I could gain the skills to study these dynamics. I jumped 
ship. The company closed down a few months later, unable to raise the next round of financing it 
needed to grow and keep the lights on. Most of my former colleagues found positions at other 
start-ups, a couple left for medical school, and our founder took a break from working, recasting 
his twitter profile to be less about health care and more about the Boston Red Sox, at least for a 
short while, following the company’s close.  
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Fast-forwarding to 2020, several digital health companies that started at the same time as 
our group are now sitting on the precipice of an initial public offering, or company acquisition. 
The circumstances we encountered then were chalked up to the destinies of most start-ups: the 
wrong smattering of people, a product too early for the market. It was the nascent days of digital 
health.  
*       *      *    
 
This project, while the extension of a pilot study I conducted in 2016-2017 on 
stakeholder collaboration in digital health, is also the product of my own sense-making about 
what is happening at the border between technology companies and health care organizations. 
Findings from my earlier research pointed to a blurring of professional roles across institutions, 
and to an increasingly fluid employment environment where employees switch jobs frequently, 
and leverage discourses from both established health care institutions as well as technology firms 
in order to bolster start-up company legitimacy.  
Considering digital therapeutics was a way, in keeping with the call to “follow the 
money,”  to study healthcare industry formation. Even the notion that there are discrete industries 
for healthcare (notwithstanding controversy about referring to healthcare as an industry in and of 
itself) is a somewhat new phenomenon. Traditionally these industries are considered 
pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology (Grundy, 2018). More recently, “digital 
health” might be added to the group, particularly in light of software advances in the last decade 
(Sharon, 2016). Nevertheless, I chose digital therapeutics as a “category” because it presented 
the most pressing regulatory “blurriness.”  The area exhibited sufficient cohesiveness (e.g. 
industry conferences, visible companies, an established non-profit trade group) to render it 
 7 
visible enough for examination despite its invisibility as a defined category with attending 
regulatory framing by FDA. As I plowed further into the empirical literature on digital health 
technology, I also became more curious about the widespread assumption that digital access 
solves problems, or, put a different way, that framing “access” as a basic health problem 
appropriately characterizes the issues at stake.  
In crafting this project, I was especially interested in how people work together in the 
name of innovation, and for whom this collaboration matters. Health care innovation – the 
environments in which it is taking place, the resources allocated to its promise, the mission-
specific glue affiliating its proponents across institutions – is redefining the way we think about 
care problems within and across health systems. Studying digital therapeutics, a nascent area of 
digital health, was an opportunity to examine how early industry activity takes place across 
regulatory, commercial, ethical, and social arenas in the name of advancing 21st century cures. I 
chose to focus on the creation rather than uptake of these inventions as a way to examine how 
sociocultural elements of a burgeoning workforce become built into physical “things,” and how 
stakeholders work together in absence of regulatory guidance to bring them into existence. While 
my data are specific to digital therapeutic product creation, they speak to larger trends across 
other new labor arenas and beckon further qualitative analysis on the ethical and social 
dimensions of technology production more generally. 
Review of the Literature 
 
Digital health product development, including the social processes and federal policies 
that inform which types of products and product models are built and deployed within health 
systems, is understudied. To date, there is no research on technology production practices for 
health, and quantitative methods routinely employed in health services research are poorly suited 
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for characterizing sociocultural aspects of organizational activity in emergent and novel 
situations. Research on existing digital products for human health tends to focus on clinical 
contexts, stressing the advances that machine learning can make in efficiency, quality, and safety 
(Faggella, 2018 and Jiang et al., 2017). 
The study of digital health production – how product prototypes originate, how resources 
are allocated to build them, the motivations of their crafting, and the social, cultural, and 
financial arrangements girding their creation – is virtually non-existent both because of the 
perceived difficulty of obtaining entrée to private company employees, as well as a current focus 
on implementation science that shapes the public fundability of research proposals. The 
qualitative expertise necessary for analyzing these arrangements is scarce within many health 
research institutions. Further, the pace in which technology propels advances and new research-
worthy social phenomena is hard to match with federally-supported grants requiring long 
timelines for funding through to dissemination of results. Nevertheless, there is growing interest 
in examining these topics from the standpoint of resource allocation and the equitable provision 
of care. Calls for work that can investigate the “datafication of health” have begun to surface 
both in social science arenas, as well as in clinical care contexts where the public interest is at 
stake (Ruckenstein, et al., 2017; Milstein, 2020). 
This research engages questions crossing several areas of scholarship including bioethics, 
biomedicalization, and science and technology studies. A common thread knitting the areas 
together, one that became more evident with the hindsight of data gathered for this project, is the 
notion of health equity. If digital therapeutic products are better appreciated as originating from a 
complex set of social arrangements, it is possible to identify and examine upstream aspects of 
their structural development that impact care provision.  
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As empirical work, this project aims to fill a gap in public knowledge about how digital 
products for health are originating, and what sorts of processes underlie their creation. 
Significant aspects of my research deal with the policy context in which digital therapeutics are 
being built, and how regulatory and commercial activities take place in tandem. In order to 
provide some background that contextualizes the policy environment, I will provide a brief 
history leading up to the passage of the 21st Century Cures Act and then discuss the connected 
areas of scholarship to which this research contributes. 
A Brief Digital Health Policy History 
 While “health IT” and “med tech” are terms that have been around for several decades to 
describe the industry spaces supporting technology development for health care, the advent of 
the smart phone ushered “digital health” into vernacular language. The United States’ Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) defines digital health as an umbrella term that, “includes categories 
such as mobile health (mhealth), health information technology (IT), wearable devices, 
telehealth, and precision medicine (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017a).” What is 
distinctive about these technologies in comparison to the health tech of yore is that they: 1) often 
include a significant software component, if not existing solely as a software technology 2) are 
often designed for patient use rather than health systems and 3) do not confine use to the 
boundaries of the clinic setting. Additionally, a very blurry regulatory landscape has developed 
in response to these technological evolutions. Where once a medical device was something either 
embedded in the body or not, distinct from a pharmaceutical drug, and/or existed as a clear 
hardware product with a specific use-case, pharmacologic products now contain ingestible 
sensors and software that resides in the body, while also monitoring it. The FDA has stretched to 
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develop regulatory processes capable of assessing risk and efficacy alongside rapidly evolving 
technological capabilities.  
 Alongside the formation of a new industry space, and outside the FDA clearinghouse, 
health institutions have shifted to computerized health records during the last decade. The newly 
amassed “big data” contained within electronic health records (EHRs) has transformed health 
system problems into challenges mirroring those found in other industries striving to optimize 
the efficient flow of information from one place to another. The piece of legislation that enabled 
this shift was passed in 2009, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) Act. Since then, two other policy pieces, the Precision Medicine Initiative 
(PMI), and The 21st Century Cures Act have also been enacted, and each has influenced the 
development of Digital Health as a field.  
The HITECH Act 
 The piece of health care legislation responsible for bringing about the “big data 
revolution” in health care is the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) act of 2009. This piece of federal legislation was signed into law as part of 
Obama’s stimulus package in the wake of the 2007 economic recession (H.R.1, 111th Cong., 
2009). The bill, part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, allocated approximately 
$19 billion to be given to health systems in order to incent health systems to make a final 
transition from paper to electronic health records (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2017). The act “provid[ed] HHS with the authority to establish programs to improve health care 
quality, safety, and efficiency through the promotion of health IT, including electronic health 
records and private and secure electronic health information exchange (U.S. Government, 
2017).” Apart from any analysis regarding the effectiveness of this piece of legislation eight 
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years later, the technology intended to solve for a trifecta of quality, safety, and efficiency. The 
transition from paper to software meant that throughout the U.S., a giant sea of structured 
medical information was amassing, a data source which promised new knowledge about treating 
patients and curing disease– aims also leveraged by the Precision Medicine Initiative and its 
prioritization of individualized care.  
 While efficiency has ostensibly increased by having more organized and accessible 
patient information stored in computers, this machine-enabled management of health information 
has been fraught with interoperability issues. A surge of structured and institutionalized medical 
data accumulation within health institutions ensued, enabled by software packages that were not 
universally implemented and compatible across practice and institutional domains. Meanwhile, a 
separate ocean of personal health data has formed outside of the clinical domain, enabled by 
consumer technology advances in the form of mobile-based applications, trackers, and self-
monitoring devices for consumer health. Much of these data are housed within private 
technology companies that have built the machines to collect it. Little is known about the 
practices and policies within these institutions, a gap which has informed digital health 
evaluation research on the trustworthiness of the information they collect (Sbaffi & Rowley, 
2017). Several questions arising from new practices pertaining to the meeting points between 
digital health and the provisioning of health care are: Where is the line between health and 
illness, between clinical information and personal health information and who gets to decide? 
How are clinicians supposed to respond to patient-generated data? What responsibility do private 
companies bear for the reliability of the data their technologies gather? Each of these questions, 
and many more, are further implicated in the aims of the Precision Medicine Initiative. 
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The Precision Medicine Initiative 
 In 2015, President Obama called for the PMI to “enable a new era of medicine through 
research, technology, and policies that empower patients, researchers, and providers to work 
together toward development of individualized care” (Precision Medicine Initiative, 2015). On 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) website, the Precision Medicine Initiative describes its 
goal as one in which treatments can be personally tailored to individuals on the basis of their 
own unique set of genomic characteristics (National Institutes of Health, 2018). 
Pharmacogenomics, as it is characterized, promises to impact care across a wide range of 
conditions including diabetes, cardiac disease, and cancer (Pereira, 2011; Dawed, 2016; 
Rodriguez-Antona & Taron, 2015). To date, many progressive health systems are in the midst of 
figuring out how to implement pharmacogenomics information into models of care, as well as 
genomics education for clinicians in training, all in in keeping with the mission of the Precision 
Medicine Initiative (Carabello et al., 2017; Flowers et al., 2019).   
In addition to pharmacogenomics goals, in conjunction with PMI, the National Institutes 
of Health spearheaded the All of Us research program as an effort to gather personal health data 
from 1,000,000 or more people in order to develop better tailored treatments, earmarking 
approximately $55 Million to further its goals. In October 2017, a video series was released 
describing the potential benefits of research enabled by data from electronic health records 
(National institutes of Health, 2016). The All of Us campaign is described as a collaborative 
effort between industry and academic partners across the United States, working together to 
usher in the best, most innovative treatments. The program presents a platform for researchers 
and an intention to leverage the best technologies for human health, working across institutional 
lines in order to do so (Bresnick, 2017).  
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Whereas the HITECH act made big data gathering possible within health care 
environments, the Precision Medicine Initiative extends its goals in aspiring to use this health 
data to improve treatment outcomes. While it is clear through the PMI’s mission statement that a 
new era of technology-enabled health care is on the horizon – bolstered by academic, health 
system, government, and industry alignment – the practices of various collaborating industry 
partners building the “platforms” for digitized information remain basically opaque.  These 
production practices – specifically for medical device creation – have been encouraged by a final 
piece of digital health production legislation, the 21st Century Cures Act, passed in December 
2016.   
The 21st Century Cures Act 
The 21st Century Cures Act, which has both pharmaceutical and medical device 
stipulations, has helped usher forward a restructuring of the FDA’s safety and efficacy evaluation 
processes, de-emphasizing pre-market approval and focusing heavily on post-market assessment 
using real-world data. One of the most significant aspects of the bill with regard to digital health 
production is that it exempts many forms of software from FDA approval, including software for 
clinical decision support, electronic health record, administrative, and lifestyle purposes (H.R.34, 
114th Cong., 2016). Since December 2016, the FDA has been in the midst of restructuring its 
approach to evaluating digital health technologies in order to better clarify guidelines for 
developers. In the summer of 2017, the Centers for Devices and Radiologic Health (CDRH), the 
FDA unit charged with overseeing digital health technology, published a Digital Health 
Innovation Action Plan in order to 1) Clarify the new act’s guidelines for designating software as 
a medical device and 2) Launch a precertification pilot with 9 companies in order to draft new 
digital health technology oversight. The pilot was conceived in part to move the FDA away from 
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reviewing medical device products on a case-by-case basis, and move the agency toward 
streamlining products through an approval process based on the extent to which a company is 
known as having a “culture of quality and excellence” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
2017b). As Bakul Patel was quoted during a public webinar on the precertification pilot, “The 
goal for having…a culture of quality and organization excellence is to have an ability to get a 
software as medical device to market faster.” He continued: “Traditional implementation of the 
premarket requirements may impede or delay patient access to critical evolutions of software 
technology, particularly those presenting a lower risk to patients” (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2017c).  
Analysis of the Bill: Repercussions for Digital Health Labor Space 
Federal initiatives like Obama’s 2016 National Artificial Intelligence Research and 
Development Strategic Plan aim to create legislative pathways for boosting the economy and 
keeping pace with international technology innovation. It follows that, not only does a bill like 
the 21st Century Cures Act signal a change in regulatory stance that seeks to quicken the FDA 
approval process for new technology products, but, equally important, it is favorable to the labor 
sectors developing it. Just as the passage of the HITECH bill in 2009 benefitted the companies 
developing meaningful use software as part of an economic stimulus package pushing 
technology into health systems, the 21st Century Cures Act also incents companies through a 
language of patient access.  
The first way companies experience a heightened incentive is through a streamlined, 
faster, and less burdensome regulatory pathway to market. This helps make an entrepreneur’s 
opportunity to develop health technology more equivalent in risk to that of other industries 
without strong regulatory oversight, particularly among new software products that will be 
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exempt from FDA jurisdiction. Second, among digital health technologies that are still subject to 
FDA approval due to a higher health risk classification, there is more complete information as to 
how these technologies will be evaluated by the FDA and what the timeline for evaluation looks 
like, thus lessening the risk from an investment perspective. Third, with the FDA’s newly 
initiated precertification pilot, it will be companies rather than individual products that are 
subject to evaluation according to whether and how they demonstrate the “culture of quality and 
organizational excellence (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017c).” The nine companies 
taking part in the pilot project are a mix of public, private, and non-profit corporations including 
Apple, Google’s Verily, Roche, and Tidepool (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017b). This 
shift to a company rather than product focus will orient other burgeoning digital health groups to 
whatever legitimacy standards are being set. While it is too early to know how and in what ways 
these legislative and concurrent programming changes will affect the nature of digital health 
work, in considering new device legislation in relationship to the pharmaceutical industry and 
concurrent legislative levers, there are many corollaries.  
Similarities with Drug Development Pathway 
Certain provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act mimic legislative pieces already in place 
for drug development, namely the designation of a “Breakthrough Device” pathway for 
innovative pharmaceutical therapies (H.R. 34 111th Cong., 2009). According to the bill, an 
extension of the previous Expedited Review Pathway, the FDA has agreed to create a program to 
streamline the development and review of technologies considered to present novel treatment or 
diagnosis of debilitating conditions and diseases where no alternatives exist, or when having the 
technology available is in the best interest of the patient (Kesselheim & Hwang, 2016). This 
pathway already exists on the pharmaceutical side and is designed for drug therapies such as 
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ones developed in accordance with the Orphan Drug Act of the 1980’s. The provision decreases 
the time it takes devices and/or drugs to get into the market (H.R. 34, 111th Cong., 2016; 
Letourneau et al., 2016; Cortez, et. al, 2017). On the pharmaceutical side, however, Orphan Drug 
classification also entails a monopoly pricing mechanism such that drugs with this designation 
are not only allowed to come into the market more quickly, but are also promised 8 years of 
competition-free sales as other comparable drugs are prohibited from entering the market during 
that time. Of note, in 2017 34% of newly approved drugs were Orphan Drugs (Challener, 2018). 
While there has been no discussion of a monopoly pricing mechanism for breakthrough medical 
devices, with drug and device categories becoming so blurred and needing such similar 
legislation to ensure safety and efficacy, it is possible that a pricing mechanism like this could 
come to pass in the future which would further incent the area for developers and investors alike. 
Venture capital funding mechanisms have evolved in response to the Orphan Drug Act because 
of the profit opportunity present in regulated pricing (Beier, 2017; Stack et al., 2016).  
Connections with Digital Health 
 Thus, within the present-day landscape of digital health, significant software components 
of many technologies and the heightened risk profile of others are blurring the lines between 
drug and device categories, calling for new regulation needs (e.g. Pear Therapeutics and Proteus 
Digital Health). In doing so, the FDA is taking steps to become more collaborative with industry 
in its standard-setting practices and in late 2017 formed a group of “Entrepreneurs in Residence, 
(EIRs)” appointed technology experts to help define the architecture for how the FDA will 
approach digital health oversight moving forward (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017b). 
Previously the public has grown accustomed to seeing progressive venture capital firms and 
other start-up accelerators host EIRs in an effort to incubate profitable projects onsite, providing 
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resources and guidance to fledgling developers. The FDA is replicating this learning approach in 
an effort to build a relevant and timely regulatory process that will reward approved companies 
with faster pathways to market. 
 The structure of the legislation and resulting changes signals a federal position supporting 
the need to get medical device technology out to the market more quickly. This is in keeping 
with the legislation’s placement within a stimulus package designed to bolster the economy. In 
effect, it supports the perceived economic benefit to these labor spaces above the protective 
mechanisms that have been in place to prevent products from being sold until they are deemed 
safe and effective.  
Proponents of the overhaul cite patient need as a primary driver. Opponents perceive a 
danger in bringing more products into the market without safety assurance processes (Brown et 
al., 2016). The real risk to patients is currently undetermined and the FDA is faced with creating 
new risk-classification classes for technologies that do not fit squarely within any existing class 
designations. The timing of the passage of the 21st Century Cures Act is significant because, 
dovetailing with the era of Precision Medicine, it has helped create a larger opportunity for 
digital health products to come into existence. In this era of incentivized developer opportunity 
and forthcoming medical device market-entrants, we have little understanding of digital health 
production practices themselves. Increasing public knowledge in this area is important not just 
for individual patient safety, but also for advancing a more nuanced conversation about resource 
allocation, the integrity of scientific evidence, and potential underlying mechanisms for the 
commercial determinants of health. 
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Datafication, Public Health, and Biomedicalization 
 There is a widely implicit assumption within the evaluation literature on Artificial 
Intelligence projects for health/care that the positive impact of digital health technology to 
patients, providers, and health systems is imminently forthcoming. For several years, a mounting 
discourse has named health/care issues as “adaptability and interoperability problems,” 
positioning digitized health care as an “unlocking” agent in the puzzle (Black, et. al, 2011; 
Wachter, 2015; McCann, 2017). This techno-optimistic attitude reveals the promissory aspect of 
technological enterprise, namely, that problems may have already been defined in a way to show 
technological answers as the solutions (Alam, 2016). This logic encourages attention toward 
tweaking existing, imperfect machines rather than defining health problems in ways that allow 
for non-technical solutions.   
As stated by Kuziemsky, et al. (2017), “there is a shortcoming of empirical research on 
“contextual factors” in health information technology development. Social aspects of technology 
development, such as those that are the focus of this project, are examples of contextual factors. 
In defining characteristics of “human-centered design” and “sociotechnical” design processes, 
the goals of these activities are described as understanding the relationships between technology, 
the users of the technology, and the social context of the technology use. “Technology,” 
however, is often not considered as itself socially constructed – it is treated as neutral territory in 
juxtaposition to other social phenomena (Kuziemsky et al., 2017: 2).  
Empirical literature within the realm of participatory design for digital health tends to 
describe production processes by a) naming members of the decision-making team -- usually a 
combination of clinicians, technology designers, and end-users [sometimes clinicians and 
sometimes patients]), b) naming a software development methodology such as “iterative” or 
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“Agile” design and c) describing the frequency of the design team’s meeting schedule (Agile 
Design Manifesto, 2018; Tang, et al., 2018, Pollack et al., 2017). In most cases the design 
process usually begins with a functional prototype that has been incubated elsewhere, about 
which there is no mention. Notable exceptions to this construct are arrangements where the 
developers hold academic appointments within institutions and are founders of the technology, 
hold equity interest in the technology, and/or are among its employees or paid consultants. This 
design structure has been prevalent in the creation of digital translations of in-person or paper-
and-pencil interventions/tools (e.g. Matthews et al., 2016; and Chen et al., 2016), and is 
prominent in the social arrangements of stakeholders involved in building digital therapeutics.  
Within critical social science literature on digital health practices, attention has been 
given to digital health discourses as a form of practice emphasizing the “customer 
empowerment” language used by companies to market their technologies, even in the midst of 
ambivalent customer experiences in using them (Schull, 2017; Sharon, 2017; Ruckenstein and 
Schull; 2017). Within this genre of scholarship, empirical work has focused on non-human 
elements of digital health culture, namely the growing literature on algorithms and dangers 
associated with the interpretive power of health data. Algorithmic investigations have focused on 
cases where their decision-making replaces human autonomy (Gillespie, 2014 in Ruckenstein 
and Schull; 2017), where they are programmed to reproduce social difference (Hogle 2016 in 
Ruckenstein and Schull, 2017) as well as gendered assumptions (Eveleth, 2014; Lupon, 2015). 
Further scholarship in this area uses a language of “imaginaries” to describe production practices 
centered on building electronic nudging mechanisms to encourage behavior change, “reducing 
uncertainty over which day-to-day activities to pursue” (Berg, 2017: 6 and Schull, 2016 in 
Ruckenstein and Schull, 2017: 269.) In connection to emerging scholarship on the datafication of 
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health, these investigations look at digital health practices associated with marketing discourses, 
as well as algorithmic implications for human action (Prainsack, 2020; Recht et al., 2020). These 
critical lenses speak to a consideration of data as inherently non-neutral and connect with a 
public health ethics that is concerned with equity in development and dissemination activities.  
In public health ethics, the concept of “relational personhood” is central to social justice 
and equity concerns (Sherwin, 1998; Jennings, 2017; Prainsack, 2017; Cole, 2020). This focus 
on personhood as bound up in relationships is a move away from historic considerations of 
individual actions as a function of personal independence, autonomy, and strategic rationality 
and stems from feminist scholarship on care practices (Butler, 1990; Benner, 1994; MacKenzie 
and Stoljar, 2000; MacKenzie, 2010; Wardrope, 2015; Prainsack, 2017). Notions of relational 
personhood underpin normative decision-making for social goods such as medical information 
commons and public biobanks, as well as the re-envisioning of consent practices in medical 
contexts (Koenig and Gates-William, 1995; Manson and O’Neill, 2007; Foster, 2008; 
Dickenson, 2013; Prainsack, 2017; Cole, 2020). Relational personhood also has implications for 
this project, and the way that patients/consumers are being considered by companies developing 
digital therapeutic products. “Championing the ‘We’ in ‘Me’” seems to run counterintuitive to 
the era of personalized medicine in which digital therapeutics are situated; it challenges the idea 
that individuals are organized for empowerment and improvement by the latest healthcare 
gadgets for self-tracking and diagnosing wellness. Nevertheless, insofar as this research 
contributes to a public health interest, work on relational personhood and relational aspects of 
care practices asks, “what is in the common good?” and “how can it be achieved?” This directly 
connects to questions of access and equity at the core of this project’s motivations to better 
understand technology development logics. Emergent scholarship in this area has used a 
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justification framework (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006) to consider a plurality of ways that “the 
common good” is conceptualized by technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, and 
Apple (Sharon, 2016; Sharon, 2018). This  research considers the common good in examining 
how problem formation and resource allocation coalesce to make digital therapeutic innovations 
possible. While distinct from Sharon’s examinations of the common good within the activities 
and discourses of large corporations, this project examines early start-up company activity that is 
subject to and benefits from many of the same capital arrangements that have fueled these types 
of corporations during infancy.  
Finally, this work contributes to other scholarship in the realm of biomedicalization 
(Clarke, et al., 2003), including better understanding the types of human, financial, and cultural 
capital (Shim, 2010) going into digital therapeutics as one example of technoscientific 
development in action. Previous work has considered how and in what ways value is constituted 
by digital health company activity (Alam, 2016) and how health information is financialized 
(Blacker, 2014), however regulatory aspects of the area are largely unexamined by scholars, 
particularly in connection with company formation. In this dissertation, I pull from the broader 
Science and Technology Studies literature to consider ways that regulatory and commercial 
activities are being co-produced, privileging certain types of knowledge production over others 
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Latour, 1990; Jasanoff, 2004, Chapter 1; Kristensen and 
Ruckenstein, 2018). 
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Overview 
 
In the chapters that follow, I explore the development of digital therapeutics as a subset 
of the digital health commercial enterprise in connection with its regulatory framework, and 
situate this work in San Francisco, where many companies are physically present and where my 
in-person interviews took place across two years of fieldwork. In Chapter 1, “Methods and 
Reflections,” I describe the overall structure and iterative approach to this ethnographic project 
and reflect on the contributions of contextual data present at interview sites, made more explicit 
by my experiences providing patient care in the same urban environment. I reflect on the place 
and appropriateness of ethnographic research, discuss data analysis procedures, as well as 
challenges and limitations of the work. In Chapter 2, “The Regulatory Morass,” I explore the 
interpretation of the 21st Century Cures Act as it applies to Software as a Medical Device 
(SaMD), and what I name the “iterative conundrum” of how regulation is forming to vet 
products that are ephemeral in nature. Chapter 2 discusses the logics of regulation presented by 
employees of digital therapeutics companies working in quality management capacities, as well 
as their interpretation of FDA’s mandate to build “cultures of quality and organizational 
excellence.” In this chapter, I explore a challenge named salient by several people across 
professional roles, that of melding clinical and technical approaches to vetting quality, and the 
larger cultural divide these companies are faced with in managing employees from traditional 
healthcare environments as well as technology sector engineering firms. The chapter concludes 
by using Richard Matland’s conflict-ambiguity model to characterize implicit institutional effects 
of the 21st Century Cures Act and competing digital therapeutic start-up behaviors.  
Chapter 3, “Defining Digital Therapeutics” explores what it means to be a “digital 
therapeutic,” where the term originated and for what reasons, and how it is being operationalized 
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among people working in connection with the development of these products. I examine the way 
an industry trade organization positions the term and discuss a salient position threaded through 
interview data: that digital therapeutics are evidence-based interventions based on individual 
diagnostic approaches to behavioral medicine. Chapter 3 discusses digital therapeutics’ promise 
to remove therapeutic benefit from entanglement with human relations and resituate it within 
standardized software protocols that minimize the effects of “bad (human) actors.”  I situate this 
movement within bioethics literature on relational personhood. The chapter considers 
participants’ perspectives on defining digital therapeutics as mechanistic interventions divisible 
by objective and quantifiable parts, lending transparency and trustworthiness to their 
deployment. Chapter 3 presents a critique of the co-mingling of codes in my interview data, that 
codes for “defining digital therapeutics,” were frequently overlaid with codes for “descriptions of 
behavioral science/medicine.” Using case examples, I show how participant descriptions of 
digital therapeutics speak to a movement of behavioral science out of academic labs and into 
company settings over the last 5-7 years by way of the “digital” promise. The leveraging of 
certain types of data production were connected with this shift, particularly methods and 
evidence that demonstrate positive health outcomes of the digital therapeutic product. This 
chapter connects a drive for positive outcomes to the commercial enterprise, and to new logics 
that locate disease responsibility with the end user of the technology – the consumer, or the 
patient. In this relocation of responsibility—or, in this empowerment of the technology user – the 
company benefits based on the effectiveness of their engagement metrics, and the value of the 
personal data they design their product to collect.   
Chapter 3 zooms out to consider the logics of a phenomenon called “blitzscaling,” a term 
coined by entrepreneur Reid Hoffman to describe a set of recommended practices for start-ups 
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interested in rapidly growing and outpacing their competition. In considering the definitional 
hallmarks of digital therapeutics as an aspiring industry, I center their drive to obtain positive 
clinical evidence within this context as a necessary ingredient for company success. I show 
through interview data how time pressures and the bracketed role of the researcher within start-
up environments contribute to this aim, propelling company legitimacy and growth through 
increased credibility. Lastly, I elaborate on the significance of “digital therapeutics” defined as 
the translation of behavioral medicine to the digital realm.  
Chapter 4, “Problematizing Access,” turns to questions of equity as they apply to the 
development of digital therapeutics. By outlining the varying ways that concepts of access 
surfaced in my interview, media, and document data, the chapter troubles traditional notions 
about technology’s benevolent promise to extend access by removing geographic boundaries to 
intervention. The chapter addresses ways that participants called upon notions of access to 
further company mission statements, particularly in connection to extending the pharmaceutical 
company sales model and concepts of “population health” in relationship to patients as 
consumers. The chapter goes on to address access as something leveraged in participant notions 
of safeguarding health, both by using digital therapeutics as substitutes for highly regulated and 
monitored pharmaceutical drugs like psychotropic prescriptions, as well as for their benefit in 
treating addiction. In the case of addiction, I use the way that access appears in my interview 
data to show how digital therapeutic companies frame disease as biologically based and 
behaviorally perpetuated, omitting possible social determinants as a cause.  
Chapter 4 echoes some of the preliminary themes touched upon in Chapters 2 and 3 by 
addressing the shifting locus of scientific evidence – that with access to improved standards of 
expertise, digital therapeutic companies present their products as superior treatment alternatives 
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to what is currently available, if anything. Examining access in this study shows ways that 
“caring” and “curing” are differentiated by digital innovations in therapeutic benefit that center 
on systems-based approaches to diagnosis. Lastly, the chapter touches on ideas of “access to 
what” and “access for whom” in briefly outlining a culture of persistent fundraising efforts where 
company founders are usually in the midst of striving to access more capital. In this 
environment, despite their potential access to large sums of capital, the perceived scarcity of 
resources acts as a barrier to candor about company status and activities. The chapter ends with 
reflections on the “digital divide,” discussing ways that the ubiquity of digital access may be 
shifting the value of human therapeutic resources, despite interview data touting the increased 
quality of a standardized digital therapeutic option. I complete the chapter with reflections about 
access in conducting research on this topic and present it as a frame for future studies that center 
health equity.  
The dissertation concludes by circling back to the beginning to revisit the 21st Century 
Cures Act as lawmakers call for public input in the formulation of a Cures 2.0 bill emphasizing 
digital cures (Martin, forthcoming). I conclude by considering the COVID-19 pandemic that 
broke out at the final writing of this dissertation, forcing widespread regulatory approval of many 
digital forms of care. Particularly given central findings from this study on the shift toward 
commercial evidence production, I argue that framing “access” in its plurality may present a 
helpful framing for future studies involving health equity. 
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Chapter 1: Methods 
 
This research is the result of ethnographic fieldwork taking place between August 2018-
December 2019. During the course of the project, I drew on policy documents, industry 
conference materials, news media articles, and interviews to analyze the development, history 
and dissemination of the term “digital therapeutic.”  I knew from having worked at a now 
defunct start-up that technology products come and go quickly along with the companies that 
make them. Taking the ephemeral nature of these phenomena into consideration, I was less 
interested in any one product or company, and more interested in the arrangements giving rise to 
them. I was also interested in how the motivation to define “digital therapeutics” as a real thing 
dovetailed with regulatory efforts happening concurrently, and in what ways, if at all, these 
activities were “extending access” to therapy.  
During the 16 months of fieldwork, I conducted 75 hours of observation: in specific areas 
of San Francisco where I met interview participants (namely in the mid-market neighborhood) 
(n=12 hours), at two multi-day digital therapeutics industry conferences (n=50 hours), at one 
FDA virtual public workshop (n=8 hours) and informally at two technology company worksites 
(n=5 hours). During the industry conferences, I conducted 18 informal interviews with attendees 
which were developed into field notes and considered alongside formal interview data. 
In addition to observational data, I conducted 41 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
individuals working as part of or with knowledge of digital therapeutics production including 
professionals across clinical, sales, finance, executive leadership, regulatory, academic, and 
engineering roles. These interviews were meant to tease out individual perspectives on how 
digital therapeutics is being defined, is evolving, how evaluation and safety is considered, and 
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what notions of health they are making. The interview guide utilized during these conversations 
is attached as part of the Appendix. Lastly, I triangulated (Creswell, 2013; Tracy, 2010; Bloor, 
2001) observational and interview data with documents collected during the course of the 
research including policy guidance, salient news articles, industry reports, and thought leadership 
on aligned areas including digital health, artificial intelligence, innovation, inequity, and trends 
across the technology sector. These documents helped situate my interview data in a larger 
public conversation about technology sector development, regulatory logics, and health 
technology practices. News articles popping up over the course of the research helped 
corroborate or refine questions I had in following up with interview participants, particularly in 
relationship to digital therapeutics’ connection with pharmaceutical firms. Specific source data, 
sampling, and recruitment strategies are further explicated in the Approach that follows. 
Approach 
 
The three types of data utilized for this study: 1) Collected Documents, 2) In-depth 
Individual Interviews, and 3) Ethnographic Observations are depicted below. 
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Collected Documents (n=25) included relevant text-based data including policy 
documents, digital therapeutics conference materials, and news media articles.  
In-Depth semi-structured individual interviews (n=41) were conducted across clinical, 
sales, finance, executive leadership, regulatory, academic, and engineering roles. Follow-up 
interviews were conducted (n=7) following particularly rich accounts of stakeholder experiences. 
Ethnographic Observations (n=75 hours) were conducted in-person at Digital 
Therapeutics conferences in September 2018 and February 2019 (n=50 hours), at interview 
locations (n=12 hours), at two technology company worksites (n=5 hours), and at one FDA 
virtual workshop (n=8 hours). Informal interviews (n=18) with conference attendees at both 
digital therapeutics were included in this observational data, as they were not recorded but 
incorporated into field notes from memory and audio-memos. 
Collected Documents 
Written accounts, particularly FDA’s evolving development guidelines and 
organizational perspectives, comprise materials that are part of social functioning within and 
across institutional settings. They provide rich sources for interpretive analysis. Documents are 
invaluable in ethnographic work as part of a triangulation scheme to achieve convergence and 
corroboration of other source data. They may contain data that can no longer be observed, 
provide details that interview participants have forgotten, and/or can track change and 
development over time (Bowen, 2009). They may also reveal differences in formal and informal 
understandings about “how things work” within organizations.  
Documents collected for this study included those that 1) provided a perspective on what 
“digital therapeutics” means, including its origin, history, and dissemination as a term 2) 
provided information about regulatory formation, funding, or evaluation of SaMD products 3) 
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provided media accounts of digital therapeutic company activities. Documents were used to 
examine the emergence of digital therapeutics as an industry, as well as to extend observational 
and interview data in analyzing convergences and discrepancies in public information and ways 
that stakeholders collaborate (Marshall, 1996).   
A range of documents as outlined in Figure 1 was collected for this study in order to 
enable a thorough understanding of how “digital therapeutics” is being operationalized, and how 
regulatory formation is taking place for these products. The source and method of access for each 
document was detailed in field notes and all documents were uploaded into data analysis 
software. 
Document Collection: Search Strategy  
A purposive sampling of written documents was collected through systematic procedures 
pertaining to four types of text data: i) Policy Documents ii) FDA Public Guidance iii) Digital 
Therapeutics Conference Materials iv) News Media Articles.  
i) Policy Documents  
The 21st Century Cures Act was screened for portions of the Act dealing with SaMD 
translatable to digital therapeutic products. These sections were uploaded into data analysis 
software for inclusion. The FDA Center for Devices and Radiologic Health’s website was 
scanned for all published guidelines related to SaMD classification and the Digital Health 
Precertification Program from 2015-December 2019. These documents were screened for 
relevance to 1) stakeholder involvement and 2) regulatory framework development. Any 
applicable documents, or portions of documents were uploaded for inclusion. When applicable, 
field notes were also taken on collected documents and included for analysis. All documents 
were uploaded into data analysis software.  
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ii) FDA guidance documents  
FDA Guidance Documents were screened for inclusion based on their detail of works in 
progress dealing with 1) SaMD evaluation 2) Cultures of Quality and Organizational Excellence 
3) the Software Precertification Program 4) newly approved or cleared products that could be 
considered as a digital therapeutic 5) stakeholder collaboration.  
iii) Digital Therapeutics Conference Materials  
Digital Therapeutic Conference Materials including panel slides and from the Digital 
Therapeutics 2018/2019 conference events were screened for inclusion. All conference materials 
from these multi-day events was screened for inclusion based on relevance to 1) stakeholder 
involvement and 2) regulatory framework development. Of related materials, those selected for 
inclusion were only those with the most information-rich substance. 
iv) News Media Articles  
I tested different search strings by evaluating the first three pages of search results on 
GoogleScholar searching for terms “digital therapeutics” and “Software as a Medical Device.” 
Many newspapers now offer readers the opportunity to respond to particular articles by posting 
comments on-line; I captured this content by going to the original source of the article, searching 
for and downloading readers' comments. I utilized the Lexis Nexis database available free to 
University of California San Francisco affiliates to search for full articles appearing in the 
publication categories outlined in figure 1. These categories were purposively selected to cover a 
range of publication genres. 
In-Depth Individual Interviews  
In-depth semi-structured individual interviews were conducted with a range of digital 
therapeutics stakeholders including employees, investors, clinicians, academic researchers, and 
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regulatory personnel (n=41). Individual interviews are an important data source for ethnographic 
research, helping to clarify, extend, and “thicken” observational data with accounts of individual 
experiences told in the research participant’s own words. Repeat interviews were conducted as 
necessary to reach data saturation with regard to emergent themes with participants who 
provided particularly rich accounts of stakeholder collaboration, or where clarification of 
concepts was necessary. 
Sampling and Eligibility  
Individuals recruited for this research were adults (>18 years of age) currently working 
for or in connection with a digital therapeutics company, the FDA, an organization that sets 
standards for digital therapeutics product development, an academic medical institution, or an 
investment firm (institutional and/or strategic) currently investing in, or considering investing in 
digital therapeutic products. These types of personnel were well-represented at Digital 
Therapeutics conferences, the primary physical recruitment sites for the study.  
Recruitment Procedures  
Participants were recruited across various professional roles, including but not limited to: 
Data science, software engineering, research, clinical/medical affairs, regulatory operations, 
quality assurance, sales, and investing. Twenty-six of the 41 individual interviews conducted 
were recruited at the Digital Therapeutics Conference in September 2018 and February 2019 and 
arrangements were made for interviewing during the weeks that followed the conference events. 
Previous participants from my pilot study also assisted with participant recruitment, facilitating 
entrée to current employees of digital therapeutics companies who would have been difficult to 
reach through random sampling or impersonal recruitment strategies (Sadler, 2010). The number 
of interview participants for this study was based on publicly available evidence that there are at 
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least 30 identifiable digital therapeutics companies to date, 18 of which are based in or have 
significant operations located in the San Francisco Bay Area or Los Angeles, CA. Utilizing the 
February 2019 conference event and FDA public workshop, introductions made by previous 
research participants, and a purposive sample of additional employees identified through publicly 
available social media information on Linkedin, Crunchbase, and Facebook, an additional 15 
individuals were recruited. Individuals from at least one third of the 30 identifiable companies, in 
addition to investment personnel participated. Flexibility was allowed for additional referred 
enrollees (n=4). 
Interview Procedures  
Interviews addressed individual experiences considering safety and efficacy in day-to-
day work responsibilities, as well as participant descriptions of company approaches to the same. 
Using a semi-structured interview guide with open-ended questions (see Appendix), participants 
were asked to describe experiences working with others, solving problems, making decisions, 
considering regulatory guidelines, and the technology tools used on a day-to-day basis to 
facilitate these activities. Interviews were conducted in-person, by video-conference, or 
telephone at places of the participants’ choosing. They lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
Interviews were audio recorded for verbatim transcription, de-identified, and uploaded into data 
analysis software. Following completion of data analysis, audiofiles were destroyed.  
Ethnographic Observations 
Conducting observations at conferences and start-up company worksites provided insight 
into how regulatory discourse is developed and shared across companies in spaces where 
individuals gather to network and speak about the sector, as well as how employees work 
together in actual practice at company worksites. Direct observation of digital therapeutics 
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stakeholder interactions provided access to the ways in which individuals collaborate across 
institutional settings to form consensus, and identify shared problems and motivations. Targeted 
observations included: instances of consensus and disagreement among stakeholders, the process 
of defining problems that aim to be solved by digital therapeutics, and how individuals utilize 
software tools in their everyday work. At the Digital Therapeutics Conference event in 
September 2018, for example, there was considerable disagreement about the appropriateness of 
using Randomized Controlled Trials to demonstrate product effectiveness. Examining this site of 
disagreement enhanced understanding of the values and implicit understandings about priorities 
and constraints among/between companies and regulatory agents, particularly with regard to the 
commercial presence of pharmaceutical firms.  
Conducting observations at the interview locations provided insight into one urban 
environment, San Francisco, in which many digital therapeutic products are being developed. It 
further linked company activity in this area to the technology sector, as the presence of other 
technology firms was evident at the interview locations by the tenure of the customer base. It 
also situated digital therapeutics within the city environment of San Francisco in which very 
apparent social distress often flanked the outside of our meeting locations and seemed to be 
normalized amidst the hustle and bustle of an otherwise vibrant urban core.    
Sampling and Eligibility  
Two conference events, one FDA public workshop, and a company setting were 
purposively selected for this research. Based on rigorous web searches, the conference events 
constituted 100% of the public events held specific to digital therapeutics and/or the 
development of its regulatory process during the 2018-2019 data collection timeframe. The 
varied nature of the public events – two formally sponsored by digital therapeutics companies 
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and the third hosted by the FDA – provided opportunities for comparison of perspectives within 
and across settings as well as comparison of group dynamics and culture. Did it feel stiff and 
formal here? Did people seem to know one another? How were people dressed? What did they 
talk about to each other?   
As for the companies selected for conducting observations, one larger (>100 employees), 
one smaller (< 50 employees) was intended to enable comparison of differences in company 
structure and motivations based on growth stage. Because I was unable to garner formal 
permission to conduct observations at digital therapeutics company locations, I conducted 
informal observations at adjacent technology firms where I had a social or professional contact. 
Observations conducted at the technology company (>100 employees) in October 2018 provided 
information as to the original motivations and use-cases for building open source software tools 
that have been taken up by digital therapeutics software engineers in product development.   
Procedures  
At conference events, I observed panel presentations and group discussions, as well as 
informal conversations between presentations during each of the two-day events. At the FDA 
event, I participated in workshop panels virtually with other virtual attendants. In meeting with 
interview participants, I would usually arrive early to mid-market meeting places, or remain at 
the location following the interview in order to gather a thicker account of activities taking place 
in the respective location. At technology company locations, I observed social dynamics and the 
arrangement of office configurations. I recorded audio-files of my observations during and 
immediately following field activities which also contained information from informal 
conversations with individuals. I drafted memos from these activities that I subjected to analysis 
alongside formal interview transcripts.  
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Ethical approval for this research was obtained in August 2018 through the University of 
California, San Francisco’s Institutional Review Board and specific permission to conduct 
observations at industry conferences was granted by conference organizers in exchange for 
producing a report on the conference which was disseminated to conference attendees following 
both public events. Reflections on this exchange with industry conference organizers are 
included as part of my research findings in Chapter 4, “Problematizing Access.” 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis for this study was iterative and commenced with data collection. The 
analyzed text for this study included all transcripts from field notes, interviews, and collected 
documents. All transcripts were checked for accuracy alongside audio-files, de-identified, and 
stored in a password protected, encrypted electronic format. Using interpretive methods, analysis 
was a circular rather than linear process. Writing notes or memos helped in this initial phase of 
exploring the database. I first read through a complete interview text, field note and/or document, 
and noted overarching themes, analytic puzzles, and any contradictions between data sources 
related to the way “digital therapeutics” was being discussed, or the way a regulatory concept 
was being conceived. Iteratively reviewing all data, I searched for contrasting cases, instances 
where some sort of breakdown or conflict occurred, and discrepancies between discourse (such 
as that at industry public events) and practice within companies. Instances of breakdown and 
silences in the data were particularly valuable to study as they revealed implicit assumptions 
about normal practices that were otherwise invisible and taken for granted.   
Using data analysis software, I assigned preliminary codes, which involved aggregating 
the text into smaller categories of information where detailed descriptions of concepts were 
identified. For example, a document described a justification for not requiring a clinical trial for 
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digital therapeutic devices, and that section of text was categorized under codes: EVIDENCE 
PRODUCTION, RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS, and RATIONALE.  These 
preliminary codes were shaped, refined, compared, and extended as I moved through more of the 
transcript data. I examined situations where there were multiple codes for one section of text, and 
considered the constellation of codes that surfaced concurrently in the data. I also considered 
absences in the data that these constellations brought to light, and from this method was able to 
develop most of the entirety of Chapter 4, “Beyond Access” which was made possible by tracing 
the ways that the word “access” surfaced throughout transcript text. A coding schema was 
developed from the first half of the interview data as a way to capture preliminary emerging 
themes. This schema evolved with time and with the addition of interview, document, and memo 
data and is included in the Appendix.  
Interpretive Research 
Many criticisms of post-positivist research persist despite several decades of consensus 
among philosophers of science and sociologists that they have been put to rest by the post-
modern turn (Popper, 1959; Kuhn, 1970; Clarke, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2002). In many ways, acknowledging a person’s subjectivity as a researcher continues 
to open up their work to criticism (Schuessier, 2015) that may be otherwise prevented by 
presenting the research as taking place within objective and value-free framing (Giddings, 2006; 
Smythe 2005). Despite the continued privileging of positivist empirical traditions within public 
discourse, interpretive ethnographic analysis is well-suited for explicating nuance, range, 
subjectivity, and multiplicity in producing data – for producing “truths with a ‘little t’”(Creswell, 
2013; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012; ). For this project, the chosen methods present one way 
to consider implications of social arrangements forming across multiple arenas. Situational 
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mapping aided in the analysis, both as a visual way “into the data,” as well as a way to explicate 
and then examine what kinds of non-human elements (e.g. virtual networks, software platforms) 
were important to them (Dreyfus, 1991; Bowker and Starr, 1999; Bowker, et al., 2010; Clarke, 
2003; 2005). 
This project identifies and describes emergent aspects of group culture. (Geertz, 1975; 
Fisher et al., 2006). My sorting of groups took place initially at a professional level in conceiving 
of a recruitment strategy to aptly represent the roles of people working to develop digital 
therapeutic products. As mentioned, these areas included: engineering, sales, clinical support, 
executive leadership, finance, academic, and regulatory roles. Nevertheless, these roles do not 
always capture the social dimensions of specific work arrangements and for that reason, it is 
significant to note that the project also took place against a professional backdrop of the 
technology sector in San Francisco  
Interpretive research is no exception to any other form of empirical work where 
methodological choices the researcher makes influence the results they produce (Silberzahn et 
al., 2018). Ethnographic analysis, in particulary, is characterized as immersive. It is useful for 
revealing everyday practices, and discrepancies between policy and practice, that may be lost in 
other types of empirical examination. Preliminary data from a pilot study revealed that the 
creation of digital therapeutics as an industry, as well as its regulatory framework, took place 
across both physical and virtual sites of production. Thus, this study was comprehensively 
immersive across virtual sites such as Zoom calls and participatory webinars, as well as physical 
sites such as conference events, company workplaces, and the mid-market meeting places 
convenient for many interview participants working in downtown San Francisco.  
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Challenges and Limitations 
 
This descriptive, exploratory study identifies ways that the burgeoning field of digital 
therapeutics is being defined, and ways that collaboration is taking place across physical and 
virtual arenas in its formation during the period of 2018-2020. While the findings cannot be used 
in empirical hypothesis testing, results from this research contribute to public knowledge 
regarding stakeholder collaboration in the formation of both a new industry as well as its 
regulatory considerations. Entrée is usually challenging in this type of research; however the 
collaborative nature of this critical period in both industry and regulatory formation enabled 
ready access to interview participants. 
Findings from this research may inform upstream activities such as the incorporation of 
new regulatory considerations for SaMD at the organizational or federal level, as well as the 
development of ethical frameworks to guide health technology development and implementation 
within health systems. This study aims to elucidate some of the place-based aspects of an urban 
environment in which digital therapeutic production practices are occurring. As such, it brings to 
light the need for structural competencies within commercial environments building novel health 
interventions, and ways that the forms of “access” a product intervenes on need to be better 
explicated in product claims and development motivations. This study generates new questions 
that can be empirically tested in quantitative studies, and clarifies areas demanding further 
qualitative analysis in order to ensure the adequate and appropriate crafting of policy.  
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Chapter 2: The Regulatory Morass 
 
“No regulator in the world could keep  
pace with the volume of software being  
created.” 
 
-Bakul Patel 
FDA Director of Digital Health 
 
The 21st Century Cures Act passed with bi-partisan congressional support in an 
environment overshadowed by the United States election of President Donald Trump in 
November 2016 (H.R.34, 114th Cong., 2016). Patient safety lobbyists, including Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, had been starkly opposed to its passage in the first place, warning that the 
proposed legislation was a cover for pharmaceutical company profit-making at the expense of 
legitimate patient benefit (Warren, Smith and Murray 2019; Lupkin, 2016; Mendoza, 2017). 
Nevertheless, in connection with the election of President Trump, the Act was rumored to have 
been a crucial guard against possible future actions to defund public agencies. Accordingly, it 
allocated money to FDA with very broad guidelines for intended use, and FDA would spend the 
next several years spending it in figuring out how to properly revamp its evaluation framework 
for digital health products.  
The process of revamping FDA’s evaluation procedures has been a very public and 
collaborative one including the creation of a pilot project involving 9 companies, a group of FDA 
“Entrepreneurs in Residence,” the shift to whole company rather than individual product 
assessment, and the promise to interfere as little as possible with the entrance of products into the 
market but for vetting their safety (FDA Website, 2017; Cortez, 2019; Schwartz, 2017; Ropes 
and Gray, 2016). In keeping with this promise, a risk-based schema was created to assess safety, 
while effectiveness testing moved to post-market activities, at least for low-risk medical devices 
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(FDA Proposed Evaluation Framework, 2019). FDA’s activities within the Center for Digital and 
Radiologic Health are centered on crafting best practices for evaluating software – moving away 
from an old model that was designed to vet the development of hardware products.  
While FDA has been busy issuing draft guidance for public commentary to be eventually 
utilized by manufacturers, an active ecosystem of digital health enthusiasts in the Bay Area 
across industry, academic, and health care settings has formed to provide input to the federal 
agency’s initial iterations. A group named ADviCE sprung up as a collaboration among 
prevailing medical centers and industry partners to outline implementation stipulations for 
medical device developers.  
During this project, my recruitment process led me to the posh surroundings of UCSF’s 
Mission Bay campus, and to my own academic institution’s situation at the epicenter of this new 
frontier of medical innovation. Closely nestled in the same building as UCSF’s Center for Digital 
Health Innovation at 1700 Owens Street in San Francisco were two life sciences investment 
firms, several biotech start-ups and at least one digital therapeutics company that I could name at 
the time. I didn’t know what to make of this co-mingling quite yet, but the arrangements 
certainly shrunk the physical space between labs and companies and spoke to an aim of my 
research – to better understand the collaborative nature of this moment.  
In this chapter, I situate the 21st Century Cures Act and aligned FDA changes with the 
burgeoning segment of digital therapeutics. I discuss the uniqueness of software as a health 
product, and the attending issues this uniqueness brings to bear for evaluation practices to 
regulate its safety and effectiveness. I name existing regulatory practices as taking place within a 
decentralized “regulatory ecosystem,” formed through loose collaboratives of academic, 
industry, and agency partners. I discuss findings from my data that illustrate how the growth of 
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startup companies, their “professionalization,” is dependent on the negotiation between clinical 
and technical occupations within these work environments. Quality plays a centralizing role in 
this process which advantages larger company actors over smaller ones, and speaks to ways that 
the 21st Century Cures Act – while appealing to notions of innovative cures – benefits 
commercial actors. 
The 21st Century Cures Act 
 
The 21st Century Cures Act includes a wide-ranging criteria for oncology, 
pharmacotherapy, and medical device innovation, aiming to usher in novel cures to patients 
without sacrificing safety. As applicable to the development of digital therapeutics, its 
stipulations positioned medical device manufacturers as beneficiaries of less stringent and 
meddlesome regulatory forces (Public Law 114-255, 206; Martin, forthcoming 2020). This act is 
not the first public law purporting to help patients by bolstering commercial enterprise, nor was it 
passed without opposition from a plethora of patient safety lobbyists at the time (Lupkin, 2016; 
Mendoza, 2017). Regulatory formation to bolster innovation was an important part of the 1983 
Orphan Drug Act, the 2009 HITECH Act, as well as the 2015 Precision Medicine Initiative. In 
each case, regulation deeply incentivized development of novel cures/technology where they 
were deemed to be needed, thereby creating increased labor activity in these domains, as well as 
increased interest on behalf of private investment entities privy to new opportunities (Reaves, 
2003; Aspinall and Hamermesh, 2007; Wellman-Labadie and Zhao, 2010; Kesselheim et al., 
2011; Halamka and Tripathi, 2017).  
Coupled with increased enthusiasm for funding translational medicine within academic 
medical centers, new programs for advancing discoveries with clinical impact have popped up 
over the last decade, bringing the so-called “academic lab” closer to the commercial venture 
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(UCSF Catalyst Program Website, 2019). Throughout my research, but especially at industry 
conferences, there was widespread acceptance across professional domains that this commercial 
engine was “simply the way to things get done.” While I had no expectation that commercial 
enterprise would be criticized at an industry conference, I was disappointed in speaking with 
folks who fund these technologies that there wasn’t a more academic conversation happening 
about funding arrangements and shareholder benefit. It seemed to me a digital therapeutic 
product should be considered as distinct from other forms of digital innovations and may 
necessitate different kinds of capital formation because of its intended public use as a human 
therapy. Aside from potentially being reviewed by FDA, however, there is no regulatory body 
for monitoring the activity of these products in the marketplace, nor are there regulatory 
protections in place to ensure that public benefit is considered in their initial formation.     
Currently, FDA reviews digital therapeutics just as they review other Software as a 
Medical Device (SaMD) products: according to a risk-based schema. They are therefore invisible 
within any formal FDA guidance documents and do not contain their own standards or metrics 
for evaluation. Despite this fact, the director of FDA’s Center for Radiologic and Digital Health 
(CRDH), Bakul Patel, has participated as a speaker at numerous Digital Therapeutic conference 
events over the last 4 years, as well as investment conferences for digital health more generally, 
signaling agency awareness and monitoring of varying digital health “things.” FDA’s most 
significant move in connection to these swirling worlds of venture capital dollars, start-up 
gadgets, and health systems is its current plan to evaluate companies rather than products for 
quality. 
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Pursuant to the passage of the 21st Century Cures Act, in 2017, FDA’s appointed 
Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb, also a partner at the world’s largest venture capital firm, New 
Enterprise Associates, issued a public statement to:  
“Empower Consumers and Advance Digital Healthcare… Historically, healthcare 
has been slow to implement disruptive technology tools that have transformed 
other areas of commerce and daily life. One factor that’s been cited, among many, 
is the regulation that accompanies medical products. But momentum toward a 
digital future in healthcare is advancing. Not all of these tools are subject to FDA 
regulation. For the devices we are asked to evaluate, we know that our policies 
must continue to empower consumers and facilitate innovation” (Gottlieb, 2017).  
Accordingly, FDA developed a schema for examining Software as Medical Device (SaMD) 
products, whereby low-risk products, including those intended to augment clinical decision-
making, will not be pursuant to ongoing evaluation. Rather, companies are audited, whereby 
those exhibiting “cultures of quality and organizational excellence” (CQOE), defined according 
to seven “excellence principles” receive expedited product approval. In 2017, FDA started a pilot 
program of 9 companies of varying sizes, age, and organizational structure to help determine key 
performance metrics for use in defining CQOE. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017).  
FDA’s changes since 2017 have attracted considerable attention from device 
manufacturers, researchers, policy, and business audiences with different concerns. At the dawn 
of the 21st Century Cures Act’s passage into public law, scholars expressed apprehension that the 
Act would create an environment with sub-standard product evaluation, with effectiveness 
testing moved to the realm of post-market surveillance (Kessleheim and Hwang, 2017; Kinney, 
2018; Orlando, and Rosoff, 2018; Uzdavines, 2017). Investment audiences, as evidenced by the 
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surge in business consultancy-produced white papers on the topic, were aware of potential 
business opportunities that could result from a relaxing of regulatory activity (Chatterjee, et al., 
2018 and “21st Century Cures,” 2017). Six firm representatives interviewed in connection with 
this ethnography expressed that their company was “looking for a regulatory person,” 
acknowledging that what was going on at FDA was new and important, and also that the 
acquisition of regulatory expertise may result in a competitive advantage against other firms. As 
one CEO mentioned to me, describing his recent experience hiring a new senior executive,  
“That was how she [senior executive] sold her last company, by ensuring that 
industry measures were being met. When she asked us, ‘What industry metrics are 
you being measured up against?’ we were basically like, ‘We don't know.’ So 
right now she’s investigating what those metrics are. If you end up finding out the 
things that people use, I'd be extremely grateful to hear back.” 
Harkening to others’ descriptions of digital therapeutics as “the wild west,” this quote highlights 
the commercial value that an understanding of “industry metrics” brings to a company, 
particularly when actors are competing with poorly defined regulatory information. In an 
environment where regulatory bodies have not yet codified their evaluation procedures to vet 
these products and where commercial actors do not fully understand the rules of the game, 
regulatory expertise is heightened as a desirable commodity to capture within a private firm 
setting. It becomes a competitive point among firms. Having it may position company actors at 
an advantage to collaborate with FDA in rule formation, and ultimately to compete against other 
firms for market share. So, backing up a bit, why was it necessary for FDA to create this 
regulatory vacuum in the first place? 
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Software is a Different Beast 
 
FDA’s stated motivation for changing its procedures was the fact that many medical 
devices currently look much different than they did a decade ago. The term “Software as a 
Medical Device” has come into common parlance, signifying realities of the virtual world such 
as electronic health records, smart-phone mediated prescriptions, and the interface for hardware 
products like glucometers and defibrillator machines. Developing software products is different 
from developing hardware products. In the world of hardware, design cycles are time-consuming 
because engineers have to translate their concepts to the physical world. Once they are produced, 
they cannot be cheaply altered. For this reason, hardware manufacturers usually apply upfront 
time perfecting designs before building a working prototype to submit for review. With software 
development, on the other hand, a working prototype is developed through lines of computer 
coding almost instantaneously. The working code contains a wide range of possibilities for how 
it may be altered. Because of this development ease, there is no wait time for a prototype and 
software developers can continue to tweak the software product without incurring additional 
incremental costs .  
FDA’s procedures for validating medical devices have been traditionally based on 
hardware development cycles. The agency was accustomed to reviewing tangible products, 
examining the different pieces, and approving, step-by-step, each iteration of a device. Advances 
in software development technology have rendered much of this evaluation paradigm obsolete. 
Given the numerous iterations and tweaks made when creating SaMD, prior to the current 
changes underway, FDA was struggling to use its hardware evaluation paradigm for review of 
not only a very different type of device, but also a very different type pf design process. This 
poor attempt to retrofit an outdated framework to 21st century technology was only exacerbated 
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by the fact that prior to the new funding from 21st Century Cures, FDA lacked appropriate 
engineering resources to update its review process. Thus the problem was twofold: The agency 
tasked with regulating safety and efficacy did not have appropriate procedures for evaluating 
some of the most novel products submitted for approval, and it did not have the expertise within 
the organization to guide necessary changes to create them. Thus, the 21st Century Cures Act was 
passed with a political tagline about addressing patient need while implicitly satisfying a 
commercial driver — one for regulation to keep up with advances in technology. One of the first 
challenges to this understanding was posed to me by several engineers and regulatory personnel I 
spoke with: What does it mean to regulate something that is under constant iteration? 
The Iterative Conundrum  
I arrived to the coffee shop in downtown San Francisco just a few minutes before my 
scheduled 9:00 am meeting with Chris, the engineer I had been corresponding with by email. 
Scanning the café, only a couple of others were present inside. Scattered on concrete outside 
were several individuals wrapped in blankets, one of whom appeared to be reading out loud from 
a tattered novel, as a frenzy of morning workers in ear buds deliberately avoided him, briskly 
making their way to what I imagined were office locations in the sky. Upon realizing that one of 
the others in the coffee shop matched the description I’d received by email, I walked over to the 
couch where he was sitting to confirm that the person typing was Chris. He looked up from his 
computer, smiled and verified that he was in fact himself, and said that he would be ready in just 
a few minutes after finishing something up. “Great, take your time,” I replied, sitting down next 
to him and setting up for the interview while he pushed keys for a few more minutes.  
As I waited for Chris to finish up, the man in a blanket outside looked up from the book 
and came in approaching the register, exchanging some inaudible words with one of the baristas, 
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who then exchanged some inaudible words with the other barista, who handed the blanketed man 
a croissant and coffee. As he was exiting the café, he started singing, which turned both my and 
Chris’ attention toward the door, then toward each other. I muttered something along the lines of, 
“that was nice that they gave him some food, I hope he’s ok, Chris agreeing with, “it’s just so 
bad here,” the “it” seeming to mean “homeless people,” and both of us taking a deep breath. I 
suggested we start the interview, missing the opportunity to ask questions about what Chris 
thought of the blanketed situation. Chris was eager to jump in and with seeming relief, launched 
off by letting me know he was a lead engineer at a start-up working in “stealth mode.” I had 
heard this term before and knew it was one that connoted a strategy for temporary secretiveness 
to avoid mimicry of competitors (Wertz, 2019).  
Chris came into his work in digital therapeutics with a diverse background in real estate 
and business and was the first technical employee I had spoken with to explain how, in 
developing software, it was crucial to fail. “If you create an environment where you're not able to 
fail then you're not able to accelerate your development,” he said. He went on to discuss the 
specific pressures on him and his team to experiment quickly, detailing ways that this was 
ultimately the smartest approach to claiming a place in the market. 
The notion of “failing fast, failing often” was a trope I’d encountered previously in 
connection with start-up ideology. It stems from Agile Development principles espousing active 
collaboration, response to change, working software over documentation, and efficiency over 
burdensome documentation protocols (Manifesto for Agile Software Development, 2001). 
Implicit in this methodology is a race against time. In start-up environments, it dictates a lean 
process of rapidly evolving product prototypes and self-organized teams. It contrasts with the 
idea that product design should be perfected before product construction. In building much of the 
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software infrastructure that runs our digital world, this methodology has served engineers well. 
When executed appropriately, it lends teams an edge against their competitors. Nevertheless, as 
an approach to building digital therapeutics, it presents a challenge for engineers who need to 
craft safety and effectiveness, and account for these concepts in an environment that disparages 
documentation. Chris’ explanation dovetailed with that of the VP of Regulatory Science at a 
leading digital therapeutics company who explained: 
“Here’s an example of the challenging case: You have the software engineers 
whose motto is, “fail fast, fail often.” But on the device side, or for any sort of 
regulated product, failure is not great. If you fail ... Like Facebook can push out a 
feature, or Instagram can push out a feature, and the patient population they could 
get pissed off and not want to use the product anymore, and that's it. But if we 
push out a feature to our patients that upsets them, you get them into mood 
disorders, which are adverse events. There's a big difference in paradigm there. 
Basically in an ideal scenario, the quality management system would be able to 
seamlessly and in a least burdensome way, try to adapt software development 
practices in a way that is still highly rigorous but produces documented outputs. 
But in reality, that's something our industry is still trying to solve. Look, let's be 
honest, a lot of software development companies that are really good, they don't 
document anything. They don't document a thing. And so asking a product 
manager who's used to using a [software tool] to pause before deployment and do 
a design review with a bunch of people…that comes across as very burdensome 
for that product and engineering team. …That's the challenge that digital 
therapeutics companies face. How do we blend a traditionally linear burdensome, 
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heavily documented process into an equally rigorous but less documented 
software developing process?” 
This participant’s explanation demonstrates several important points. First, the modus operandi 
for software developers, coming from non-clinical work environments where speed and 
deployment of engineering features takes priority, stands in tension with the safety 
considerations of patients who will be using the engineering product as a clinical intervention. 
Second, the modus operandi of software developers within a company’s product team also stand 
in tension with employee functions at the same company who are tasked with vetting quality and 
regulatory appropriateness. “How do you reconcile those tensions?” I asked this same participant 
at the time, referring to the differences in priority between a quality management group and a 
product development group at a single firm. “Well, if I knew how to do that, I’d be a multi-
billionaire,” he replied smiling, acknowledging the difficulty of the task. In the hasty 
environment that digital therapeutics employees are working, there are few discrete guidelines 
for leading these types of “negotiations,” if they can even be termed something so formal.  
Work decisions described to me were often charged with an air of urgency, where in 
many or most cases, the speed of building took priority over cross-team discussion about 
documentation or validation needs. In instances where a more thorough risk-analysis may have 
been warranted, when I asked questions like, “How do you know, at any given time along the 
product development journey, what the right thing is?” I was told that it, “usually comes down to 
a gut feeling between a group of people, where the people whose input weighs heaviest are the 
product managers, me [the CTO], and other technical leads.”  
Despite regulatory employees’ described need for quality management systems that 
provide documentation without slowing down product development progress, the mechanics for 
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how this becomes possible within a company setting remained opaque. While the regulatory 
function within a company may be tasked with the highest degree of responsibility for patient 
safety, if a central aspect of iterative design is the eschewing of documentation, it presents an 
even deeper challenge for outside regulators like FDA, who have limited visibility into the 
process through which a working prototype came into existence, or any algorithmic information 
contained therein. Currently FDA does not review the source code for any of its submissions. In 
guidance documents dated November 2019, FDA mentions,  
“To date, FDA has cleared or approved several AI/ML [Artificial 
intelligent/Machine Learning]-based SaMD. Typically, these have only included 
algorithms that are ‘locked’ prior to marketing, where algorithmic changes likely 
require FDA premarket review for changes beyond the original market 
authorization. However, not all AI/ML-based SaMD are locked; some algorithms 
can adapt over time…the power of these lies in the ability to continuously learn, 
where the adaptation of change is realized after the SaMD is distributed for use.” 
(FDA Website Proposed Regulatory Framework for AI/ML SaMD, 2019). 
FDA’s discussion paper further describes how product approval will exist on a continuum of 
locked to unlocked in relationship to how much risk the device poses to patients. Of course, 
regulators must understand and appropriately label the category of risk that a product poses, 
which is also complicated when predicting everything that the product may “continuously learn” 
to do over time (Hwang, Kesselheim, & Vokinger, 2019).  
To date, FDA’s approach, while still in its infancy, does not reflect revisions following 
public input. In a flow diagram explaining “Good Machine Learning Practices,” FDA makes 
mention of a second type of model evaluation in addition to performance: clinical validation 
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(FDA Website Proposed Regulatory Framework For AI/ML SaMD, 2019, p. 8). The distinction 
bears mentioning in relationship to a larger conversation about quality that seemed to weave 
itself problematically through my interviews. Although I spoke with several employees whose 
job function entailed “quality assurance,” the type of quality this merited was largely one of a 
technical nature. In FDA’s flowchart, clinical validation is separated from performance 
evaluation, but the two concepts seemed intertwined, or at least difficult to tease apart, in 
speaking with digital therapeutic employees. Given the infinite tweaking that is part of software 
iteration, it is challenging to identify when or at what point performance modifications justify 
clinical evaluation. The same VP of regulatory science explained: 
 It's fairly qualitative, there is FDA guidance, for instance, on what constitutes a 
politically significant software modification, but it is a crapshoot. It's just up to 
the discretion of the manufacturer to determine what's important or not. We 
always do a clinical analysis to determine whether a change in the software is 
going to lead to any changes in safety and efficacy that we should be aware of. 
…but the therapeutic content is really entrenched in the actual text audios, videos 
that are delivered in that product. You could imagine that changing the wording 
of, for example, there's a module on risky behaviors and there's a module on the 
underlying basis of addiction and so if, for example, you're just changing texts, 
that sounds pretty innocuous. "Like, oh, we're just changing some texts." And for 
some other products that are software driven, that'd be fine if the main mechanism 
of action wasn't cognitive behavioral therapy. But in this case, the text is part of 
the therapy, and so we are very careful. We do a deep clinical analysis to see if we 
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change that text, are people going to react negatively to it? Is it going to drive 
behavioral change in the same way that the old text was? 
As this participant laid out, determining what constitutes a significant software change – one that 
warrants FDA submission – is far from a measured science. It is a qualitative process, relying on 
individual judgement and manufacturing discretion, as well as the company’s own crafted 
procedures for performing “deep clinical analyses.” The subjectivity of these activities contrasts 
with the idea of therapeutics being objectively “effective” or easily tweaked on the fly for 
personalization. At the least, it begs questioning as to what kind of meaningful tweak can be 
made on the fly, given the complicated nature of determining what the stakes are and what types 
of product modifications may be needed. It also begs questioning as to what kinds of 
professional expertise are needed to sufficiently vet products, and whether and how companies 
are operationalizing an awareness of these needs. The word this participant used is “embedded.” 
The company’s therapy is embedded in text that is embedded in audio and video clips, that 
themselves are embedded in a smart phone device. No wonder it becomes hard to tease out the 
changes or to define what, exactly the “there” inside of there really is; the very notion of 
transparency is conflated by how the technology is designed.  
The Regulatory Ecosystem 
 
It seems significant to mention that while 55% of FDA’s funding is allocated by the 
federal budget, 45% of it accrues through user fees. Digital therapeutic submissions to FDA for 
authorization, whether through the 510k clearance pathway or de novo route, range in cost from 
approximately $10,000 to $100,000 (FDA Medical Device User Fee Amendments, 2020). Data 
is not currently available as to whether current FDA changes have increased the number of 
submissions, but this outcome is probable, particularly in the long run. Prior to changes 
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implemented as part of the 21st Century Cures Act, scholars were already bringing attention to 
the growing problematic of FDA’s reliance on user fees stating, “In a different political climate, 
adequate public funding in place of user fees would allow the FDA to continue its current 
performance levels while adding further confidence that the public remains the primary client of 
the FDA” (Darron, Avorn, and Kessleheim, 2017). While concerning with regard to commercial 
influence of regulatory practices, FDA’s growing reliance on user fees also contains varying 
implications for its commercial actors, since higher fees indirectly advantage larger firms that 
can more easily weather their price tag. This bias is also implicit in the CQOE framework, since 
satisfying FDA dashboard requirements for “excellence,” requires building unique infrastructure 
that is cost-additive.  
The advent of the Cures Act has ushered in a new era where the public persona of FDA’S 
Center for Radiologic and Digital Health appears to be very friendly and collaborative. This 
center within the agency must strike an awkward balance. On the one hand, it must interact 
closely with companies in order to learn about the most novel products being presented to them 
to ensure that agency review procedures are appropriate for 21st century advances in technology. 
On the other hand, the Center must maintain impartiality as the arbiter of safety and efficacy. 
Concurrent with striking this balance, Bakul Patel has joined the University of California San 
Francisco (UCSF)-initiated Accelerated Digital Clinical Ecosystem (ADviCE), a multi-
stakeholder collaboration, “helping to ensure that digital health software tools can enter into use 
quickly, safely, and effectively.” Members of the collaboration include other employees of FDA 
in addition to digital health center faculty from several academic medical centers, and individuals 
working at organizations such as Apple, Johnson and Johnson, and BlueCross BlueShield. As the 
collaboration’s website states,  
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“FDA ADviCE is not a regulatory or compliance entity, but rather a voluntary 
organization that assists in effective collaboration between the healthcare 
marketplace and [FDA] Pre-Certified companies… ADviCE may help set 
expectations and implicit standards for innovators and investors developing 
Digital Health Software Tools, as well as for healthcare systems seeking to adopt 
them in practice” (Initiatives of ADviCE, 2019). 
While not a regulatory body, this alliance functions as its own type of clearinghouse for quality: 
providing “best practices” documentation for implementing digital health in clinical 
environments, a model for gathering real-world performance data, and a set of quasi-
standardized questions for health systems to ask of vendors prior to commercial engagement 
(ADviCE Website, 2019). These functions are aimed at creating transparency and reducing 
friction between health systems and vendors, are proposed as informal “rules of engagement.” 
As disclosed in the website text, the collaboration is entirely voluntary and works by setting 
expectations and developing implicit standards for commercial developers. It is enabled by a 
diverse group of influential participants across their respective organizations and sectors.  
As the ADviCE collaborative suggests, my interviews among individuals with connection 
to digital therapeutics are situated in a regulatory environment that includes more than simply 
FDA as a clearinghouse. In FDA’s attempt to situate themselves in a learning position to keep 
pace with technology advances, some of the most pressing work for safety and efficacy has 
shifted to health system administrators charged with implementation science—how to implement 
digital health tools within health institutions safely and effectively. In this sense, FDA is one 
actor within a regulatory ecosystem – to pull from ADviCE’s title – an informal smattering of 
alliances with connection to a common goal of implementing digital health tools within health 
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systems. While the ecosystem extends beyond digital therapeutics, the landscape helps reveal 
aspects of this particular cultural moment in connection to health where there is somewhat of a 
regulatory vacuum for what the safety and effectiveness standards should be.  
I expected to sense ubiquitous enthusiasm for digital health implementation among 
industry partners I interviewed, and it was certainly palpable at the industry conferences I 
attended. I was surprised, however, to learn that FDA’s 23rd commissioner was a partner at a 
venture capital firm, and also surprised by the fervor of academic and health system actors I 
interviewed who acknowledged the myriad of regulatory predicaments connected to 
development and implementation of digital therapeutics, while also remaining solid in the 
position that their production was needed and would be beneficial. One reason for this may be 
that among health system participants in the decision-making ecosystem, all are acting in an 
environment of privatized care provisioning where technology promises cost-effective solutions 
in the long run.  
Cultures of Quality 
 
An expressed part of FDA’s revamping includes the establishment of indicators for 
CQOE among institutions. In its draft appraisal documents dated April 2019, the agency lays out 
five categories in which to prove organizational excellence: patient safety, product quality, 
clinical responsibility, cybersecurity responsibility, and proactive culture. While the key 
performance indicators for each excellence category are currently outstanding, the four common 
validating perspectives for each respective excellence area (patient safety, product quality, 
clinical responsibility, cybersecurity responsibility, and proactive culture)  include 1) 
organizational resources 2) customer voice 3) learning and growth and 4) process (FDA Website 
Developing a Software Precertification Model, 2019). For each excellence area, companies will 
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need to demonstrate ways in which the four perspectives are being satisfied in their software 
development process. These categories stand to bear on organizational staffing requirements, as 
well as job function, and probably even organizational size. Thus, the process of building clinical 
competency within a product organization, such that a company is able to perform “deep clinical 
analyses” may really entail a staffing overhaul for many organizations currently lacking that 
expertise. In this sense, “building a culture of quality” likely aligns with the professionalization 
practices of young companies after receiving a large round of funding. It may only be at this 
point that company founders can afford to hire more seasoned expertise for growing the 
organization into a more mature institution. It also means, as alluded to early in this chapter, that 
large firms already possessing these resources, or subsidiaries of larger corporations enabled by 
these resources, will not only be at a significant advantage, but may be the only organizations 
with sufficient bandwidth to bring products to the market. 
Professionalization 
 
While most of my interview participants were only vaguely familiar with the CQOE 
concepts, many individuals I interviewed were intimately acquainted with the challenges of 
professionalization. These challenges often had more to do with “clashes of culture” in building 
out the clinical arm of an organization than they did with pains pertaining to growth-related 
change.  A Chief Technology Officer (CTO) I spoke with reflected: 
“It came to mind for me when you asked what was one of the biggest challenges. 
I think one of the biggest challenges in this space – I'm going to say the biggest 
challenge in this space, not from a <company> standpoint, but for digital 
therapeutics period, is having a very capable group of technologists and clinical 
scientists, who can understand each other's perspectives, and factor in clinical 
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evidence of therapy into the products at the same time that you're factoring in the 
common knowledge and commonplace user experience type things. There are 
people who have been working in technology for a very long time, and have been 
building apps and software, and have learned from common mistakes and things 
like this. Companies like Google, Facebook, and all those spend literally tens of 
billions of dollars in advancing their products. There's a ton of expertise on that 
side, just like there's a ton of expertise from people who have been practicing 
medicine for 25 years, and are psychiatrists working in a certain space, and they 
know from talking to patients, and from doing this time and time again what will 
work, what will not work. The blend of those two into creating a product is, I 
think, the biggest challenge, or the biggest opportunity as well…We have a new 
scientist who comes from a purely clinical standpoint, and we’re like, ‘Ultimately 
no one's going to want to read that text [generated by the new scientist for product 
users]. It sounds like it's from a doctor, or like a warning label type of speech, 
versus something that's more friendly.’ So, people definitely come across that 
gap. Ultimately everyone has to realize that our end product is software as a 
medical treatment. And people who come from all the different perspectives there 
have to understand that all of those things are a component.” 
The challenges of melding clinical and technical perspectives were often mentioned in 
my interviews, as they are in the paradigm quote here. In lay terms, a purely “clinical” 
perspective is defined in two ways: first as “relating to the observation and treatment of actual 
patients rather than theoretical or laboratory studies” and second as “efficient and unemotional; 
coldly detached” (Dictionary.com, 2020). The CTO seems to leverage the latter interpretation of 
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the term, implying that clinical language wouldn’t be as engaging for an end-user as friendlier, 
more easy-going words would be. The first definition of “clinical,” however, is one that centers 
the patient rather than the research lab and implies a specific kind of evidence. In this 
interpretation, “clinical” means evidence relevant to human patients rather than hypothetical or 
controlled settings. “Technical,” in lay terms, is defined as: 1)“related to a particular subject, art, 
or craft,” 2) “involving or concerned with applied industrial sciences” and 3) according to a strict 
application of the rules. “Technical,” in these definitions implies specificity of components, 
commercialization, and compliance.  
Taking the participant’s description, the entanglement of these words as descriptors for 
different ways of knowing reveals company perspectives on both the use-value of institutional 
knowledge in considering patients as users of products, as well as a clash in ideas about the 
worthiness of institutional knowledge more generally. Healthcare expertise is limited, in this 
participant’s view. It can contribute to a component of the product, but wouldn’t necessarily 
inform how the company designs the interactive features of it, nor does it overshadow what can 
be learned from a patient by collecting and analyzing their product data. But more than a 
difference in clinical and technical perspectives, this engineer brings attention to a cultural divide 
between employees coming from very different professional worlds. The cultural rift hangs on a 
comparison between clinical expertise and consumer expertise, or “the common knowledge and 
commonplace user experience type of things” that result in more friendliness, a strategy that 
boosts product engagement. He describes the new scientist’s text as lacking in this type of 
approach, and an overall rift between people who have worked on consumer products and 
understand how to craft something that people will want to use, versus people who come from a 
clinical background and sound stiff and inhuman in their interactions, cautioning against a 
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“warning label type of speech.” Consumer engagement knowledge in this context operates by 
eliminating a sense of danger or hierarchy between the knowledge holders (software developers) 
and the patients using the product, hopefully translating into increased use. The goal, by this 
engineer’s measure, is to make the product as approachable as possible. Doctor-patient 
interactions, on the other hand, marked by the implicit inequality of a doctor’s professional 
expertise and a patient’s naiveté, may effectively push patients away from the digital realm, 
working against a company’s goal of user acquisition and retention.  
Perhaps not ironically, start-up offices I visited reflected this same cultural ethos of “flat 
and friendly.” Evidenced by large open office environments and many self-designed job titles 
aimed at eradicating structural hierarchy among employees, modern work spaces with tall 
windows and catered lunch all seemed to exude the same tacit belief that hipness begets 
company success. The fun, informal nature of these work places differs from that of most clinical 
settings where patient privacy is prioritized, and where the potential severity of life-threatening 
illness mixes with low-budget, sterile design aesthetics. While far from advocating for more 
hospital-like work spaces, research shows that the open office – supposedly an enabler of 
transparency, congeniality, and collaboration – actually inhibits employee productivity and in-
person interactions (Bernstein and Turban, 2018; Bernstein and Warber, 2019; McGregor, 2018).  
As it turns out, employees prefer privacy in pursuing their daily work activities; in an 
ever-noisy open office, this can mean a room of headphone-clad young adults, socially isolated 
yet sitting among others attempting concentration. This distinction between appearance and 
reality is significant in relation to the process of developing software products for health. Despite 
a friendly and approachable interface, the source code of a product’s intervention – as well as its 
capabilities and previous iterations – are invisible to consumers, patients, regulators, and non-
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technical employees. The product’s insides, its code lines and branches, form a technological 
infrastructure that is inherently non-transparent. While its invisibility may not be as troubling to 
the user of a product as might be a negative in-person interaction with a care provider, it makes 
the risks of use nearly impossible to measure. In conversation with the senior official of an 
international non-profit body that authors medical device standards for uptake by FDA and other 
regulators, we spoke about the challenges of defining quality in this context. He mused: 
When you say a digital therapeutic, how do you know that the code you're getting 
or what they're playing is really what it is? How does one know that it isn’t full of 
bugs or contain more nefarious code that may do some bad things? How do you 
know that it's actually doing something, or what is the strength of it? One of the 
things that I like to talk about when we talk to people about this is, what's the 
difference between a digital therapeutic game and a game that somebody's 16-
year- old nephew or niece is creating in the basement? Not a whole lot, because it 
all looks the same. How do you know that, or the doctor, or the patients, or the 
insurance companies, how can they be assured that what the doctor prescribed and 
you downloaded from the iStore is “Evelyn” from <digital therapeutic company> 
and not something that looks like “Evelyn?”. 
The regulator went on to describe how the central concepts girding pharmaceutical development, 
notions of identity, purity, strength, and quality, will likely be utilized in the development of a 
framework to evaluate digital therapeutics. “The outcome of course will be different, and how 
we manage that, and how we define and/or describe, and then test, verify it will be different, but 
the ideas are really the same.”  
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Opaque and Productive 
 
“Many legislative compromises depend on language sufficiently ambiguous that diverse actors 
can interpret the same act in different ways. This is a natural and inevitable result of the working 
of political process.” –(Matland, 1995, p. 158.) 
 
Within policy implementation literature, Richard Matland’s oft-cited 1995 conflict-
ambiguity model is still used to help explain how policy is passed in differing circumstances 
(Matland, 1995). In situations where there is low conflict among stakeholders and a high degree 
of goal ambiguity, implementation is theorized to take on an experimental nature, where the 
process is governed largely by contextual factors. While there were policy opponents of the 21st 
Century Cures Act, the passage of the public law was a swift and unanimous effort in congress, 
signaling a low degree of formal conflict. And while the law is written to minimize apparent goal 
ambiguity by stating a basic objective of expediting cures to patients, its consequences are more 
nuanced and far reaching than this language states. Implications of the Act extend to FDA’s 
development of software-appropriate evaluation frameworks, whole-company appraisal, and a 
new reliance on real world evidence to affirm product claims. Moreover, FDA’s development of 
new regulatory pathways for SaMD has taken a collaborative tone as evidenced by the agency’s 
pilot program and evolving guidance documents open to public input, signaling an experimental 
implementation period. 
One speculated outcome of the Act’s passage is that large, established firms will have 
considerably more influence in getting medical device products approved. Small firms may not 
have resources to house a “Quality Management System” within their organization, or the means 
to outsource this function to a third party. This may, in turn, translate to FDA adoption of more 
corporatized guidelines, particularly as the FDA’s designated pilot organizations work with FDA 
to refine key performance indicators. Extending from this, heightened cost of entry may mean 
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that true innovation – the kind the 21st Century Cures Act purported to incentivize – is hampered 
since competitive firms will use existing technological infrastructure to build products that are 
marketable quickly. This same logic underpins a commercial justification for increasing public 
funding for FDA. In the climate where only large corporations are the commercial players who 
can pay to have their products reviewed, it stands to reason that they will have an outsized 
influence on the type of innovation that happens in this product category. Increasing FDA’s 
funding so that it is less reliant on user fees would mean a more equal playing field for 
commercial actors in addition to preserving the public’s interest as the heart of FDA’s mission to 
safeguard safety and efficacy. 
While the 21st Century Cures Act keeps patients front and center in its language, one of 
the most direct results of its passage pertains to advantages bestowed to certain private industry 
actors creating new technologies for health. If the originally crafted legislation had named digital 
health companies as its explicit beneficiaries, it might have been more hotly contested in 
congress as a veil for corporate interests. By keeping patients front and center, lawmakers were 
able to pass the Act easily – leaving considerably more ambiguous regulatory terrain to be 
negotiated between FDA and private firms, and among health system administrators in the name 
of implementation science.  
Similar to crafting policy that appeals unequivocally to patients, digital therapeutic 
mission statements promise unparalleled health improvements, marrying the path to market 
success with therapeutic benefit. The mechanisms for achieving these improvements are opaque 
and their market presence does not contain substantive regulatory oversight. More research is 
needed to better explicate public risks associated with the differences between product marketing 
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claims and product capabilities, and the consequences of shifting regulatory activities to loosely 
networked ecosystems with varied priorities beyond the public interest.  
Central Themes 
 
Findings from this chapter demonstrate a troubling quagmire of commercial and 
regulatory practices, digital therapeutics situated at their nexus. This chapter engages with 
several “big picture” ideas brought forth by my findings. Central to these themes are questions 
about transparency, quality, and the discrepancy between behavior and discourse.  The chapter 
begins by describing the advent of the 21st Century Cures Act, and ways that its legislation has 
filtered into changes the FDA is making to revamp evaluation frameworks for SaMD products.   
It then goes on to examine the difficulty of regulating products that are essentially ephemeral in 
nature, and the advantages that beget certain firms in making this regulatory shift. The next 
chapter elaborates on these findings, particularly those relating to the regulatory vacuum of the 
present moment, by discussing ways that the term “digital therapeutics” was defined for me in 
interviews, and the “translational” moment that it marked for behavioral science. 
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Chapter 3: Defining Digital Therapeutics 
 
 
“In order to get income,  
you’ve got to show outcomes!” 
 
-Anand Iyer, PhD MBA  
Chief Strategy Officer, Welldoc 
 
 
I spent much of late August 2018 through May 2019 running across San Francisco to 
interview start-up employees, hovering over email to catch people by phone or, if luck would 
have it, for a coffee. Arriving to the midmarket neighborhood of well-appointed buildings with 
sleek exteriors and street level coffee shops, I enjoyed learning about the hustle and 
predicaments of eager digital therapeutics company employees over the last year, despite some 
bracketed skepticism about the area more generally. My desire to study the emergence of these 
products started in late 2016 when I began to hear the term “digital therapeutics” in connection 
with the latest wave of digital health gadgets. The term peppered a wide variety of news 
publications and industry reports, pointing to a new incarnation of “datafied” health 
interventions, one stretched across traditional pharmaceutical firms and other more robust 
technology companies. Early on in crafting this project, after learning about the first FDA 
approved digital therapeutic that Dr Oz hosted part of his show to discuss, but before I had a firm 
idea of what about this area was research worthy, I realized that digital therapeutics were being 
talked about in varying ways. Part of what I hoped to clarify though this project was how digital 
therapeutics came into being, as a term, and why. I hoped to gain a better understanding of how 
the term was being put to work – not just how people assigned a definition for it, but what kinds 
of health imaginings it may be offering to the world.  
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Over the course of 2018-2019, I spoke with many people working on the development of 
these products – digital therapeutics company employees, regulators, academics, clinicians, and 
investors with working knowledge of the area. What follows is an account of how my 
conversations with them, my document analyses, and observations from field sites triangulated to 
suggest a productive quality in the breadth of the term, one that was connected to a field’s 
migration from academic labs to private company settings, helped along by specific types of 
evidence production.  
In this chapter, I investigate ways in which my data show how digital therapeutics are 
being defined as something other than existing things – both situated outside of digital health as 
well as pharmaceutical development – whose effectiveness rely on proprietary knowledge. I 
show through my data ways in which the highly targeted and individualized nature of these 
interventions confers with notions of health that aim to de-center human relationships as 
constitutive of the therapeutic encounter. Digital therapeutics were presented and defined as 
therapeutic interventions superior in nature for their freedom from the messiness of human 
interactions. As I came to learn, these products were an extension of the field of behavioral 
health. Their development demonstrated the movement of behavioral health out of psychology 
labs and into startup company environments, with attending commercialization. The process of 
commercialization was aided by an incentivized drive for positive health outcomes shaping 
evidence production and points to the need for closer examination of these products’ scientific 
integrity.  
What’s in a Name 
 
In conducting this research, I formally set out to explain how the term “digital 
therapeutics” is being defined and operationalized by people working in connection with its 
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development. In order to accomplish this task, I tracked media coverage of “Digital 
Therapeutics” in salient news publications, reviewed trade organization and industry reports 
mentioning the term, and I analyzed my own interview and fieldnotes data. In virtually all of the 
interviews I asked people to define the term, and where they first heard it used. In response, I 
received a myriad of explanations. Digital Therapeutics were described to me as medical 
interventions different from in-person medical interventions, as therapeutics separate from 
pharmaceutical therapies, as software instead of hardware, and as a subset of technology 
interventions among other digital health products. They were described to me as something that 
only a small handful of people could really understand at this point and they were consistently 
characterized as “evolving.”  
Several members of executive leadership at different companies mentioned that while 
they couldn’t remember where it had first been used, they “may have been guilty of coming up 
with [the term] ourselves,” while several other interview participants noted digital therapeutics as 
having first been coined by Omada Health, a leading digital therapeutics firm founded in 2014 
that has attracted approximately $200 million in venture capital funding (Crunchbase, 2020). 
Omada was the front runner in translating an in-person protocol to a digital format, creating a 
software product from the Centers for Disease Control’s (CDC) lifestyle guidelines for diabetes 
prevention. In a 2017 interview with an Omada engineer I spoke with during the pilot project 
that foregrounded this research, he hesitantly mentioned the term when I asked him to explain 
what they were building, “I think the official name of what we do is ‘digital therapeutics,’ but 
specifically right now we focus on helping people who are at risk for diabetes hopefully avoid 
getting full blown diabetes.”  
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Two company founders I spoke with mentioned a Harvard Business Review article 
published in November 2016 entitled, “Simple digital technologies can reduce healthcare costs,” 
that first named digital therapeutics as an area. In the article, digital therapeutics were defined as 
“technology-based solutions that have a clinical impact on disease comparable to that of a drug” 
(Fogel and Kvedar, 2016). The article launched off by recommending:  
“Businesses that are serious about reducing health care costs — and improving the 
health and well-being of their employees — should take a serious look at digital 
therapeutics, which have the potential to provide effective, low-cost ways to prevent 
and treat chronic diseases and their consequences.”  
Within the second paragraph of the article there was a disclosure statement mentioning 
one of the author’s positions in advising “several companies involved in the digital therapeutic 
space.” (Fogel and Kvedar, 2016). 
The numerous descriptions I received about where the term “digital therapeutics” came 
from and what it meant – existing as a preventative solution for patients, a cost-saving agent for 
health systems, an investment opportunity for financiers – reflected different actors’ positions in 
relationship to the product. I also realized that over half of my interview participants, particularly 
those I spoke with later in 2019 during my interview process, referenced the Digital Therapeutics 
Alliance (DTA) in defining the “space.”    
 DTA, as I immediately learned at the first digital therapeutics conference I attended in 
Fall 2018, is a subscription-based non-profit trade group comprised of 37 digital therapeutics 
companies (DTA Website, 2020). Annual membership dues follow a tiered model based on 
annual global company revenue. The lowest price tag is $3,000 for an academic institution with 
$75,000 for a pharmaceutical firm on the upper end of the spectrum (DTA Website, Annual 
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Membership Dues, 2020). DTA was founded by a previous employee of Voluntis, a European 
pharmaceutical company. A representative from DTA explained to me that the group formed 
following conversations among attendees at the 35th annual J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference 
in January 2017. These conversations conferred the need for a centralized non-profit group to 
differentiate digital therapeutics from other types of wellness software, thereby advancing their 
reputation as clinically rigorous. In a formal interview with the same person, she told me:  
“What I've respected most about all the companies I've worked with so far is that 
everyone really wants to be on board with ensuring that these products are being 
developed in a way that will support patient care and improve clinical outcomes 
across the board due to the strong foundation they all have and being able to 
prove that they are doing what they say they're doing.”  
In explaining DTA’s specific role, she went on:  
“We are not a certification body or accreditation body. Nor are we an official 
standard setting body and nor do I want to be. But I do want to start to point to the 
standards that people are using across Asia, Europe and the US and all these other 
places. There are internationally recognized standards that we can all adhere to. 
And that I think gives more applicability also to a product developed in the US 
that launches in Europe. If they are all still achieving these internationally 
recognized standards, you're not replicating efforts and you're not confusing 
different regulatory agencies or payers on either side of the regulatory 
jurisdictions or along the spectrum of them.” 
This participant’s description of DTA’s role echoed the explanation of the 
ADviCE collaborative’s role in helping advance implicit standards for digital therapeutics 
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companies to work from, as discussed in Chapter 2. Similar to ADviCE, work was being 
taken up by this entity in the absence of “industry metrics” as established by a more 
global regulatory body. Despite stating that that she didn’t want DTA to take on a formal 
standard setting role, advancing global standards being utilized in other places would 
help member companies to establish legitimacy and position their products for uptake in 
other markets. DTA is a trade organization; its membership comprises digital therapeutics 
companies paying to participate in the collaborative. It therefore benefits both these 
companies as well as DTA to advance legitimizing frameworks for them. In doing so, 
DTA gains recognition as an entity advancing their credibility, as well as the collective 
commercial interest, while remaining impartial to any one company over another. At the 
San Jose Digital Therapeutics Conference, a presenting venture capitalist referenced 
DTA several times on stage in discussing the extent to which his investment calculus, a 
“highly qualitative process,” relied on trusted sources who knew more about the products 
than he did. 
Text on DTA’s website defining digital therapeutics has been consistent over the 
two years that data collection took place for this project. The website includes the 
following explanation: 
“Digital therapeutics (DTx) deliver evidence-based therapeutic interventions to 
patients that are driven by high quality software programs to prevent, manage, or 
treat a medical disorder or disease. They are used independently or in concert with 
medications, devices, or other therapies to optimize patient care and health 
outcomes. DTx products incorporate advanced technology best practices relating 
to design, clinical validation, usability, and data security. They are validated by 
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regulatory bodies as required to support product claims regarding risk, efficacy, 
and intended use. Digital therapeutics empower patients, healthcare providers, and 
payers with intelligent and accessible tools for addressing a wide range of 
conditions through high quality, safe, and effective data-driven interventions.”  
-DTA Alliance Homepage (April 2020) 
The website text demonstrates a sentiment that was shared with me in interviews, one 
that offers digital therapeutics as evidence-based interventions.  At face value, this seems like an 
obvious observation since all biomedical treatments can be considered interventions on disease. 
Nevertheless, it signals the idea that some digital health products are not evidence-based, or that 
being evidence-based is some kind of unique and special differentiator. It also implies an 
individual-level diagnostic approach to health where problems are identified and intervened upon 
at the level of the body, rather than through structural or systems-based approaches. The DTA’s 
mission statement leverages the logics of optimization and empowerment – concepts that were 
present in many of my conversations with digital therapeutics company employees, ones that 
were reinforced by the FDA commissioner’s statement in revamping the regulatory framework 
for digital health products outlined in Chapter 2. “Evidence-based” was also a frequent tagline 
present at the industry conferences I attended for fieldwork. Given the frequency with which it 
came up as a differentiator (e.g. digital therapeutics are “evidence-based” solutions), it seemed 
important to unpack what kind of evidence these products were relying on and advancing. 
Evidence-Based 
 
In the time that I attended two conference events for fieldwork and interview recruitment, 
the name of these events changed from “Digital Medicine and Digital Therapeutics,” to simply 
“Digital Therapeutics,” reflecting both a desired shift away from traditional medicine as well as 
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the title’s appropriateness for conference attendees and sponsors, mostly digital therapeutics 
company employees. In keeping with the shift away from medicine, individuals I interviewed 
expressed a desire for digital therapeutics to go beyond medicine, as was evident in the promise 
of these products to not only treat disease, but to collect more types of observable behavioral 
information more quickly that has ever been possible. Through making good on this task, the 
promise of a faster intervention looms at the forefront of digital therapeutics, and in the 
background there is a unanimous sense that the therapies themselves will be improvable because 
of the observability of the intervention in real time. As one former nurse and Chief Operating 
Officer of a digital therapeutics company explained to me: 
“Some of the advantages are we can collect, of course, a lot of data. We can use 
that data on the fly to adjust programs. We can make sure that everybody's getting 
the protocol as designed. Even if it's customized for them, I'm not dependent on a 
therapist or a doctor or a nurse or provider to do it right. When you do other 
studies, especially around behavioral [health], you have two wildcards in the mix: 
You have the patient and you have the person delivering it and how they respond. 
The nice thing about doing research, especially, on technology-delivered 
protocols, is that everyone's getting the same protocol. Even if there's 
customization for the individual, you can really start to see what's effective and 
what's not, not based on how good the therapist is at delivering and adjusting, but 
on the protocol, itself. That's really exciting to us.”  
An engineer I spoke with said of traditional mental health therapy,  
“Yes, so a lot of these [interactions with patients] are face to face and so they're 
ephemeral. Whereas when we're creating something in a quality management 
 72 
system that's gonna get reproduced infinitely, it releases that kind of technique, 
and makes it observable to arsenalize. …it will be a good way of disseminating 
knowledge… People treat therapy as a black box: you enter, you exit and that's 
that. And so even breaking it down, I consider it as an engineer. I have my 
breakdowns and my systems so we can model it and optimize it, right? That's 
what I do. So breaking it down into those components, I can say, "How do we 
accomplish the same thing?" The means by which we accomplish it will be 
different, right? The means are not human, the means are going to be an app. But 
what are these effects? How do we establish a sense of duty? How do we establish 
a sense of authority? How do we establish a sense of personalization?” 
What is evident from the quotes of these two interview participants, ones highly 
representative of many folks I spoke with, is that by both accounts, descriptions for what 
constitutes successful therapy are dependent upon elements of human therapy that can be 
separated from human relations, teased out, adjusted, and improved. For the Nurse COO, 
creating a digital therapeutic product was a way to eliminate human interference with protocols 
in order to more accurately assess how the therapy was working. In this sense, she wasn’t 
dependent on a reliable clinician in order to be able to deliver the therapy, thereby liberating the 
intervention from the level of human activity, democratizing it for use without the need for a 
doctor or nurse. Harkening also to the bifurcation between clinical and technical understandings 
of quality and the institutional arrangements these differentiations spoke to in Chapter 2, the 
COO here alludes to the idea that the technology frees the intervention from interference by 
healthcare – from provider relations altogether.  
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In the case of the Engineer, the technology offered new ways of understanding human 
therapy in terms of its individualized parts that could be observed and tested. By his description, 
digital therapeutics lent transparency to therapy, making observable that which otherwise 
normally takes place within the privacy of an in-person patient encounter. In both cases, we 
receive the perspective that by taking a medical intervention outside human encounters and 
situating it in the encounter with a technology product, new research possibilities are created. 
The standardized and observable ways the therapy is being delivered enable these research 
capacities, as well as the therapy’s reproducability and potential for wider dissemination.  
From these accounts, digital therapeutics present a sense of therapy, even in its previous 
in-person incarnation, as a deliverable set of interventions that stand separate – though not 
impervious to – the humans working with them. In this narrative, what counts as therapy is not 
some messy amalgamation of protocols and human interactions, but a purified set of deliverables 
that stand only to be improved upon with time. To be therapeutic, then, is to be both free from 
humans, but also superior to them, and identifiable as a discrete set of observable components 
that can be dismantled, reconstructed, and delivered by something – human or machine agnostic. 
The mechanistic definitions of digital therapeutics that came through in my interview 
encounters spoke to particular understandings of therapeutic concepts as objective and 
quantifiable scientific processes. They revealed logics of empowerment and optimization put 
forth by the DTA’s definition of digital therapeutics where there was an optimistically moral 
aspect of liberating these products from their dependence on delivery by “good actors,” or 
adequately human therapists. With app-based therapy, the patient is empowered to seek out the 
intervention on their own, especially, as another participant described to me, “because there is 
way less stigma in working with an app than there is in working with a human.” App-based 
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therapy, then, appeals to a world where human stigmatization is not something to be socially 
addressed, but rather, a problem to be gotten around by eliminating the human encounter 
altogether. Evidence, in this sense, aims at building things to bypass people and their messiness.    
The Nurse COO states that their products can “be tweaked on the fly,” implying a state of 
constant iteration to better tailor the intervention to the patient. The precision of this treatment, 
consistent with the hype of personalized medicine, presents a picture of not only highly 
individualized care, but of highly individualized patients. It contrasts with ideas of relational 
personhood as advanced by Barbara Prainsack and others (Prainsack, 2017; MacKenzie, 2010), 
where the very idea of a self is understood as an evolving mesh of human relations.  
According to my data, the idea of being “therapeutic” according to this nurse and 
engineer is made meaningful not because of its immediate care outcome for the patient – in fact, 
any rendering of this sort is largely absent from their descriptions – but instead because of the 
future potential that patient data presents to the companies developing the product. In both cases, 
the potential for a refined protocol rests at the heart of their conceptions of benefit. The 
engineer’s specific interest in how their technology can mimic human success in establishing 
duty, authority, and personalization points to a specific understanding of the human role in 
establishing compliance during therapeutic encounters more generally. Both descriptions make 
highly instrumental use of the patient and contrast with notions of healing as an activity 
constituted through relationships (Benner, 1994; Malone, 2003).  
The Migration of Behavioral Science 
 
 Despite the difficulty in defining digital therapeutics in practice and with specificity, 
within my interview data, codes for “defining digital therapeutics” overlapped with codes for 
“behavioral science” as well as “time.” What emerged in my interviews, unique from news 
 75 
media coverage, white paper analysis, or DTA reports was that whenever someone began to 
define what digital therapeutics were, they also began talking about the “translation of behavioral 
medicine” to the digital realm. At the same time that a confluence of definitions was presented to 
me, people building digital therapeutics were fervent in their discussions with me about the 
necessity to strive for at least equivalent clinical outcomes as in-person interventions, when there 
was an in-person analog (or predicate, to use FDA language). In some cases, digital therapeutics 
were being built as part of or in extension to a pharmaceutical product, and borrowing expertise 
from clinical and technical domains. One ubiquitous answer I received amidst all of what digital 
therapeutics were in relationship to other things, and amidst many references to the DTA as a 
credible and centralizing industry source, was that somehow this term was inseparable from 
moving behavioral health out of the in-person sphere and into an on-phone format.  
Maybe it should not have surprised me that these products were being described as the 
translation of behavioral health to the digital realm. As one psychologist casually explained to 
me in conversation, “behavioral health is just euphemistic for mental health. There’s less stigma 
in calling it behavioral health, and most digital therapeutics, even if they’re designed for a 
physical disease, are aiming to impact the behavioral components of it.” There again, the concept 
of stigma came up in my data. This time it was not in connection with the benefits of digital 
therapy to work around stigma – but in the benefit of calling mental health by a different name 
(behavioral health) to avoid it.  Nevertheless, I was actually surprised by the consistency of the 
notion that digital therapeutics represented some type of field movement for behavioral health. I 
hadn’t planned on tracing any of these products from bench to bedside, and yet in interviews 
with people across professional roles and institutions, I began to hear stories about the way that 
behavioral health – not only as a set of intended interventions, but also its related expertise and 
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tools – was moving out of academic labs and into company settings. The following vignette, 
including the participant’s quotes, stands out as a paradigm case illustrating this finding. 
November 2018 
Claire and I met in downtown San Francisco. I was running to get there. The location was 
a corner café on Market Street and while the interior was posh and modernly decorated – you could 
see it from the outside -- to get inside I passed two people asking for change and one man urinating 
on the sidewalk, appearing to have an auditory hallucination. As usual, as it seemed, no one was 
paying him much attention aside from working hard to avoid contact while passing by. I found a 
seat and Claire arrived momentarily with her suitcase as she was headed to a Behavioral Science 
conference directly following our meeting. We jumped into talking – she was the VP of Research 
for a digital therapeutics company, had spent the last decade toggling between industry and 
academia. I asked her how she would define digital therapeutics and she told me: 
“Well, it’s probably more relevant for me to tell you how I got into this. Yeah so, 
how I got into this? Well, I actually got into it through academia. I was a faculty 
member in the department of psychiatry at an academic medical school for 5 years, 
and during my time there as a faculty member, I was exposed to several early ... not 
necessarily early stage, just kind of the early folks out there doing this kind of work, 
building various digital health products and solutions. So at that point I wasn't really 
aware that this field existed. And yet this was back in 2013, 2014 when we started 
having meetings with these types of companies. …But in terms of how I got started 
it was exposure to these really interesting companies that were just sort of showing 
up to us in our department of psychiatry. Like, they were showing up and saying, 
"hey, we either wanna do research with you or we want your time as a consultant." 
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You know, "we wanna partner with you in some way." And this happened both 
internally at <academic medical center> because they started an innovation hub to 
cultivate ideas from the faculty there, and then also externally. So I saw a lot of 
activity happening around this like, 2013, 2014. And I think at that time something 
kind of clicked in my head where I thought, ‘this isn't going away, this is an industry 
now that's growing.’ And I started seeing how funding was changing around this. 
Grant funding was really bad around that time and these small companies, that are 
venture backed companies, were helping to fund some of the research. I saw how 
it could be mutually beneficial for the investigators on the academic side. So all of 
this was really interesting to me. I think my attention was always also peaked 
because ... psychology, or evidence-based psychology, has never had an industry 
like this. And I'm an interventionist so I'm in behavioral medicine and I create brief 
or regular length interventions for various medical populations and in various care 
delivery models. So, I was really interested in where this industry was going. I also 
had the experience. They needed a psychologist or psychiatrist or somebody who's 
an expert in mental health or the healthcare system, because a lot of them didn't 
have that person on their team, or that type of a person, or that discipline on the 
team. And so I just saw a huge opportunity for the field of psychology and wanted 
to jump on board. I was like, the train is taking off whether we're on it or not and 
like, better for us to be on it.” 
I was curious and asked Claire how her research was different then than it is now. 
 
“Well, just in terms of the research aims, they were totally different. … the start up 
rules for venture backed companies, if they're gonna become credible in a 
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healthcare setting or adopted in a healthcare setting, whether or not you go the FDA 
route, you've gotta show outcomes. You have to show positive outcomes… the 
number one goal of these companies is to have a randomized control trial, a very 
fixed randomized control trial, to show outcomes, to show benefits. That are 
meaningful, like commercially relevant. Commercially relevant to the company, 
and then you know, also meaningful to the healthcare stakeholders.” 
In this memo, Claire lays out a brief history of how, at her previous medical center, 
behavioral science began to shift outside of the health care setting and into the commercial world 
by virtue of individuals working at venture backed companies. She describes this history as one 
that surprised her – an industry for psychology that formed a field in its own right, one that she 
hadn’t known about, that was new. This movement was nested around the concept of 
“innovation” – a hub that had been created within her own institution, but then also a heightened 
commercial presence within her department of Psychiatry as a result of the attention to 
innovation. Claire went on to describe how this shift was taking place at the same time that the 
predominant academic funding mechanism – grant money – was drying up, making hard money 
alternatives for research funding particularly appealing, especially, as she notes, because she 
understood how these kinds of partnerships could benefit the academic researcher.  
 In the early 2010’s, innovation hubs began to pop up within academic medical centers. 
They tended to be called “Centers for Digital Health,” or “Centers for Clinical Innovation,” and 
came a couple years after the passage of the 2009 High Tech Act, with discretionary budgets to 
seed new products and programs, usually involving technological interventions. In connection 
with observing these developments within her own institution, Claire made note of the time 
pressure she experienced, likening her decision to work for a company doing behavioral health to 
 79 
that of jumping aboard a moving train. Her urgent description reflects the shifting landscape of 
the time – moving the expertise of psychology labs from academic institutions to privatized 
venture capital-backed company environments interested in leveraging the science for 
commercial value. This shift was made possible by not only the advances in software 
technology, but also by the increased standardization of psychological protocols delivered by 
therapists and now translatable to machine-enabled services.  
Between the years 2010 – 2015, other health care related standardization procedures were 
well underway at a federal level. During this time, the United States government incentivized 
medical systems to adopt electronic health records as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, an economic stimulus bill aimed at pulling the national economy out of 
recession. As a result, the burgeoning sector of digital health began to grow as entrepreneurs 
took on investment dollars to tackle the problem of organizing health care. This tactic, an 
ostensible win-win, was intended to help patients by improving care, while at the same time 
creating jobs within the technology sector (Pattani, 2016). One of the iconic organizational 
veterans of this movement was Practice Fusion, a company that offered free cloud-based 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems to individual medical practitioners. In 2019, after the 
company had been acquired by another EHR company giant, Allscripts, it was subpoenaed for 
alleged Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, Public Law 104-
191) and anti-kickback violations. By this time, the company founder, Ryan Howard, had 
already left to co-found a behavioral health company, iBeat, described as the “heart-monitoring 
smartwatch that [could] save your life” (Feit, 2018).  
Claire’s personal account of psychology moving out of the academic lab and into 
company environments is nested within a broader shift toward standardization. In attempting to 
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trace this movement, it is difficult to discern whether the technology created the drive for 
standardization, or whether the drive to contain and understand health problems via 
standardization created the need for technology. Both were connected to a legislated attempt to 
lift economic recession, and both were and are connected to the commercial promise of turning 
psychological interventions into profit-making companies. This movement is shrouded in a 
language of impact and patient access, as I heard time and time again from the people I 
interviewed. Commercial success was intertwined with product success. A drive for positive 
outcomes, as I began to find out, was the fuel propelling these activities along the same road.   
A Drive for Positive Outcomes  
 
Claire described a specific type of research desired by digital therapeutic companies: the 
Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT). She positioned this type of research design as the gold 
standard, the surefire way to prove effectiveness in an environment where the purpose of 
research is to generate proof that the product works. Nothing about this seemed particularly 
surprising. The Randomized Controlled Trial is regarded as the Gold Standard within academic 
institutions, and is taught that way in Research Methods courses within the academy – the best of 
quantifiable research approaches, and often the most likely study design to be funded by public 
institutions. I remember very clearly during my research training, a venerated research nurse 
displaying a pyramid of quantitative research methods from weakest to strongest with RCTs 
occupying a cherished position on top. By Claire’s description, the presence of bench scientists 
in advisory board positions for these companies, individuals with considerable clout in shaping 
company directions whose careers have largely been defined by conducting RCT-centric 
research, had a lot to do with this trend in digital therapeutics.  
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For digital therapeutics, or any technology product, health problems must be defined in 
such a way that the product can present a viable, clinically validated solution for them. To 
present disease as something that shows up in individual bodies with roots in psychosocial, 
cultural, institutional, and environmental circumstances is to present something that an app on 
your cell phone has little ability to impact. To instead define disease in terms of behavioral 
components means that a person can take some basic responsibility for the disease, and improve 
their situation through acts of individual autonomy and agency. Because the individual is at the 
helm, there is a locatable end user for the technology, a consumer or institutional actor who can 
be billed for the technology’s use. By leveraging the use of RCTs, building things that are 
“generalizable” to a population, the technology can be reproduced for wider use and 
consumption. In this way, we see that the methods used to chart a product’s effectiveness – 
methods that have been adapted from academic research settings as standard quantifiable and 
objective science, are well aligned with commercial mechanisms for large scale profit-making.  
Research for Success 
 
“Scalability” is the mode of potential that attracts venture-backed funding for companies. 
By “scaling” a product, companies grow massively through deploying duplicates of their 
technology to many, many users. Because of the facility of doing this so quickly and cheaply 
with software, as described in Chapter 2, a new era of venture capital backed entities has 
emerged with larger-than-ever money valuations. These companies, in anticipating such wide 
up-take, are able to leverage the bets of investors, take on funding in larger amounts, and stand 
by multi-million (or even billion) dollar valuations. The original founder of LinkedIn, Reid 
Hoffman, describes this process in a book called “Blitzscaling.”  
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Hoffman explains how the financial success of large technology companies like 
Facebook and Google is due to the organizational prioritization of speed over efficiency in times 
of uncertainty. In his book trailer, he notes, “The world is changing faster and faster, and the 
only way to thrive is to accept the inevitability of change. If you are willing to accept the risks 
when others aren’t, and learn how to navigate those risks responsibly, you’ll be able to move 
faster than your competition, and race to the future.”  
While I found no references to “Blitzscaling” in my interviews, I include the reference 
here because of the sentiment among many entrepreneurs I spoke with that, as a digital health 
CEO once said to me, “there is still a Facebook-like opportunity out there in healthcare.” Aside 
from referencing Facebook for its ability to produce and capture revenue in a new or different 
way, or for impacting the way millions of people spend time on the internet, I understood this 
reference in a most basic way to mean that healthcare represented a problem in the world that 
people could make a lot of money solving. He presented a sense of health care as a “thing” that 
could be fixed like cracking the code to a lock, similar to the therapeutic dreams of the nurse and 
engineer I spoke with describing excitement for the potential of their products. Many of my 
interviews described how scientific methods borrowed from academic research institutions were 
making their way to company settings in service of producing the clinical evidence needed to 
garner credibility and profit. In addition to the “start-up rules” that Claire described, she talked to 
me about how working at a start-up differed from working at an academic medical center:  
“Of course I was at a startup that had a very young group of employees. Like, 
they were very, very young. So you know, they were much less formal. They 
were more able to just like, send emails with gifs and emoticons, lots of 
exclamation points, and things like that. And just put meetings on your calendar. 
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I'm used to controlling my own calendar, at least in academia I was. Like I lost 
time and ... just how friendly and nonchalant it was was really interesting to me. 
There are good and bad things about that. So that was one of the major shifts like, 
right away, that I noticed. When I was in academia, it was very fast paced work. 
Very, very fast paced, like I saw patients, I taught in training, I had research, dealt 
with corrective issues, things like that. It was very fast paced in a specific way. 
Long, long, long hours, for sure. And then startup was very fast paced too, but in 
a totally different way. And certainly not as long of hours as I put in when I was 
at [academic medical institution]. But it's fast paced in a sense that there's just 
multiple streams of work going on all at one time. And you have this sense of, of 
course urgency, but then of also catching people and the other teams to make sure 
you know what they're doing because everyone's moving so fast and it's hard to 
backtrack.” 
Another psychologist, Ann, who was working as a consultant to digital therapeutics 
groups went on to say: 
“I was the first PhD and I really helped them. I think they didn't initially 
understand maybe exactly what I could contribute, but then I was very capable of 
just carving out like little bits and pieces of research without really bothering 
people tremendously or costing a whole lot of money. So I think they were 
pleased that I was able to work within the parameters of the resources that they 
had…I was producing data that they could take to customers or investors, they 
can talk to clients and say,“this is what we're seeing.” And, and they could use it 
for product iterations and innovations…I was coming from experimental 
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psychology, like randomized control trials, very vigorous and counterbalance. But 
I realized that in this real-world clinical setting, you need to do the research 
differently and oftentimes you don't have the luxury of large samples and you 
need to produce data sets in a shorter period of time. So what I tried to do was 
create rigor, but on a smaller scale.”…Science is a little bit prejudiced towards 
some of the methods, more of the qualitative or the smaller scale studies where it's 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. And so one of the hurdles 
that I'm running into now is where, you know, people I think, you know, 
everyone's in awe of stem cells or AI or something that they don't understand. 
Like, oh, that must be difficult. But I think people don't always recognize that 
behavior or behavioral science is a science too… I regularly have clients that will 
invest lots of money in the technology and then nothing, or very little in the 
validation. They will validate in the lab and made sure that the technology works 
and that the App works, but they don't validate it with end users… You want to 
improve population health or health outcomes. So that has human being and 
behavior written all over it. But human, you know, behavioral scientists are rarely 
part of the discussion.” 
 
In the first quote, academic research is contrasted with start-up research in terms of the 
control the researcher had, the time pressures, the autonomy, and her sense of research as moving 
from being the center of attention to being one of many priorities within a company. In Ann’s 
case, she describes how she changed the work that she did to create results within a shorter 
timeframe – manufacturing credible research by altering the size of her sample, scaling down the 
scope of her work in order for the company to scale up. Competition among firms, demands from 
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investors, and the need to attract investment dollars may dictate the need for faster results, 
positioning the research as a credibility marker for attracting more value to the product. These 
activities harken back to the sense of urgency driving a pursuit of positive outcomes evident in 
other interview excerpts, and the value placed on attaining them in order to generate revenue.  
Ann’s description is also a fairly differentiated understanding of the goal of evidence 
production as compared to the nurse and engineer from earlier in the chapter. Here, rather than 
leveraging the patient in order to refine a research protocol for reproducibility, the researcher 
describes her frustration with clients for not using behavioral science to prove the effectiveness 
of the product with the patients/consumers for whom it is intended. For her, behavioral science is 
a type of knowing “with human being written all over it,” casting its methods into the realm of 
the qualitative. While we don’t have a description of what rigor means in this context aside from 
it being something she was aiming to create on a smaller scale, we do receive an opinion that 
behavioral science of this “human” form intending to validate product effectiveness with 
patients, is frequently left out of the company equation. This connected with the description of 
research detailed to me by a Clinical Director at another firm describing the importance of 
testing their diabetes software on the intended audience, elderly people: 
“It was really surprising these young engineers, they're in their 20s and they were 
just so surprised that people didn't understand scrolling...in our app, there wasn't a 
very obvious indication that a person should scroll and so people were stuck on 
that screen going like, ‘I don't know what to do next.’ There's not enough 
information here, but these 70-year-old people, they didn't know they were 
supposed to scroll. Then in a human factors study, for the delete button we had 
put D-E-L because that's pretty common. So we were testing this with people with 
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diabetes and even though “DEL” was pretty common for “delete” on an insulin 
pump, people were hesitant to touch it because they thought it might mean 
“deliver.”  They weren't ready to deliver their insulin, they were still kind of 
calculating their dose. So we didn't even think about that, that they might think 
“DEL” meant deliver versus the delete. In that case, we quickly put a back-arrow 
as the icon for “delete,” and then people knew what it meant, there was no 
ambiguity. That's why it's so important to test in the intended audience. If your 
audience is 60 or 70 years old, you need to test in that audience so you can get 
what their perspectives and perceptions and health beliefs are to see if they can 
use your health app.” 
While this anecdote very clearly lays out a case for rigorous product testing before market 
deployment from the perspective of patient safety, the research director doesn’t mention that the 
point of testing with the intended audience is to prevent something really bad from happening to 
the patient. In this case, the focus is on the product and its capabilities, and the way that the 
patient’s behavior aligns with whether and how the product can be taken up for use. 
 Speaking with a recent psychology PhD graduate who had been hired to clinically 
validate products at Digital Therapeutics company in San Francisco, he reflected,  
“So, if I were working at my old job in a medical center doing research, it would 
take a long time to get a research project started and funded and running. But here 
we can just quickly test whether things are working or not. So for me, that's really 
exciting because I like things that are faster paced. And testing that we're just 
interested in and not have to rely on funding to do that. So that's a really cool 
aspect of it…Throughout graduate school my mentor started doing anxiety 
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disorder treatment research, but that wasn't as fundable. So he ended up 
developing another line of research combing anxiety with smoking cessation, 
helping people who have anxiety quit smoking. And that way it's interesting 
because you still get to work with people who are anxious and you get to work on 
anxiety, but you're also adding in this other component. Which I guess he has an 
interest in, but I felt burnt out by the idea of having to research things based on 
what's fundable.” 
I followed up by asking why anxiety research wasn’t fundable, and he replied: 
“I think it is if you are doing more genetic-based work or studying biological 
models of anxiety. But, the type of work that I'm interested in is basically how can 
we help people get access to anxiety treatments and make sure that they're 
effective for different groups of people. And that is fundable through some 
sources, but less commonly funded. There are some resources for implementation 
research, but most of those are within VA [Veteran’s Administration] settings. 
Maybe it’s just harder to come by than other types of basic science or biomedical 
studies of anxiety.” 
In this participant’s view, the question of joining a start-up was, similar to others’ marked 
by funding considerations. Different from Ann, his expertise in behavioral science on anxiety 
was readily taken up by the start-up group, and working on something “tweakable” presented a 
fun new challenge in a faster-paced, dynamic setting. Here, he found an alignment with his 
interest in “access” to that of the mission statement of the start-up firm wanting to increase 
dissemination of the digital intervention. His description of constraints as to what was fundable 
in the academic environment align with the biomedical bias that Ann discussed in light of her 
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clients’ unwillingness to invest in clinical product validation. Contrary to Ann, however, his 
skills and interest in “access” aligned with a company objective in disseminating digital 
interventions, so his experience of translating behavioral science found a more natural fit in the 
commercial setting. This notion of increasing “access” points to an important area for unpacking, 
one at the center of Chapter 4. 
Discussion 
 
This chapter focuses on the breadth of activities the term “digital therapeutic” was 
invoked to mean during the time that I conducted research from 2018-2019. Through my 
analysis, I describe its multiple commercial roots, both in its purported imagining by attendees at 
an investment bank-sponsored healthcare conference, as well as in the traveling of expertise from 
behavioral psychology labs to start-up environments. Through my interview experiences, I came 
to learn that digital therapeutics were connected to ideas about how behavioral science, 
traditionally a psychological domain of interventional science, was becoming something else 
within its translation to a digital sphere.  
Previous investigations of translational science in the bioeconomy (Birch, 2017; Birch 
2020) describe data as something produced in a lab that then gets transported to commercial 
settings in a process of turning datasets into valuable assets. This leads to a lab’s ability to rent 
its data to commercial entities, trading the dataset’s value for revenue to support the maintenance 
of research activities (Pinel, 2020). What emerged in my research, however, was not such a clean 
transaction to be traced in the leveraging of scientific interventions. In the case of digital 
therapeutics, what I observed was not only the shifting of whole human capital – researchers 
with their attending skills, knowledge, and methods – from academic science to commercial 
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domains, but the more fluid and enmeshed reshaping of evidence production that was occurring 
as a result of it.  
Participants described processes of research “scaling down” in order for the company to 
“scale up,” and of crafting research agendas within companies to prove positive outcomes 
quickly, or to orient their methods to product-related questions. In this highly dynamic, very 
networked sphere, workers moved between jobs frequently, and research methods were 
massaged to appeal to their intended audience, whether investors, internal company colleagues, 
or health system clients. Some participants were drawn to the start-up environment because of 
the excitement of being part of the future, as Claire described the train that was moving whether 
or not she was aboard. Others, however, were motivated by the experience of academic burnout 
and funding constraints, ultimately looking to start-up employment as a place where creative 
experimentation was possible, encouraged, and compensated. 
 While I did not conduct a thorough analysis of company product evidence as part 
of this project, the scientific integrity of evidence that supports pharmaceutical product 
development has been and continues to be deeply interrogated by scholars (Moynihan et 
al., 2019). Findings from this chapter speak to similarly aligned concerns in connection 
with digital therapeutics, in so far as they are defined by the digital translation of 
behavioral science and its attending commercialization.  
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Chapter 4: Problematizing Access 
 
“Abstaining from care is something  
that worries me a lot about this space.”  
 
-Senior Software Engineer 
 
Across organizations developing digital health technologies, there is a widely-held, 
implicit view that technological interventions facilitate patient access to services and that this 
increased access is of public benefit. Digital therapeutics are expressly defined as interventions 
that have come to be through the process of commercializing behavioral health interventions. As 
the previous chapter demonstrates, producing positive health outcomes and disseminating 
products to more people aligns with commercial logics and constitute core definitional features 
of digital therapeutics. The mission-worthy task of increasing their access, as was ubiquitously 
explained to me, lies at the heart of digital therapeutic company taglines. Concepts of access, 
however, also lie the heart of equity: who has access to the various forms of capital needed to 
build technological interventions, who has access the jobs these influxes in capital create, who 
has access to the potential benefits of the product outcomes, and who is absolved from their 
potential harms.  
Despite a seeming ubiquity to the “do-good” marketing language of technology company 
discourse, critical data and technology scholars have exposed many problems behind this 
ostensive technological benevolence (Benjamin, 2019; Alam, 2016). Behind the veil of company 
mission statements espousing the inherent societal benefit of technological advances, there are 
often conflicting and conflating representations of public benefit inherent in company activities 
(Sharon, 2018). Further, the activities constitutive of building technologies belie stratifying 
processes at work (Benjamin, 2019; Costanza-Chock, 2020). In the technoscientific realm, this is 
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especially true. As such, this chapter contributes to critical scholarship on translational science 
by tracing the ways that “access” surfaced throughout my data. Conducting this exercise was a 
path into considering ways that stratifying forces were invoked within my interviews, and spoke 
to differing notions of what health equity means in the context of digitizing behavioral health.  
Throughout interviews in connection with this project, tracing “access” was a way of 
getting to grips with how the promises of increased access might be overshadowing other types 
of access falling outside the purview of public benefit. This chapter aims to address the nuance 
and range with which access showed up in the project. I begin by discussing the different kinds 
of access constituted by my data, and then turn to a discussion of “access to what” and “access 
for whom” as extensions of the analysis. My hope is that considering the data in this light may 
lead to new avenues for normative intervention, and shed light on how organizing activities 
within novel occupational environments confer structural arrangements with downstream 
implications. 
Commercial Promises 
 
The most ubiquitous notion of digital therapeutics celebrates these products as containing 
the potential to increase patient access to health care services in a digital form as a helpful 
alternative to in-person interventions. My data show participants’ views about how this aims to 
improve the quality of care standards, as well as facilitate care when a shortage of providers 
renders it unavailable. These ideas of “access” came up most commonly in reference to the 
problem of provider shortages in rural areas, or in areas without significant healthcare 
infrastructure, positioning digital therapeutics as a way of navigating around geographical 
barriers to care. The Digital therapeutics Alliance (DTA), notes in its Industry Foundations 
Report the potential for these products to achieve global reach: 
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“As a class, digital therapeutics have vast potential to establish a significant 
global presence given their ability to: Deliver high quality, evidence-based 
therapies to underserved and under-diagnosed populations. Make effective, 
patient-centered treatments accessible and scalable at relatively low units of cost. 
Support healthcare teams in countries with varying degrees of health care 
infrastructure. Transform how patients and populations manage medical 
conditions and engage in their healthcare.” (DTA Industry Foundations, 2018, 11) 
This explanation for what digital therapeutics can do fits squarely with the promissory 
explanation of digital technologies more generally – that through their accessibility by smart 
phone, the need for person-mediated service is eliminated. Nevertheless, as this excerpt shows, 
the fact that the products have global potential is couched in language extolling their benefits as a 
scalable product to establish “global presence,” again coupling the notion of commercial success 
with widespread adoption without mention of how the presence of these alternatives impacts 
existing care models. 
What kind of access 
 
Makers of digital therapeutics fairly ubiquitously mentioned the premise that digital 
therapeutics will benefit patients by extending access to care. Across professional roles, 
individuals mentioned that digital therapeutics would lessen a dependency on geographical 
proximity to providers, helping to solve the shortage of medical care staff. In addition to this 
explanation, discussions of “access” also focused on: extending the pharmaceutical sales model, 
safeguarding public health, and standardizing professional expertise.  
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Extending the pharmaceutical sales model 
At both industry conferences I attended, the presence of the pharmaceutical sales industry 
hung heavy in the background of many panel discussions and presentations. Several digital 
therapeutics companies, including at least one with significant funding, aim to develop digital 
therapies that will enter the healthcare system through existing pharmaceutical development and 
sales channels such that a digital therapeutic would be vetted by the FDA and priced in much the 
same way as a traditional pill. This path, one that seems well-established among health systems, 
has taken the appearance of digital therapeutics start-ups formally partnering with 
pharmaceutical companies, or taking on significant investment from them. In this way, digital 
therapeutics start-ups can work collaboratively with a more seasoned organization that has the 
experience of moving products through FDA’s approval process and into vetted sales and 
distribution channels within health systems. As one Chief Commercial Officer described to me,  
“So what we have to do at this point is take our pilot trials, which showed efficacy 
in depression, and do large scale federal trials that could lead to FDA giving us a 
label for promotion, make marketing claims, and those kind of things. Just like 
drugs do. I mean, if a drug looks good in pilot trials, the drug company works 
with FDA to get the drug approved. And then there's a label given to the drug that 
frames how a sales representative has to interact with the physician in terms of 
promoting that drug. In terms of what it can do, what side effects might be. So 
that'll be the same for our software. It'll come with a FDA cleared label. And then 
sales reps will begin to promote the product based on its benefits because of the 
exceptional technology platform, which creates the efficacy that's needed. And the 
fact that we're already aligned with a major payer, you'd expect that we'd have 
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decent coverage right out the gates. And then we'd be able to get the word out 
pretty easily because we have the relationship with a major pharmaceutical 
company like _____. And we think that paves the way for success. For us, success 
looks like this: the patient goes to the doctor's office, and the doctor goes to treat 
depression, the doctor diagnoses the patient as having symptoms of depression, 
and then makes the determination on what the treatment course is going to be. 
Maybe they don't want to put him on drugs for one reason or another, and they 
suggest to the patient that if they have a smart phone, they can try an application 
to help them overcome their symptoms. If the patient agrees, they go ahead and 
prescribe it, and then the payer would cover it, and the patient would get better. 
That's what we aim to do, and that's what we're working on doing.” 
In this description, the Chief Commercial Officer lays out the ways their company 
intends to mimic the drug development process – both by following the same procedures that the 
drug developers follow, as well as by having a partnership with a pharmaceutical firm. Gaining 
FDA approval, according to this participant, is connected with being able to access appropriate 
marketing claims. His description of the promotional process positions their product as superior 
because of its technology platform, “creating the efficiency that’s needed,” and enables their 
digital therapeutic to serve as an alternative to pharmaceutical products, eschewing the need for 
pharmaceutical intervention provided the patient has a Smart phone and willingness to engage 
with their program.  
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In a conversation with the Chief Operating Officer of another digital therapeutics firm, I 
received a differentiated account of this mission statement: 
 “One of my concerns, to be perfectly honest, is at our core mission. Of course we 
want to make more money. We're a startup. We have some investors, that kind of 
stuff. Our mission is really to use technology to expand access to evidence-based 
healthcare. But if everything has to go down a true pharma route, maybe you have 
to get approval, distribute it only through a prescription, that kind of stuff, we're 
not expanding access. We're limiting access.”  
I interrupted by asking the participant to say a little more about that.  
 “Yeah. I know, I'm a little contrarian here. I think it's why <company> will 
continue to have a population health arm and a digital therapeutic arm. The digital 
therapeutic arm that wants to be prescribed by a physician, that should be really 
rigorous. That should probably have FDA or some other group, maybe, in the 
long run that approves this, that looks at your science, that looks at your 
technology, that looks at your ... Everyone should be looking at IT security and 
privacy. I'm surprised at how many are not. Those should be rigorous like any 
other medical treatment. Although, people tend to say it's a very pharma-specific 
route because there's more money in the pharma route. But, to me, it might be a 
little bit closer to other types of therapy, like physical therapy, behavioral therapy, 
and some of those kinds of things. I'm not totally sold on the idea that everything 
belongs in the full pharma model. … To me, a therapeutic doesn't have to be a 
drug. I felt [at the conference] like there was alignment to say, "This is definitely 
aimed at going down a pharmaceutical route." I think that's smart. 
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Pharmaceuticals know how to distribute things through healthcare. They have 
in's. They have processes in place. You don't have to reinvent the wheel. They 
have fail cues. They know how to communicate with docs. I think there's validity 
there, and I don't think it's a bad idea. I think, sometimes, though we don't give 
enough credit to the other options.”  
In this example, the participant sets up a situation where access is constrained by human 
relationships, by the existing health system, and by market forces shaping the availability of 
pharmaceutical products. The digital therapeutic must be prescribed by a medical provider, 
therefore a patient must have some kind of relationship with a provider in order to get it. 
The participant’s perspective was that because of the costs involved in developing a digital 
therapeutic along the traditional drug development route, the product would likely become  
expensive and limited in accessibility – only people with access to health care services, and a 
health care provider would be able to get it. She contrasts this access with the type of access a 
consumer has to dowloadable smart-phone applications, naming those kinds of health 
applications as ones that fall into the bucket of “population health.”  
 In medical research contexts, “population health” refers to the care and management of 
large numbers of individuals, particularly within a given geographical or clinical context 
(Kindig, 2015). In this interview excerpt, the participant seems to craft a definition of population 
health that rests on consumer access to smart-phone applications. The distinction in her 
company’s “digital therapy” and “population health”arms is one based on the time and resources 
available for the development of either application. If not everything “belongs in the pharma 
model” involving time-intensive development cycles and FDA approval, then the other options 
are to build digital therapy applications that could become available in a way more reminiscent 
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of other non-pharmaceutical therapies like physical or behavioral therapy. These alternate paths 
may not be as lucrative for a company as developing a drug, but they also may not be as costly to 
bring to market.  
According to this participant, patient access to therapy does not stand to be dramatically 
altered by the advent of digital therapeutics. At least, the relative difference to patients is not 
mentioned, but for the potential to gain an additional treatment option through their medical 
provider. Even in the case of therapeutics that would be disseminated through a population 
health arm, their distribution would be dependent on existing health care infrastructure such as 
the kind that enables a patient to access physical therapy following an injury.  
Safeguarding Health 
Another way that “access” surfaced in my interview and document data was in 
relationship to safeguarding concepts of public health. The initial digital therapeutic to gain FDA 
approval, Abilify MyCite, demonstrated ways that the basic promises of digital therapeutics – 
unfettered access to the patient – while bioethically fraught, could pose a form of protection to 
society. Negative critiques of MyCite hinge on the inappropriateness of trialing novel forms of 
patient monitoring on a vulnerable (and potentially paranoid) patient population. This technology 
is designed to increase medication adherence and control the negative symptoms associated with 
schizophrenia and Bipolar I disorder. These diseases are strongly correlated with social 
circumstances of homelessness, poverty, and behavior that may be considered dangerous to 
society at large. Thus, the development of a technology to encourage their control is something 
that could be considered desirable by health care workers and law enforcement. Similarly, 
companies are developing digital therapeutics to serve as a substitute for problematic 
pharmaceutical therapies like opioids and psychotropic meds that may be heavily regulated and 
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pose institutional challenges to prescribe. Digital Therapeutics, then, may increase provider 
access to legal ways of controlling unruly patient populations. This came through subtly in my 
interview data, and was described through a language of empowering caregivers working with 
elderly senior populations, as one former digital therapeutics CEO described: 
“…But, you can't put enough objects, enough different things to do, in any one 
community to be able to reach any one individual. So we think about digital 
therapeutics in a very pointed definition. A digital therapeutic replaces a med. 
Customers, providers of longterm care were using <product> as a digital therapy 
instead of medications. Specifically psychotropic drugs. My thinking was this 
simple. A clinician goes to identify that for Mrs. Jones she can administer this 
psychotropic drug, why shouldn't she also in that EHR, have an indicator, have a 
prescription for digital therapy and be able to prescribe <product>. All of that 
should be and could be tracked. I was recruited to run <digital therapeutic 
company> in a bit of a turnaround. I saw more and more firsthand this anecdotal 
demonstration on probably eight or so customers that did their own studies. 
Again, I stress I wouldn't call it “research,” but they did their own studies to 
demonstrate not only the impact they had on the individuals with cognitive 
challenges, but the impact that this also had on caregivers, and families, and 
socialization. If you think about it, now I'm a caregiver and I didn't just put 
somebody to sleep in their bed. I also got them engaged in something that's of 
interest. As a caregiver, there's a great sense of value that now I have, that I did 
something fundamentally different and fundamentally better.”  
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In this particular example, the participant is referencing longterm care facilities, places 
where the use of some psychotropic drugs to control patients has been outlawed among dementia 
patients because of their abuse as “medical restraints” (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Stockwell, 
2018). One particular example I am familiar with from my hospice work is the use of Haldol. 
Haldol, a commonly prescribed psychotropic drug used to treat symptoms of agitation and 
nausea at the end of life, is commonly discouraged by facility administrators from being ordered 
for patients in order to avoid the possibility of misuse – or accusations of misuse. For this reason, 
the staff at long-term care facilities are more limited in what they have on hand to soothe elderly 
patients. Meanwhile, they often lack the necessary staffing for continued human-human 
interaction, something that has been shown to reduce symptoms of agitation in elderly patients 
living with dementia. Thus, the design of a digital intervention to occupy these patients could be 
of great interest. While described in light of the personal satisfaction it would bring caregivers, 
access to digital interventions like this reduces the burden of continuously responding to the 
needs of agitated patients, and it could potentially replace the need for hiring additional staff.  
 In a different but aligned example, some of the latest digital therapeutic products have 
been designed with the opioid epidemic in mind. In these cases, a sense of safeguarding public 
health is also invoked as the technology is leveraged for application to an epidemic rooted in 
social, structural determinants. Different from the situation with elderly patients, the opioid 
epidemic is geographically linked to rural, economically depressed areas of the United States 
where job opportunities are limited and where poverty is a basic reality for many citizens (Rigg, 
Monnat and Chavaz, 2016; Rigg and Monnat, 2018). By designing a digital tool to intervene on 
behavioral issues, the makers of the technologies propose increased control of a patient 
population that have traditionally been hard to reach. In a press release from January 2019, a 
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pharmaceutical company, Novartis, now partnered with pear Therapeutics, a Digital 
Therapeutics start-up, stated in reference to their intervention ReSet ™: 
“‘Addiction is a chronic and relapsing disease that requires constant support, 
monitoring and access to treatment,’ said Corey McCann, M.D., Ph.D, President 
and CEO of Pear Therapeutics. ‘We believe prescription digital therapeutics can 
transform the way clinicians treat addiction by providing a way for patients to 
access treatment when and where it's needed. reSET-O has been clinically proven 
to increase the likelihood that a patient will remain in treatment, while also 
providing a way for patients to access treatment anytime, anywhere, under 
clinician supervision.’” …High attrition and relapse rates represent a significant 
obstacle to providing care to patients with OUD [Opioid Use Disorder]. 
Therefore, it is important to retain patients in treatment. Retention in treatment is 
a well-established indicator of successful treatment outcomes for OUD patients. 
The study data demonstrate that reSET-O significantly improved OUD patient 
retention rates in outpatient treatment.” (Novartis Website, 2019) 
In this situation, addiction is framed as a disease that persists because of patients’ lack of 
access to appropriate forms of treatment – and appropriate forms of treatment, the improvement 
that digital therapeutics can make, are framed as those that provide a constant veil of 
surveillance. The promise of the digital therapeutic is that providing a behaviorally based, 
continuously present treatment option to providers will enable them to maintain better control 
over their patients, solving issues of patient attrition. Behavioral components of addiction are 
thus identified and prioritized in connection with the explanation of a disease as biologically 
based and behaviorally perpetuated. 
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Improved Medical Standards  
While my data revealed how access connected to ideas about safeguarding health – 
protecting it, controlling it, and granting medical providers increased ways of intervening on it –  
access also came up in connection with the provisioning of health care expertise. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 in connection with technical quality and the migration of expertise, interview 
participants described digital therapeutics as a way to improve medical standards. An academic 
researcher focused on addiction research reflected: 
“Basically centers that provide treatment for addiction, many of them it, if you 
look at the employees who they employ, at the educational backgrounds of who 
they employ, it looks very different from other health conditions. And what I 
mean by that is the proportion of people with master's level training is very low. 
And so there's a lot of folks without clinical credentials providing care at those 
agencies, which tends to go along with not having been exposed to training in 
psychosocial treatment or therapies that have been shown to have evidence. And 
<evidence based> therapies are the ones that are incorporated into digital 
treatments for addiction, like digitized cognitive behavioral therapy, community 
reinforcement therapy, or contingency management. Some of these things have 
been tested in research. They're effective. They are providing a way for people to 
be able to access what works without the human there.” 
Here the participant describes how, within the context of addiction treatment, part of the 
problem associated with ineffective treatment is that the people working in treatment facilities do 
not have appropriate training. With the advent of digital therapeutics, patients have access to an 
improved standard of care without having to rely on the credentials of a human provider. This 
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perspective was echoed and elaborated on in an engineer’s explanation of disease and digital 
therapeutic benefit: 
“Part of why people are sick is because they avoid doing things that affect their 
health that are unpleasant. And so we're trying to overcome that. So giving them a 
reason to is going to be hard but identifying a reason they already have is a little 
bit more doable. And when you're talking to someone maybe they can do that, we 
could do that same kind of question and answer kind of thing or what I really love 
to do is demonstrate other patients going through that process of discovering why 
they want to do something. You can identify with that patient, even if you don't 
have the same reason, recognizing that, "Okay yeah there's something I care 
about." It's different than what that patient cared about, but I could identify my 
own reason for wanting to do this. And you don't need a person to be able to do 
that.”  
I asked:   
“And so then you build what you learn into the interaction that the person's 
having with the program?” 
Participant: 
“Yes, exactly…It could be video, it could be some kind of interactive video. Like 
when we're using technology we have all of these tools that are available to us to 
think about what could work and trying it and then of these ideas, what works the 
best? Do that enough, and you're able to segment populations to see what 
techniques match with different segments, you could even present those as 
options like, "Would you rather watch a video? Would you rather hear an audio? 
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Would you rather see a diagram? Would you rather read?" And this is what I 
mean by having that variety of content and data is how we're going to create the 
best overall solution for our heterogeneous model.” 
This conversation with a senior software engineer shows the varied sense of access that 
creators of digital therapeutics are advancing. First, he describes advancing access to early 
identification – that enabling patients to name their reasons for being healthy is a key driver, then 
he connects that with providing access to connection – to the experience of other patients going 
through similar travails. Next he discusses the digital format as advancing access to different 
options for engaging patients, personalizing their intervention to different people through various 
media – videos, audio programs, diagrams, or something to read.  
Access to What 
 
Access was invoked in my data in reference to patient access, to provider access and the 
many forms this may take: patient access to data, patient access to care, provider access to the 
patient, provider access to treatment options. Little mentioned in interviews, but mentioned in 
large ways throughout more public conversations is the notion of privatized company access. 
The digital therapeutic company (or the pharmaceutical company, as the case may be), is the 
third party that has access not only to patient information, but also to expertise and capital. None 
of my interview participants talked about the value inherent in housing these assets, but several 
participants mentioned the lengths their companies go to in securing them. My data spoke to 
notions of competition and scarcity in light of seeking financial capital. This was evident in the 
number of interviews with participants who mentioned that their company was working in stealth  
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mode, as well as in the justifications of engineers for their decision making. Take this quote from 
a data engineering manager: 
“The way that our team tries to approach things is we use something for as long as 
possible until it gets really painful (laughing), like for a small company where the 
resources are limited, that’s a really effective philosophy so that you don’t end up 
over-engineering and adopting things that they might not need just yet. So, the old 
software that we had had been around for at least a few years, and for the most 
part was working, it kind of grew organically, but over time it just became really 
slow, so we worked on improving that part of it by adopting some other 
technology and then after we addressed that issue it became more apparent that it 
was harder for the data scientists and data analysts to work with their data 
effectively using the software that we had written. It was very much written from 
the perspective of an engineer trying to move data through the system – like it 
was written in a particular programming language that was just all code for the 
most part. That code was orchestrated using <proprietary software>, but that’s not 
something that data scientists could use. It’s not a tool that they’re very familiar 
with. For the most part, the data analysts—sorry, the data scientists – are familiar 
with Python because Python has a lot of reusable software packages for 
performing analysis and performing statistics and working the data. So the data 
scientists were already familiar with those tools and actually, some of them were 
already exploring using <New software> and another similar tool. So, when we 
saw that, it was kind of this indicator that there was something missing in our 
system and it was making it harder for, essentially for our customers, to get what 
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they needed. We [engineers] provided some things – we provided the raw data, 
but we didn’t provide as much of the infrastructure for working with that data as 
we hoped we could [emphasis theirs]. …Our product manager, who is also a data 
scientist, was the one pushing for us to explore available options. So we started 
looking into <New Software> and <Another New Software> and dug more into 
the problems we had that could be solved by those tools. So that’s basically how 
we eventually ended up settling on <New Software>. 
Here the data manager shows how not only engineering constraints, but also the priorities 
of the product manager and data scientist drove decision making and narrowed the types 
of tools that were up for consideration such that they, or their customers, could get the 
information they needed faster. 
Participants with a technical role in a digital therapeutics company, when asked “what is 
the biggest priority for you right now?,” commonly mentioned the security of data, because, as 
one Chief Technology Officer said to me, “There is just a massive amount of room for damage if 
we screw it up.” The “massive amount of room” speaks to the dissemination capacity with 
software, where features and programs are deployed to all of the users, or some portion of them, 
on a company’s digital platform. Hiring practices supported this priority, as many of the senior 
level technical professionals I spoke with had professional backgrounds working on software 
systems to secure financial data; they had been recruited specifically for this expertise.  
Keeping an individual’s health data secure for these companies also means that the 
company preserves their access to the data. Because of the nascence of these companies, 
conversations about what they intend to do with the data in the future tended to beget somewhat 
unformulated explanations. While the capacity to leverage patient data is central to these 
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technologies, the full capabilities of them are largely unknown. There was a widespread 
sentiment among most executive level leaders I spoke with that part of the novelty of digital 
therapeutics was first in the capability of the technology to collect more and different 
information on patients than has ever before been possible, particularly information of a 
behavioral nature. Second, there was a strong sentiment that respective digital therapeutics 
companies housed the unique, “systems-based” thinking to learn from this accessible data, to 
make data-driven recommendations to patients who were suffering from inadequate and siloed 
treatment approaches within the traditional biomedical paradigm. As one CEO described: 
“It's crazy to me that it has taken so long for us to actually get to this place. I'm 
not kidding, we have people that have been sick for twenty-five years and they go 
through a sixteen-week protocol and they are symptom free and their kidneys that 
were failing are back to one-hundred percent, their blood work is back, their 
insulin is reduced, their daily sixty milligrams of prednisone is gone, their drugs 
went from twenty-one to seven. …When it comes to our bodies, traditionally 
we've looked at it like a game of whack-a-mole. Like every symptom pops up and 
we just hammer it down, but we don't actually figure out what in the system that's 
fundamentally signaling in the first place.” 
In response I commented:  
“What you are describing sounds like a diagnostic approach. Why hasn't the 
healthcare system taken that up as their approach?” 
CEO:  
“Exactly. That's just how we see ourselves. We call ourselves traditional 
therapeutic but of course we have a diagnostic approach, right? We're essentially 
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applying a business model optimizing for scanning, or something like that, to the 
human body. By looking at a single person in our computer system, we're 
debunking our health. A lot of times people talk about organs like, "oh we need 
your appendix" or "we really don't need your gall bladder" or whatever... but we 
don't look at it from a symptoms approach. We look at it isolated like, "Oh we can 
take out the appendix and people are fine." But we don't actually know, two years 
later, when they have a big issue, if that's actually because the system processes 
are no longer aligned. I think that's the kind of approach that we are fostering. To 
actually look at how are all these systems are interrelated and if you establish that, 
you can help your system by doing something in a completely different 
compartment. Maybe that's actually the way to understand our body processes 
better.” 
This participant describes with verve how collecting and analyzing a patient’s behavioral 
data then enables a novel, systems-based approach to diagnosis and cure, something radically 
differentiated from existing biomedical care models. In speaking with them, I had to stave off 
some amount of skepticism that they were not guilty of at least a modicum of magical thinking; 
the effectiveness of the company’s technology described seemed almost too good to be true. As I 
found myself gawking at what seemed like the absurdity of some product success stories, I 
remembered the time I had been struck by the same sense of outlandishness as a start-up 
employee. Speaking with executive leadership, particularly those in the throes of fundraising 
efforts, often felt akin to being an audience member at a product marketing campaign.  
Accessing capital is usually always a near-term goal for start-up companies pursuing 
venture capital backed financing. For this reason, access to accurate information about how 
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thoroughly effective, or vetted a product is, can be challenging to obtain. Short of working as 
part of a company in the midst of courting potential investors, talking with employees is typically 
the only road to learning about the internal activities within a firm. And a start-up CEO’s pitch is 
often the same explanation as a response detailing their company’s challenges, the product’s 
effectiveness, and/or the potential of a company’s technology to do something beyond what it 
can presently perform. In keeping, some data from this study speak as much to my participants’ 
palpable exuberance for technology to impact care, as they do to their applied knowledge of 
effective marketing.  
Access for Whom 
 
I did not receive many nuanced explanations of how relocating diagnostic or care 
activities to software modalities and data servers in the cloud actually made it easier to access by 
individuals for whom access is an existing issue. The rural populations of patients suffering from 
provider shortage may also be suffering from a lack of broadband access, as a recent article 
detailed that up to 40 million Americans do not have highspeed internet (Poon, 2020), and 
approximately 20% are without a smartphone (Pew Research Center Mobile Fact Sheet, 2019). 
This truth changes the manner in which we think about patient access as a care barrier– the 
dependencies may shift from geographic challenges to sociocultural and technological ones, at 
least in the global north, but they may not mitigate the number of challenges.  
Descriptions within my interview data speak to ways in which care is conceptually 
distilled to systems-based interventions through a language of increased access; it also speaks to 
ways in which access itself may not be increased, but rather altered by the creation of digital 
therapeutics. As medical providers become less involved in mediating the provision of 
intervention-based digital care, care may at the same time take on a more consumer-based 
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appearance where patients access interventions at home. This seems particularly true in creating 
the “population based” health applications mentioned by my interview participants whose 
acquisition and use may be mediated by downloading applications from a central repository such 
as the Apple corporation’s iTunes store. Accessibility in this case then, means considering social, 
cultural, and economic considerations that impact this modality’s likely use as a tool in 
connection with health.  
In a May 2019 New York Times article entitled, “Human Contact is Now a Luxury 
Good,” the authors describe a low-income senior living in San Francisco being monitored by an 
avatar on a digital tablet, Sox. The article describes the latest permutation of the “digital divide:”  
Life for anyone but the very rich — the physical experience of learning, living 
and dying — is increasingly mediated by screens. Not only are screens 
themselves cheap to make, but they also make things cheaper. Any place that can 
fit a screen in (classrooms, hospitals, airports, restaurants) can cut costs. And any 
activity that can happen on a screen becomes cheaper. The texture of life, the 
tactile experience, is becoming smooth glass. The rich do not live like this. The 
rich have grown afraid of screens. They want their children to play with blocks, 
and tech-free private schools are booming. Humans are more expensive, and rich 
people are willing and able to pay for them. Conspicuous human interaction — 
living without a phone for a day, quitting social networks and not answering email 
— has become a status symbol. All of this has led to a curious new reality: 
Human contact is becoming a luxury good. As more screens appear in the lives of 
the poor, screens are disappearing from the lives of the rich. The richer you are, 
the more you spend to be offscreen. Milton Pedraza, the chief executive of 
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the Luxury Institute, advises companies on how the wealthiest want to live and 
spend, and what he has found is that the wealthy want to spend on anything 
human. ‘What we are seeing now is the luxurification of human engagement,’ Mr. 
Pedraza said (Bowles, 2019). 
While hinting towards a bit of a puff piece in the stark dichotomy drawn between “rich” and 
“poor,” the article speaks to new ways that life is being organized along class lines as a result of 
technology’s cheap substitution effect. Typically, the term “digital divide” is invoked to compare 
technologically dense areas of the world to places (such as parts of the United States mentioned 
previously in this chapter) where access to technology is lacking. This piece points to a different 
emerging trend, however, that as access to screens becomes more ubiquitous, its detrimental 
effects – about which we are still learning – also become stratified along class lines.  
If we consider digital therapeutics in this regard, particularly those interventions with 
mental health applications striving to (and celebrating) the elimination of the human therapist, it 
is possible to see how the divide between care bound in relationships as opposed to curing 
through intervention also stands to widen. My interview data speak to myriad ways that this 
human elimination is a good thing – eradicating the risk of bad therapists and providing patients 
with access to improved standards, to an intervention that has been proven effective, designed to 
cure. The silences of the data – and perhaps simply the limitations of it given that this research 
did not include patient interviews – speak to all the things we do not know about what happens 
when you reduce care to non-human interventions entirely.  
Place-Based Reflections 
 
Doing this project in the Bay Area meant confronting multiple urban realities in the midst 
of interviewing a tiny sliver of the tech sector workforce. Woven as they are into small aspects of 
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my participant interviews, the context for meeting people in the mid-market neighborhood was 
one of convenience – it was the place most commonly suggested by participants as near to their 
office location, a spot where they wouldn’t lose extra time going. It was also a place where 
having coffee on shiny street corners was flanked by a noticeable degree of human suffering. 
Thinking through the encounters with interview participants meant bracketing questions like, 
“What am I/are we doing right now in light of these folks who are asking for food and money?” 
Listening to the promises of digital therapeutics in the comfort of clean clothes and the 
understanding that I had a place to sleep that felt safe, was something much easier to do over 
Zoom or by phone than out in the world. When these conversations happened in the middle of 
San Francisco’s downtown, they were starkly positioned alongside a raw and visceral sense of 
scarcity unparalleled by the form of scarcity conjured in my interviews by company founders 
competing for venture capital dollars. Could anyone care about these products if they didn’t have 
supportive relationships, a home, or money for a meal? Does producing these products help to 
create any of these necessities for people who might need them? While those thoughts often ran 
through my mind and may have been running through the mind of my participants during 
interviews, answers to them obviously fall with a resounding, “No.” Neither studying this 
segment of labor activity, nor participating in it would be possible without some basic supports 
in place. It is my earnest hope that studying this area, while unhelpful in providing immediate 
relief to any pressing issues of inequity, helps bring to light ways in which future work can get at 
some of its upstream determinants.    
Analyzing memo data showed, in a felt sense, how goals of self-empowerment and 
betterment as advanced by digital therapeutics products may push against work centering a social 
responsibility to care about those living in different ways within the same geographical 
 112 
boundaries of a city. For one thing, the frenzied and consuming pace of start-up culture described 
to me, “trying to learn things as quickly as possible, failing fast, racing to the future” (Composite 
of interview and Blitzscaling quotes, 2019), does not leave human bandwidth for considering 
much else. Moreover, concepts of health as bound up in the individual optimizing logics of 
technology products contrast with the idea of relational personhood put forth earlier in Chapter 3 
(Prainsack, 2018). While previous work has highlighted this problematic in light of the 
personalized medicine movement, I am unaware of ways that it has been applied to 
technoscientific arrangements more generally, or to digital health production specifically. My 
well-being as linked to that of the blanketed man from my interview with Claire is unaccounted 
for in the context of a digital therapeutic encounter. Neither, on the other hand, would the digital 
therapeutic encounter provide new possibilities to the blanketed man for accessing human 
relationships, shelter, or food. In a basic way, individual interventions do not get at the social and 
structural arrangements that give rise to varying depictions of health, nor can they offer much to 
public health when those arrangements are not present.  
Although tangential to the research aims of this ethnography, differing ways that “access” 
was constituted by my data show, at a minimum, the need for more nuanced investigations of 
what actors are talking about when they invoke the word. Framing access in its pluralist forms 
may be a new way to get at considerations of health equity in studying tech sector development. 
At a minimum, this framing shows a thread that runs through my data and points to the necessity 
for closer investigations of ways that inequity is situated in the context of digital therapeutic 
production and the places it takes place. 
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Discussion 
 
At a friend-of-a-friend’s birthday party, I found myself speaking with a venture capitalist 
who makes financial investments focused exclusively on Type I Diabetes. She was interested in 
trying to bolster the interest of her colleagues in digital therapeutics as all of their financial stakes 
were currently rooted in traditional pharmaceutical development. I listened to her share a little bit 
about her work, and she returned the focus to me, excited for the completion of my research so 
that I may impart to her the clear front runners of the area. Not too long after this meeting, a 
physician crafting statewide policy for opioid prescribing approached me with similar 
enthusiasm, noting that digital alternatives to in-person therapies were “crucial” for the 
feasibility of substance abuse treatment.  
Perhaps these two occurrences should not have surprised me, but they did. Over the 
course of the research, I was struck by how often people I spoke with assumed that I was 
studying digital therapeutics in order to advance their implementation. Non-technically trained 
people, including the women referenced here (neither of whom lived in the Bay Area or were a 
part of my immediate social web) referenced technology as an obvious answer to structural-level 
care problems, the cost-effective solution to issues ranging from provider shortage to patient 
attrition. While I was actually studying digital therapeutics because of my original skepticism 
and curiosity about how an industry could advance in the absence of clear regulatory guidance, 
what seemed to evolve throughout the course of research was my own position as an outlier 
among popular sentiment that digital therapeutics were a necessary, inevitable future in care.  
During the course of this fieldwork, I wrestled with the ethical question of how, if at all, 
the research I was performing would impact digital therapeutics formation. Perhaps giving 
attention to this burgeoning area as a legitimate research topic lent legitimacy to it. The phrase, 
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“all press is good press” came to mind, pointing to the possibility that nearly any attention, and 
particularly academic attention, given to research phenomena helps codify them as “real things.”  
At times I found myself acting as a spokesperson for digital therapeutics; it was a hard position 
to avoid as someone studying their production. To some degree it was incumbent on me to form 
an opinion about the activities I was examining. When research participants emailed asking for 
lists of characteristics of current digital therapeutic companies, information I had readily at hand, 
I willingly provided it to them both in the spirit of sharing, as well as in gratitude for the time 
they had given to interview. I weighed the trade-off and did not find it any more troubling than 
the one I made with conference organizers where, in exchange for free admission to both digital 
therapeutics conferences, I produced summary reports of the events to conference attendees. 
Striving to maintain a partiality to the public interest, I saw no serious problem with this 
agreement since the summaries became part of my dissertation data in contribution towards a 
publicly disseminated dissertation.  
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Conclusion 
 
“Digital therapeutic makers see  
opportunity as pandemic prompts  
FDA to ease rules.” 
 
-Medtech news headline 
April 24, 2020 
 
In December 2019, Congresspeople called for public input in the creation of Cures 2.0, a 
bill designed to foster unachieved aims of the 21st Century Cures Act with a specific focus on 
digital health (Martin, forthcoming; Degette and Upton, 2019). By March 2020, The United 
States of America had declared a state of national emergency concerning the COVID-19 disease 
outbreak. People living in San Francisco (but for its homeless residents) were ordered to shelter-
in-place following containment measures to curb the spread of the pandemic. Schools closed, 
many individuals became unemployed, and much of the city’s tech workforce scrambled in a 
shift to work-from-home. In response to the pandemic, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
and private insurers loosened restrictions on reimbursement for telemedicine, prompting health 
system attorneys to finalize contracts with digital health vendors, ushering in an era of ubiquitous 
remote care for many types of clinical visits. Rock Health, a prominent digital health incubator 
sent out its regular newsletter on March 23rd, 2020 entitling it, “Telemedicine’s tipping point” 
(Rock Health, 2020). 
As for my dissertation writing that was suddenly taking place more slowly and entirely 
from home, it seemed slightly ill-fated that writing and analysis should come to an end in March 
2020, right when such salient precedents were being set both for workplace norms and digital 
health regulatory schema. What would this mean for the digitization of behavioral health? In the 
midst of it all, on March 26, 2020 one of the digital therapeutic company frontrunners, Pear 
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Therapeutics, obtained FDA authorization for a new product, SOMRYST, to treat insomnia. It 
was the first product approval to take place as part of FDA’s initial Software Precertification 
Pilot Program, and in reading the press release I wondered if its dovetail with COVID-19 had 
been serendipitously engineered to profit from the forthcoming sleeplessness of newly 
unemployed people. In any case, as with all research on novel and evolving phenomena, the 
findings from my work mark a specific point in time – two years in time – which seemed to 
quickly recede against the backdrop of a global public health crisis. I’ve tried to do service in 
elucidating the overall climate in which this research took place, including some of the 
situational aspects of San Francisco’s urban environment and its attending specificities.  
Between August 2018 and March 2020, public conversations about widening wealth 
inequality in the United States were taking center stage in news publications (Chetty et al., 2017; 
United Nations Report, 2020; Ingraham, 2020; Zucman, 2019; Badger and Quely, 2019). San 
Francisco was often positioned as the brunt of a joke about the impossibility of life in a place 
with $3690/month average rent for a 1-bedroom apartment, scorning out-of-touch elites who 
transformed city corners into tech-sector luxury bus stations while pushing long-time residents to 
the margins (Brinklow, 2020). Following the COVID-19 outbreak, storefronts boarded up in San 
Francisco and panicked social media posts pleaded for unused personal protective equipment. 
The virtual anxiety pulsing through Zoom conference software and social media platforms 
seemed to speak to the precarity of economic and social models, rather than to people’s 
generosity in observing shelter-in-place orders. A robust ecosystem wouldn’t be this fragile, and 
yet, its un-sustainability is something that scholars have highlighted for years (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2011; Deaton, 2013; Jennings, 2013).  
 117 
While this dissertation is not an urban ethnography of health innovation in San Francisco, 
health tech sector environments and prevailing concerns with fundraising do contrast with the 
very apparent precarity lining many city areas. A double-edged analysis of these worlds would 
advance understandings of who and how certain communities benefit at the expense of others, a 
concern for both scientists and policymakers interested in the appropriate crafting of structural 
interventions.  
Overview of Findings 
 
Defining Digital Therapeutics 
In this project, I set out to investigate the trajectories of digital therapeutics industry 
formation in tandem with its regulatory development in San Francisco. My findings present ways 
in which digital therapeutics are being defined and operationalized in proximity to the 
commercialization of behavioral science. This is abetted by shifts in evidence production 
prioritizing the attainment of positive health outcomes. The formation of digital therapeutics 
confers new types of occupational arrangements in both clinical and technical domains, and 
brings to light ways that quality is differentiated along clinical and technical lines.  
Regulation 
A central finding of this research is that in the current environment where there are not 
clear regulatory standards for digital therapeutics products, regulatory guidance is effectively 
outsourced to an ecosystem of “implicit standards” as advanced by collaboratives such as the 
ADviCE group and the Digital Therapeutics Alliance. In connection to this finding, my data also 
show how in the absence of regulatory oversight, regulatory expertise becomes an asset for 
firms, advantaging actors with more resources. Current commercial actors who can capture 
regulatory expertise within their specific company position themselves to collaborate with FDA 
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in defining the rules for other players, thereby helping to shape the regulatory landscape 
according to their interests. Given new regulatory frameworks aiming to evaluate whole 
companies rather than individual products for “Cultures of Quality and Organizational 
Excellence,” the opportunity to positively interact with FDA in an initial authorization process 
would be beneficial for future rapport and potential designation as an excellent organization. 
Selfhood 
Findings from this project demonstrate particular conceptions of health advanced by 
digital therapeutics companies as centering on optimizable, behavioral processes that increase 
individual access to higher care standards. This research highlights the role of behavioral science 
in furthering individualized ideas about health, and the position that commercial entities occupy 
in their service as expertise migrates from academic labs to commercial domains. For 
developers, health is constructed as the sum of divisible parts that, when faulty, present a 
problem that digital therapeutic solutions can intervene upon for profit. Ideas of health as 
advanced by digital therapeutic companies center on notions of selfhood that are constructed 
outside of relationships, where disease burden is placed in the hands of the consumer to fix, 
should they be empowered enough to do so. These digital interventions further reassign 
responsibility to patients/consumers for their health, distancing solutions from traditional 
healthcare, and choosing against possibilities for structural intervention, linking people to the 
enterprises that house their personal health data through individual empowerment logics. These 
notions of health diverge from relational aspects of health and wellness, privileging traditionally 
Eurocentric ideas about autonomy, ownership, and individualism as enacted through self-care. 
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Evidence 
In the process of “empowering” individuals, expertise is relocated to the digital 
therapeutic product. This relocation of expertise aims to “purify” interventions in heightening 
standards of care and in the process, “liberate” patients from dependence on bad medical actors. 
In building these products, researchers with expertise in behavioral science shape the research 
agenda to fit within condensed timeframes and produce outcomes that align with commercial 
success. This finding contains implications for studying the commercial determinants of health, 
particularly in light of the fact that many firms produce their own research, in addition to 
generating and submitting their own analytics to FDA in fulfillment of post-market assessment 
analysis. 
Access 
Finally, my data speak to conflicting ideas about what “access” means in relationship to 
digital therapeutics, where the idea that they increase patients’ entrée to services oversimplifies 
the tangle of meanings that access assumes in consideration of these products. Teasing out the 
discrepancies between company mission statements and commercial activities using access as a 
frame may be a way to empirically examine how commercial activities influence some of the 
structural arrangements that have health equity concerns at their core. 
Discussion 
 
A question I consistently asked myself during this research was: what is being produced 
alongside the making of digital therapeutic products in the name of health innovation? My 
interviews speak to commercialization as constitutive of innovation for behavioral health, and 
they speak to an occupational reorganizing that occurs in the midst of these activities, in order to 
craft and advance products serving as interventions. My findings also speak to a co-mingling of 
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commercial and regulatory activities, particularly during a period where the nature of regulation 
is in flux as a response to the iterative nature of software. FDA’s focus, aside from expediting the 
time to market for products, is to prevent one-off adverse events. In this climate, there is virtually 
no entity tasked with evaluating a) the integrity of evidence that is proving these product claims 
b) the equitable distribution of resources fueling the creation of these products or c) any promise 
for the product to produce public benefit in the form of a social good. As such, the types of trade-
offs made within our current framework for vetting safety and effectiveness deserve more 
attention, particularly in light of who benefits from them, and at whose expense.  
As an industry, digital therapeutics is very visible to the public – company founders have 
worked with conference organizers to make sure it is a defined area within the digital health 
landscape, it has a non-profit trade group advocating for its heightened presence as well as 
lobbying for its furthered uptake in the context of COVID-19 (Brodwin and Robbins, 2020). 
Pharmaceutical firms have begun partnering with its frontrunners to build companion products 
and/or act as a strategic investment entity. The public has read about digital therapeutics in the 
New York Times and the Harvard Business Review, or seen them presented on Dr Oz. Despite 
these different forms of public presence, this cadre of products – as representative of digitized 
behavioral health interventions – remains invisible from the perspective of regulatory oversight. 
This duality of public-facing presence and regulatory non-presence works to the advantage of 
product manufacturers since it presents opportunities to collaborate with FDA in defining the 
area and setting precedents for ways that future products will be vetted.   
Emergent scholarship on assetization has named innovation as a problem in and of itself 
– that innovation and financialization are inextricably bound up in the research strategies of 
monopolistic giants (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) whose company agendas flow from the 
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exploitation of our digitized personal data (Birch, Chiapetta, Artyushina, 2020). While none of 
these companies have come out with a digital therapeutic product as of yet, the strategies of 
digital therapeutics companies fall squarely within this problematic. Some of the normative 
recommendations the authors make may also extend to digital therapeutics as considerations for 
policies centering social responsibility. 
Recommendations 
 
Based on findings from this research, I propose several recommendations in connection 
with the formation of digital therapeutics across regulatory, health system, and research domains.  
Regulatory Science 
• Digital therapeutics’ formal recognition by FDA: FDA should recognize Digital therapeutics 
as a distinct product category within the Center for Radiologic and Digital Health. This 
product category should use a capabilities approach to establish guidelines for vetting 
submissions according to stated, implied, current, and future diagnostic as well as therapeutic 
benefits.  
• Product Claims in grey areas: FDA should establish a work group with appropriate expertise 
to review SaMD low-risk devices that contain both diagnostic and therapeutic benefits as part 
of individual product claims. 
• Post-market assessment activities: FDA should establish third parties with descriptive metrics 
for assessing the integrity of post-market assessment data presented by companies producing 
SaMD.  
• Assessment of commercial evidence production: The U.S. Offices of Research Integrity and 
Government Accountability should include the assessment of digital research/ digital 
evidence production in its 2020/2021 priority agenda.  
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Health Systems 
• Incorporating ethical guidance into implementation science. Biomedical health centers 
should incorporate ethical guidance into evolving digital health implementation strategies. 
Such guidance may incorporate a full assessment of the health issue a digital intervention is 
aimed at solving including its non-technical solution alternatives. It should include equity 
assessments for how and in what ways varying patient populations served by the health 
system will benefit, thereby creating opportunities to fill gaps with alternate forms of 
care/support as needed.  
• Bolstering structural competency training: Education about “commercial determinants of 
health” should be incorporated into structural competency training for health professionals. 
While the structural determinants of health disparities have been largely incorporated into 
physician training models in medical school curricula, this is not the case for all allied health 
professions, particularly those existing on the “front lines” of care. Information pertaining to 
commercial determinants of health should be incorporated into structural competency 
training, and structural competency training should be incorporated into required the 
coursework for allied health professionals in areas including nursing, occupational, physical, 
and speech therapy, and medical social work.  
Future Research 
As alluded to in Chapter 4, this research points to “access” in its plurality as a helpful 
concept for framing research on technoscientific development and its stratifying effects. In 
crafting future research on health innovation, attention should be given to specific ways in which 
evidence production is shifting alongside commercialization in moving behavioral health 
interventions into products. Specific questions to consider are: What are the epistemological 
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foundations of the effectiveness testing for these products? Who are the beta testers for a product 
and how were they recruited? For whom is a product intended and how has it been “taken up” by 
consumers/patients/users? 
Empirical examination of health innovation funding arrangements is also an area 
deserving of more attention by researchers. Beyond the financing of individual health startups in 
comparison to startups of other industries, dollars flowing into product formation should be 
weighed against financial support for other types of health improvements within geographies.  
A Final Word 
 
Studying the formation of digital therapeutics presents a case study in how technological 
innovation is reshaping the nature of evidence production, therapeutic standards, and human 
interaction for behavioral health. This domain is virtually unregulated and deserves attention for 
the sake of public health, evidence integrity, and future promises of equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
References 
 
Accelerated Digital Clinical Ecosystem (ADviCE) Website. (2019). Available 
http://www.advicehealth.org/initiatives/ 
Agile Manifesto, (2018). Retrieved  http://agilemanifesto.org/principles.html. 
Agile Development Manifesto Website. (2001). Available http://agilemanifesto.org/ 
Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer Phenomenology Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative 
research. Qualitative research, 1(3), 385-405. 
Alam, S. Y. (2016). Promissory Failures: How Consumer Health Technologies Build Value, 
Infrastructures and the Future in the Present (Doctoral dissertation, UCSF). 
Aspinall, M. G., & Hamermesh, R. G. (2007). Realizing the promise of personalized 
medicine. Harvard business review, 85(10), 108. 
Badger, E. & Quely, K. (2019). “Watch 4 generations of inequality drive American cities apart.” 
The New York Times. Available https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/upshot/wealth-
poverty-divide-american-cities.html?fbclid=IwAR19gKfuIy5vNfvIqnFDZrLK5-
PVaKkCJg9bRxH6HabGmWWbjuPW2RTugLg 
Beer, D. (2009). “Power through the algorithm? Participatory web cultures and the technological 
unconscious.” New Media Society 11: 985-1002. 
Belluck, P. (2017). First digital pill approved to worries about biomedical ‘big brother’. New 
York Times, 13. 
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race after technology: Abolitionist tools for the new jim code. John Wiley 
& Sons. 
 125 
Benner, P. (1994). The tradition and skill of interpretive phenomenology in studying health, 
illness and caring practices. In P. Benner, Ed., Interpretive Phenomenology: 
Embodiment, Caring and Ethics in Health and Illness. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Pp. 
99-127. 
Benner, P. (Ed.). (1994). Interpretive phenomenology: Embodiment, caring, and ethics in health 
and illness. Sage publications. 
Berg, M. (2017). “Making sense of sensors: self-tracking and the temporalities of wellbeing.” 
Digital Health 3: 1-11. 
Bernstein, E., and Turban, S. (2018). The impact of the ‘open’ workspace on human 
collaboration. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 373(1753), 20170239. Available 
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2017.0239 
Bernstein, E. and Warber, B. (2019). “The truth about open offices.” Harvard Business Review. 
Available https://hbr.org/2019/11/the-truth-about-open-offices. 
Beier, D. (2017). Personal Communication as part of Presentation at University of California, 
Berkeley on Orphan Drug Act.  
Birch, K. (2017). Rethinking value in the bio-economy: Finance, assetization, and the 
management of value. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 42(3), 460-490. 
Birch, K. (2020). Technoscience rent: Toward a theory of rentiership for technoscientific 
capitalism. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 45(1), 3-33. 
Birch, K., Chiappetta, M., & Artyushina, A. (2020). The problem of innovation in 
technoscientific capitalism: data rentiership and the policy implications of turning 
personal digital data into a private asset. Policy Studies, 1-20. 
 126 
Blacker, S. (2014). “Your DNA Doesn’t Need to Be Your Destiny”: Colonialism, Public Health 
and the Financialization of Medicine. TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 30, 123-146. 
Bloor, M. (2001). Techniques of validation in qualitative research: A critical commentary. In R. 
M.  Emerson (Ed.) Contemporary field research: Perspectives and formulations. 
(2nd ed., pp. 383-396). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.  
Boltanski L and Thévenot L (2006 [1991]) On Justification: Economies of Worth. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bowker, G.C., Baker, K., Millerand, F. and Ribes, D. (2010). “Toward Information 
Infrastructure Studies: Ways of Knowing in a Networked Environment.” 
International Handbook of Internet Research  97-110. 
Bowker, G. C., and Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bowen, G. (2009) "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method." Qualitative Research 
Journal,   9(2) 27-40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027 
Bowles, N. (2019). “Human Contact is now a luxury good.” New York Times. Retrieved March 
1, 2020. Available https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/sunday-review/human-
contact-luxury-screens.html 
Bresnick. J. (2017). “Academia Dives into Precision Medicine, Big Data Collaborations.” 
HealthIT Analytics. Accessed March 23, 2018. Available: 
https://healthitanalytics.com/news/academia-dives-into-precision-medicine-big-data-
collaborations. 
 127 
Brewer L.C., Fortuna K.L., Jones C., Walker R., Hayes S.N., Patten C.A., Cooper L.A. Back to 
the Future: Achieving Health Equity Through Health Informatics and Digital Health 
JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2020;8(1):e14512 
Brinklow, R. (2020) “San Francisco’s rents cleared highest in the world, again.” Curbed,  
Available https://sf.curbed.com/2019/3/15/18267525/san-francisco-zumper-most-
expensive-worldwide. 
Brown, P., Rupp, T. & Findlay, S. (2016) “Congress Shouldn’t Pass the 21st Century Cures Act 
in a Summer Rush.” Health Affairs Accessed February 20, 2018. Available 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/11/congress-shouldnt-pass-the-21st-century-
cures-act-in-a-summer-rush/ 
Butler, J. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
Caraballo, P. J. et al. (2017). Multidisciplinary Model to Implement Pharmacogenomics at the 
Point of Care. Genetics in Medicine : Official Journal of the American College of 
Medical Genetics, 19(4), 421–429. http://doi.org/10.1038/gim.2016.120 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (2017). Meaningful Use. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/ehrmeaningfuluse/introduction.html 
Challener, C. (2018). “FDA Ramped up Approval Rate in 2017.” Pharmaceutical Technology  
42(1): 24-33. 
Chan, G., Brykczynski, K., Malone R. & Benner, P. (Eds). (2010). Interpretive Phenomenology 
in Health Care Research. Indianapolis:  Sigma Theta Tau International Press.  
Chatterjee, A. et al. (2018). “Real-world evidence: Driving a new Drug-Development Paradigm 
in Oncology.” McKinsey and Company.  Available 
 128 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-
insights/real-world-evidence-driving-a-new-drug-development-paradigm-in-oncology 
Chetty, R., Grusky, D., Hell, M., Hendren, N., Manduca, R., & Narang, J. (2017). The fading 
American dream: Trends in absolute income mobility since 1940. Science, 356(6336), 
398-406. 
Cortez et. al, 2017: http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170816.061554/full/ 
Warren rebuffs 21st CCA: https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/28/elizabeth-warren-21st-century-
cures/ 
Cortez, N. (2019). Digital health and Regulatory Experimentation at FDA. Yale Journal of 
Health Policy Law and Ethics Available 
https://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/21_yale_j.l._tech._special_issue_4.pdf   
Costanza-Chock, S. (2020). Design justice: Community-led practices to build the worlds we 
need. MIT Press. 
Creswell, J.W. (2013). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing. 
Crunchbase Website, (2020). Omada Health company profile. Available 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/omada-health 
Darrow, J. J., Avorn, J., & Kesselheim, A. S. (2017). Speed, safety, and industry funding—from 
PDUFA I to PDUFA VI. N Engl J Med, 377(23), 2278-2286. 
Dawed, A. Y., Zhou, K., & Pearson, E. R. (2016). “Pharmacogenetics in type 2 diabetes: 
influence on response to oral hypoglycemic agents.” Pharmacogenomics and 
Personalized Medicine, 9, 17–29. http://doi.org/10.2147/PGPM.S84854 
 129 
Deaton, A. (2013). The great escape: health, wealth, and the origins of inequality. Princeton 
University Press. 
Dickson, D. 2013. Me Medicine vs. We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common 
Good. New York: Columbia University Press 
Dickson, B. (2017). “How Artificial Intelligence is Revolutionizing Healthcare.” The Next Web. 
Accessed March 30, 2018. Available https://thenextweb.com/artificial-
intelligence/2017/04/13/artificial-intelligence-revolutionizing-healthcare/ 
Digital Health Software Precertification Program Website, (2019). United States Food and Drug 
Administration. Accessed January 2, 2020. Available https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/digital-health/digital-health-software-precertification-pre-cert-program 
Digital Therapeutics Alliance (DTA) Website, (2019). Available https://dtxalliance.org/ 
Digital Therapeutics Alliance (DTA) Website, Annual membership Dues (2019). Available 
https://dtxalliance.org/membership-dues/ 
Digital Therapeutics Alliance (DTA) Industry Foundations, (2018). Retrieved March 10, 2020. 
Available https://dtxalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DTA-Report_DTx-
Industry-Foundations.pdf 
Dourish, P. (2016). “Algorithms and their others: Algorithmic culture in context.” Big Data and 
Society. 3: 1-11.  
Dreyfus, H.L. (1991). Being-in-the-World. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Eveleth, R. (2014). “How self-tracking apps exclude women.” The Atlantic. Accessed March 28, 
2018. Available https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/12/how-self-
tracking-apps-exclude-women/383673/ 
 130 
Faggella, D. (2018). “Machine learning healthcare applications – 2018 and beyond.” 
TechEmergence. Accessed March 23, 2018. Available: 
https://www.techemergence.com/machine-learning-healthcare-applications/ 
Feit, J. (2018). “The Ibeat is a Smartwatch but it can’t save your life.” Journal of Emergency 
Medical Services. Available https://www.jems.com/2018/07/20/the-ibeat-is-a-smart-
watch-but-it-can-t-save-your-life/ 
Fogel, A. L., & Kvedar, J. C. (2016). Simple digital technologies can reduce health care 
costs. Harvard Business Review. Available https://hbr.org/2016/11/simple-digital-
technologies-can-reduce-health-care-costs#comment-section 
Flowers, E., Martin, M., Hamza, A., Binford, S, Mackin, L. (2019). “Pairing Pedagogical and 
Genomic Advances to Prepare Advance Practice Nurses for the Era of Precision 
Health.” BMC Medical Information.  
Foster, C. (2009). Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics 
and Law. Oxford, UK: Hart 
Geertz, C. (1973). “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays New York: Basic Books, 3-30. 
Giddings, L. S. (2006). Mixed-methods research: Positivism dressed in drag? Journal of 
Research in Nursing, 11(3), 195–203. https://doi.org/10.1177/1744987106064635 
Gottlieb, S. (2017) “Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on advancing new 
digital health policies to encourage innovation, bring efficiency and modernization to 
regulation.” U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Available 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-
scott-gottlieb-md-advancing-new-digital-health-policies-encourage 
 131 
Gottlieb, S. (2017). “FDA announces new steps to empower consumers and advance digital 
healthcare.” U.S. Food and Drug Administration Website. Available 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-
experts/fda-announces-new-steps-empower-consumers-and-advance-digital-
healthcare 
Grundy, Q. (2018). Infiltrating healthcare: How marketing works underground to influence 
nurses. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Gulshan, Varun, Lily Peng, Marc Coram, Martin C. Stumpe, Derek Wu, Arunachalam 
Narayanaswamy, Subhashini Venugopalan, et al. (2016). “Development and 
Validation of a Deep Learning Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in 
Retinal Fundus Photographs.” Journal of the American Medical Association 316(22): 
2402–10. 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical health (HITECH) Act of 2009. H.R.1 
111th Cong. (2009). Retrieved from ProQuest Congressional Database. 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, (1996). Public Law 104-191. Available 
https://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/104/191 
Heidegger, M . Macquarrie, J, Robinson, E (1962) Being and Time New York: Harper & Row. 
Hogle, L.F. (2016). “Data-intensive resourcing in healthcare.” Biosocieties. (11) 372-393. 
Human Rights Watch. (2018). “They want docile”: How nursing homes in the United States 
overmedicate people with dementia. Retrieved March 10, 2020. Available 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/05/they-wantdocile/how-nursing-homes-united-
states-overmedicate-people-dementia 
 132 
Hwang, T. J., Kesselheim, A. S., & Vokinger, K. N. (2019). Lifecycle Regulation of Artificial 
Intelligence–and Machine Learning–Based Software Devices in Medicine. JAMA.  
 
 
Ingraham, C. (2020). “Wealth concentration returning to levels last seen in the great depression.” 
Washington Post. Available https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2019/02/08/wealth-concentration-returning-levels-last-seen-during-roaring-
twenties-according-new-research/ 
Jennings, B. (2013) “Governance in a post-growth society: An inquiry into the democratic 
process.” Minding Nature Vol 6:2.   
Jiang, F., Jiang, Y., Zhi, H., Dong, Y., Li, H., Ma, S., Wang, Y., Dong, Q., Shen, H., Wang, Y. 
(2017). “Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare.” Stroke and Vascular Neurology 2(4): 
230-243. doi: 10.1136/svn-2017-00010 
Kesselheim, A. S., Myers, J. A., & Avorn, J. (2011). Characteristics of clinical trials to support 
approval of orphan vs nonorphan drugs for cancer. Jama, 305(22), 2320-2326. 
Kesselheim, A. & Hwang, T, (2016). “Breakthrough Medical Devices and the 21st Century Cures 
Act.” Annals of Internal Medicine. Accessed February 28, 2017. Available 
http://annals.org/aim/article/2481814/breakthrough-medical-devices-21st-century-
cures-act 
Kindig, D. (2015). “What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Population Health?" 
Health Affairs Blog, DOI: 10.1377/hblog20150406.046151 
 133 
Kinney, E. D. (2018). 21st Century Cures Act and Medical Device Regulation Departure from 
Principles or Catching the Wave. American journal of law & medicine, 44(2-3), 269-
290. 
Kristensen, D. B., & Ruckenstein, M. (2018). Co-evolving with self-tracking technologies. New 
media & society, 20(10), 3624-3640. 
Koenig, B. A., & Gates-Williams, J. (1995). Understanding cultural difference in caring for 
dying patients. Western journal of medicine, 163(3), 244. 
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Landi, H. (2019). “Investors pour $4B into healthcare AI startups in 2019.” Fierce healthcare. 
Available https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/tech/investors-poured-4b-into-
healthcare-ai-startups-2019 
Latour, B. (1990). Postmodern? No, simply amodern! Steps towards an anthropology of 
science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 21(1), 145-171. 
Lee, H.R., Sabanovic, S., Chang, W., Nagata, S., Piatt, J., Bennett, C., Hakkan, D. (2017). “Steps 
toward participatory design of social robots: Mutual learning with older adults with 
depression.” Proceedings of the 2017 ACM/IEEE International Conference on 
Human-Robot Interaction 244-253. 
Letourneau, C. et al., (2016). “21st Century Cures Act: Key Provisions of Interest to Drug/Device 
Clients.” Reed Smith. 
Lupkin, S. (2016). “Legislation that Would Shape FDA and NIH Triggers Lobbying Frenzy.” 
National Public Radio. Available https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
 134 
shots/2016/11/25/503176370/legislation-that-would-shape-fda-and-nih-triggers-
lobbying-frenzy 
Lupton, D. (2015). “Quantified sex: a critical analysis of sexual and reproductive self-tracking 
using apps.” Culture, Health and Sexuality 17: 440-453. 
Lupkin, S. (2016). “Legislation that Would Shape FDA and NIH Triggers Lobbying Frenzy.” 
National Public Radio. Available https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/11/25/503176370/legislation-that-would-shape-fda-and-nih-triggers-
lobbying-frenzy 
Mackenzie, C. (2010). Conceptions of autonomy and conceptions of the body in bioethics. In J. 
L. Scully, L. E. Baldwin-Ragaven, & P. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Feminist bioethics: At the 
center, on the margins (pp. 71–90). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on 
autonomy, agency, and the social self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Mackenzie, C. (2010). Conceptions of autonomy and conceptions of the body in bioethics. In J. 
L. Scully, L. E. Baldwin-Ragaven, & P. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Feminist bioethics: At the 
center, on the margins (pp. 71–90). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Maggs-Rapport, F. (2000). Combining Methodological Approaches in Research: Ethnography 
and Interpretive Phenomenology. Journal of Advanced Nursing 31(1), 219-225. 
Malone, R. E. (2003). Distal nursing. Social Science & Medicine, 56(11), 2317-2326. 
Manson, N. C., O’Neill, O.. 2007. Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press 
 135 
Marshall, M. N. (1996). Sampling for qualitative research. Family practice, 13(6), 522-526. 
Martin, M. (2019). “The Dawn of Digital Therapeutics.” Platypus, the official blog of the 
Committee for the Anthropology of Science, Technology, and Computing 
Martin, M. (Forthcoming). “Implications of the 21st Century Cures Act for Nursing Professions.” 
Policy, Politics, and Nursing Practice. 
Matland, R. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of 
policy implementation. Journal of public administration research and theory, 5(2), 
145-174 
Matthews, M., Abdullah, S., Murnane, E., Voida, S., Choudhury, T., Gay, G., Frank, E. (2016). 
“Development and Evaluation of a Smartphone-Based Measure of Social Rhythms 
for Bipolar Disorder.” Assessment. 23(4): 472-483. 
McCann, C. (2017). “Digital Neurotherapeutics that Heal the Mind.” XTech Day 1 Panel 
Discussion. VIDEO https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NIO4p1g_Hvo 
McGregor, J. (July 2018). “Open Office Plans are as bad as you thought.” Washington Post. 
Available https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/18/open-office-plans-
are-bad-you-thought/ 
Mendoza, R. (2017). The 21st Century Cures Act: pharmacoeconomic boon or bane?” 
Pharmacoeconomics. Retrieved December 15, 2019. Available 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13696998.2017.1282865 
Meyers, D. 1994. Subjection and Subjectivity. New York: Routledge. 
Monnat, S. M., & Rigg, K. K. (2016). Examining rural/urban differences in prescription opioid 
misuse among US adolescents. The Journal of Rural Health, 32(2), 204-218. 
 136 
Moynihan, R., Bero, L., Hill, S., Johansson, M., Lexchin, J., Macdonald, H., ... & Stegenga, J. 
(2019). COMMERCIAL INFLUENCE IN HEALTH: FROM TRANSPARENCY TO 
INDEPENDENCE Pathways to independence: towards producing and using 
trustworthy evidence. 
Natasha Azzopardi-Muscat, Kristine Sørensen, Towards an equitable digital public health era: 
promoting equity through a health literacy perspective, European Journal of Public 
Health, Volume 29, Issue Supplement_3, October 2019, Pages 13–
17, https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckz166 
National Institutes of Health. (2018). All of Us Research Program. Retrieved from 
https://allofus.nih.gov/ 
National Institutes of Health. (2016). “NIH announces $55 million to build million-person 
precision medicine study.” Accessed March 20, 2018. Available: 
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-awards-55-million-build-million-
person-precision-medicine-study 
Novartis Press Release, 2019. “Sandoz and Pear Therapeutics Announce US Launch of reSET-
OTM to Help Treat Opioid Use Disorder.” Retrieved March 10, 2020. Available 
https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/sandoz-and-pear-therapeutics-
announce-us-launch-reset-otm-help-treat-opioid-use-disorder 
O’Neill, O. 2003. “Some Limits of Informed Consent.” Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (1): 4–7. 
Orlando, A. W., & Rosoff, A. J. (2018). Fast-forward to the frightening future: how the 21st 
Century Cures Act accelerates technological innovation… at unknown risk to us 
all. American journal of law & medicine, 44(2-3), 253-268. 
 137 
Ostrom, E., & Ostrom, V. (1977). Public economy organization and service 
delivery. Bloomington. 
Patel, V., Shortliffe, E., Stefanelli, M., et.al (2009). “The Coming Age of Artificial Intelligence 
in Medicine.” Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 46(1) 5-17 
Pattani, A. (2016). “How technology is poised to create a career boom in health care.” CNNB 
Report. Available https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/10/how-technnology-is-poised-to-
create-a-career-boom-in-health-care.html 
Pear Therapeutics. (2017). Company website. Retrieved from https://peartherapeutics.com/ 
Pereira, N., & Weinshilboum, R. (2011). The Impact of Pharmacogenomics on the Management 
of Cardiac Disease. Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 90(4): 493–495. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/clpt.2011.187 
Pew Research Center Mobile Fact Sheet. (2019). Pew Research Center. Retrieved April 5, 2020. 
Available https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ 
Pinel, C. (2020). Renting Valuable Assets: Knowledge and Value Production in Academic 
Science. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 0162243920911974. 
Pollack, A., Miller, A., Mishra, S., Pratt, W. (2016). “PD-atricians: Leveraging Physicians and 
Participatory Design to Develop Novel Clinical Information Tools.” AMIA Annual 
Symposium Proceedings 1030-1039. 
Poon, L. (2020) “There are far more Americans without broadband than previously thought.” 
City Lab. Retrieved March 2, 2020. Available  
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2020/02/internet-access-rural-broadband-digital-
divide-map-fcc-data/606424/ 
Popper, K.R. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. 
 138 
Precision Medicine Initiative. (2015). Description of initiative. Retrieved from 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/333101 
Proteus Digital Health. (2017). Company website. Retrieved from https://www.proteus.com/ 
Prainsack, B. (2018). The “we” in the “me” solidarity and health care in the era of personalized 
medicine. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 43(1), 21-44. 
Prainsack, B. (2020): The political economy of digital data: introduction to the special issue, 
Policy Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2020.1723519 
Reaves, N. D. (2003). A model of effective health policy: the 1983 Orphan Drug Act. Journal of 
health & social policy, 17(4), 61-71. 
Recht, M. P., Dewey, M., Dreyer, K., Langlotz, C., Niessen, W., Prainsack, B., & Smith, J. J. 
(2020). Integrating artificial intelligence into the clinical practice of radiology: 
challenges and recommendations. European Radiology, 1-9. 
Rigg, K. K., Monnat, S. M., & Chavez, M. N. (2018). Opioid-related mortality in rural America: 
geographic heterogeneity and intervention strategies. International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 57, 119-129. 
Rodriguez-Antona, C. & Taron, M. (2014). Pharmacogenomic biomarkers for personalized 
cancer treatment.” Journal of Internal Medicine. 277(2) 201-217. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joim.12321 
Ropes and Gray, (2016). “21st Century Cures Act – Provisions Relating to Medical Device 
Innovation.”  
Ruckenstein, M., & Schüll, N. D. (2017). The datafication of health. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 46, 261-278. 
 139 
Sadler, G. R., Lee, H. C., Lim, R. S. H., & Fullerton, J. (2010). Recruitment of hard‐to‐reach 
population subgroups via adaptations of the snowball sampling strategy. Nursing & 
health sciences, 12(3), 369-374. 
Schwartz, J. L. (2017). Real‐World Evidence, Public Participation, and the FDA. Hastings 
Center Report, 47(6), 7-8. 
Sczabo, E. (2019). “Artificial intelligence is rushing into patient care – and could raise risks.” 
Scientific American. Accessed December 25, 2019. Available 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/artificial-intelligence-is-rushing-into-
patient-care-and-could-raise-risks/ 
Sharon, T. (2016). The Googlization of health research: from disruptive innovation to disruptive 
ethics. Personalized Medicine, 13(6), 563-574. 
Sharon, T. (2018). When digital health meets digital capitalism, how many common goods are at 
stake?. Big Data & Society, 5(2), 2053951718819032. 
Sherwin, S. (1998b). A relational approach to autonomy in health care. In S. Sherwin (Ed.), The 
politics of women’s health: Exploring agency and autonomy (pp. 19–
47). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press 
Shim, J. K. (2010). Cultural health capital: a theoretical approach to understanding health care 
interactions and the dynamics of unequal treatment. Journal of health and social 
behavior, 51(1), 1-15. 
Silberzahn, R., Uhlmann, E. L., Martin, D. P., Anselmi, P., Aust, F., Awtrey, E., ... & Carlsson, 
R. (2018). Many analysts, one data set: Making transparent how variations in analytic 
choices affect results. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological 
Science, 1(3), 337-356. 
 140 
Singer, N. (2018). Take this app and call me in the morning. NY Times, 1-11. 
Stack, R. et al., (2016). “Status and Impact of Evolving Medical Device Venture Capital 
Landscape on Innovation.” Springer International Publishing, The SAGES Manual 
Ethics of Surgical Innovation 
Strauss, Anselm L. 1987. Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. New York, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Stockwell, S. (2018). Report: Nursing Homes Are Overmedicating People with Dementia. AJN 
The American Journal of Nursing, 118(5), 14. 
“Telemedicine’s Tipping Point.”(2020). Rock Health.  Retrieved March 25, 2020. Available 
https://rockhealth.com/rock-weekly/telemedicines-tipping-point/ 
Thompson, D. (2018). “Healthcare just became the U.S.’s Largest employer.” The Atlantic. 
Accessed March 30, 2018. Available: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/health-care-america-
jobs/550079/ 
United Nations Report (2020). “Inequality in a rapidly changing world.” Available 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-
content/uploads/sites/22/2020/01/World-Social-Report-2020-FullReport.pdf 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2017)a. Description of Digital Health. Retrieved from 
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/default.htm 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2017)b. Digital Health Innovation Action Plan. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf 
 141 
Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 
UCSF Catalyst Program Website. 2019. Accessed December 10, 2019. Available 
https://ctsi.ucsf.edu/catalyst. 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (Producer). (2017)c. Digital Health Software 
Precertification (Pre-cert) Pilot Program [Video Webinar]. Retrieved from 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm5687
51.htm 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-user-fee-
programs/medical-device-user-fee-amendments-mdufa 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2019). “Proposed Regulatory Framework for 
Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Based Software 
as a Medical Device.” Retrieved December 15, 2019. Available 
https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/download 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration Website. (July 2019). “Developing a Software 
Precertification Program: A Working Model.” Retrieved December 15, 2019. 
Available  https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download 
U.S. Government. (2017). Health Information Technology Government Description. Retrieved 
from: https://www.healthit.gov/topic/regulations-policy/health-it-legislation 
Uzdavines, M. (2017). Dying for a Solution: The Regulation of Medical Devices Falls Short in 
the 21st Century Cures Act. Nev. LJ, 18, 629. 
Wachter, R. (2015). The Digital Doctor: Hope, Hype, and Harm at the Dawn of Medicine’s 
Computer Age. New York: McGraw Hill Books. 
 142 
Warren, E. Smith, T. and Murray, P. (2019). Letter to U.S. Food and Drug Administration about 
ongoing concerns with FDA Software Precertification Program. Available 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019.10.30%20Letter%20with%20Se
nators%20Murray%20and%20Smith%20to%20FDA%20requesting%20additional%2
0information%20on%20the%20agency's%20software%20pre-
certification%20pilot%20program..pdf 
Wechsler, J. (2017). FDA Moves to Broaden Acceptance of Real-World Evidence in Clinical 
Research. Applied Clinical Trials, 26(9/10), 7-7. 
Wellman-Labadie, O., & Zhou, Y. (2010). The US Orphan Drug Act: rare disease research 
stimulator or commercial opportunity?. Health Policy, 95(2-3), 216-228. 
Were, M. C., Sinha, C., & Catalani, C. (2019). A systematic approach to equity assessment for 
digital health interventions: case example of mobile personal health records. Journal 
of the American Medical Informatics Association, 26(8-9), 884-890. 
Wetrz, J. (2019) “Why Stealth Mode Could be the Best growth Tactic For your Business.” 
Forbes. Available https://www.forbes.com/sites/jiawertz/2019/01/30/stealth-mode-
best-growth-tactic-startup-business/#19afcd291240 
Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2011). The spirit level: Why greater equality makes societies 
stronger. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. 
Zucman, G. (2019). “Global Wealth Inequality” The National Bureau for Economic Research. 
Available https://www.nber.org/papers/w25462 
21st Century Cures Act of 2016. H.R. 34 114th Cong. (2016). Retrieved from ProQuest 
Congressional Database.  
 143 
21st Century Cures: The Future of Product Innovation and Approval (2017). Deloitte. 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/life-sciences-health-
care/us-lshc-the-future-of-product-innovation-and-approval.pdf 
21st Century Cures Act. Public Law 114-255. (2016). Accessed November 27, 2019. PDF 
available https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ255/PLAW-114publ255.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
Appendix 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO 
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
1. What is a digital therapeutic? 
a. If participant mentions more than one, or conflicting definitions: How have you 
heard it being used and by whom? 
 
2. Where did you first learn about Digital Therapeutics? 
a. Where did Digital Therapeutics originate? 
 
3. How did you come to work in [current job role/organization]? 
 
4. How would you characterize your organization’s culture? 
a. Can you tell me a brief story about your company that reveals the culture of your 
company?  
 
5. What do you do to enable the quality of the product you’re working on? 
i. Can you tell me the story of how you made a product decision about 
quality?  
ii. If there was any conflict, how did it play out? 
b. What are the key performance indicators you are using for your product? 
i. Can you tell me the story of how you came to choose these? 
 
6. What are your job responsibilities? 
a. How do you think about regulation in the context of your job responsibilities? 
b. Can you talk with me about some of the things you do related to ethics and 
innovation? 
 
7. Can you tell me anything about “Cultures of Quality and Organizational Excellence?” 
 
8. Have you heard of post-market assessment? 
a. What are your thoughts about what post-market assessment markers should look 
like for this product/for digital therapeutics products in general? 
 
9. Can you please describe for a me one kind of typical day? 
a. If none, talk to me about how you spent your time on a couple of the days of last 
week? 
b. Who do you work with on a day-to-day basis? 
c. How is your company structured (e.g. teams) 
d. How do you work with other people in your company? 
i. Can you tell me the story of how a recent decision was made within your 
company? 
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ii. Once the decision was made, where did the decision get documented? 
1. What software tools supported this process? 
2. How do company employees learn about decisions that are made if 
they do not include them? 
a. (e.g. are there software tools that are used to document 
this?) 
e. What policies exist within your company? 
f. What tools (software or otherwise, do you use on a day-to-day basis?) 
 
Generalized interview questions to ask of all participants: 
1. What does optimal health look like for you? 
2. How would you describe digital therapeutics to someone who didn’t know what it 
was? 
 
Differentiated interview questions by professional area: 
1. Question for investment management 
a. What do you look for in a digital therapeutics company as a potential 
investment? 
 
2. Question for clinical affairs, engineering 
a. How do you know your product is working for patients? 
 
3. Question for Sales/Business Development, executive leadership 
a. What is the most important thing for your company’s success?  
i. How does this thing get measured? 
 
4. Question for regulatory affairs, executive leadership 
a. How do you incorporate FDA guidelines for digital health into your 
company’s decisions? (Can you tell me a story about this)? 
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